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Summary of Thesis
Integration of sound and vision is important for humans to interact 
efficiently with their environment. Co-occurrence of sensory inputs in space and 
time orients attention (Spence & McDonald, 2004), highlights causal relationships 
between events (Blakemore et al. (2001), and enhances representational formation 
from infancy (Jordan et al., 2006).
Dysfunction within the neural mechanisms supporting multisensory processing 
hypothetically has widespread consequences, particularly in terms of social 
interaction as social stimuli are feature-rich and cross-modal. People with autism 
spectrum disorders are diagnosed on the basis of atypical behaviours relating to 
social interaction. Iarocci and McDonald (2006) consider that subjective perceptual 
incoherence in individuals with ASD reflect dysfunctional multisensory processing 
which may be causal to development of autism.
Evidence of superior vision processing in ASD supports the idea that 
enhanced perceptual functioning (EPF) is an important part of the autism phenotype 
(Mottron et al., 2006). Bertone and Faubert (2006) propose that perceptual 
integration within single modalities is compromised, resulting in elevated simple 
stimulus feature processing. Their Signal Integration Theory (SIT) accommodates 
superiorities in autistic task performance that are theoretically related to a cognitive 
preference for detail-processing (Weak Central Coherence theory; Happd & Frith, 
2006).
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In this thesis, a cross-modal phenomenon was selected assessing 
multisensory processing in typical children, adults with autistic traits and children 
with ASD. Processing cross-modal perceptual stimuli (Sekuler et al., 1997) relates 
to perceptual system functioning (Bushara et al., 2003) and is theoretically relevant 
to the development of intuitive physics (Michotte, 1963), a cognitive process spared 
in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, Lawson & Spong, 2001).
Visual disembedding and intuitive physics tasks show gender differences 
(Halpem et al., 2007). Sex differentiation in cognition has led to the Extreme Male 
Brain theory of Autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002), in which autistic ‘traits’ are expressed 
in everyone to some extent; ASD is described as representing extreme male brain 
functioning at one end of a continuum, the other end representing the ‘extreme 
female brain’.
Research using adapted cross-modal perceptual stimuli is presented. This 
evaluates whether cross-modal integration is compromised in relation to autism. 
Gender, autistic trait expression and perception/cognition relationships between 
cross-modal causality and intuitive figures/visual disembedding are also researched 
to determine whether ASD might, in future, be remodelled in terms of extreme male 
perceptual development.
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Chapter 1: Cognition, Perception and Perceptual Integration in Autism
Spectrum Disorder
1.1 Overview
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder primarily related to atypical 
social and communication behaviours. Since its original description by Kanner 
(1943), the diagnostic definition of autism has been widened to reflect a triad of 
behaviours (Wing, 1981): Disruption of social relationships; difficulties with 
communication, and a restricted range of behaviours (either in terms of personal 
interests, or demonstrable lack of imagination, or in relation to repetitive 
stereotypical movements). This triad has been incorporated into diagnostic criteria 
to describe a wide range of related conditions, and the umbrella term Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder is now used to represent individuals who show considerable 
heterogeneity in abilities, intellectual range and behaviours. Further, a ‘special case’ 
has been made of a related syndrome Asperger Syndrome (or AS), a high- 
functioning form of autism in which individuals have normal or above normal 
intelligence with no speech development delay. Debate continues as to whether 
defining AS as an autism spectrum disorder is valid, however.
Sensory and perceptual abnormalities are manifest in many individuals with 
ASD (O’Neill & Jones, 1997), but are described as peripheral symptoms, rather than 
core indicators of the conditions (DSM-IV; APA, 1994)1. The marginalisation of 
highly prevalent sensory issues reflects the fact that, at the psychological level, 
autism has been regarded as the product of a ‘core cognitive deficit’ (Frith, 
1996).Three such unitary accounts proposed to explain the behavioural autistic
1 Although they were included in core diagnostic criteria in DSM-III (1980)
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phenotype are Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), Weak Central 
Coherence (Frith & Happe, 1994) and Executive Dysfunction (Ozonoff, Pennington 
& Rogers, 1991) theories. Empirical evidence in support of each of these theories 
has mainly been interpreted in terms of cognitive rather than perceptual functioning. 
However, in neuroconstructivist terms, it is thought that early compromises in 
perceptual processing may generate atypical brain maturation (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998), and so both sensory and perceptual differences may contribute to emergence 
of autistic cognition that each unitary theory describes.
The idea that perceptual development may have causal significance in ASD 
is supported by many recent advances in understanding the nature of perceptual 
processing in autism (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack, 2006). The 
majority of studies reporting significant effects on perceptual tasks between ASD 
and control groups have been unimodal, predominantly investigating visual task 
performance and thresholds (for a review, see Dakin & Frith, 2006). A growing 
body of evidence of atypical audition has also been reported (e.g., Jarvinen-Pasley 
& Heaton, 2007; Bonnel et al., 2003). However, little research has been published in 
relation to cross-modal integration failure, or to multisensory processing in general.
Given that the typical developmental characteristics of autism include 
difficulties in speech and emotional comprehension acquisition, this area must be 
considered of research interest (Iarocci & McDonald, 2006). Both of these socio- 
cognitive functions involve a high degree of audio-visual integration, and putatively 
require active interaction with the social environment from birth in order to emerge 
successfully in the developing mind. Therefore, ASD may ultimately be redefined to
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acknowledge perceptual development as being fundamental to both diagnostic 
models and individual outcomes.
The argument investigated in this thesis is, therefore, that the ASD 
phenotype is associated with weaknesses in perceptual (audio-visual) integration. A 
series of studies is presented here exploring one particular aspect of perceptual 
integration, cross-modal perceptual causality (Guski & Troje, 2003; Sekuler,
Sekuler & Lau, 1997). This is a phenomenon in which presentation of an auditory 
signal influences interpretation of a dynamic visual event, such that one disk passing 
over a second disk onscreen is perceived as one disk launching the second. The 
visual information provided is ambiguous, and the event is generally interpreted as 
non-causal in the absence of the auditory signal. Hence, integration of the auditory 
and visual information serves to generate the impression of cause-and-effect. Recent 
evaluation of the neural systems involved in producing cross-modal perceptual 
causality suggests that the phenomenon is predominantly the result of perceptual, 
rather than attentional or cognitive, processing (Bushara, Hanakawa, Immisch, 
Toma, Kansaku & Hallett, 2003).
Cross-modal perceptual causality therefore provides a means of 
investigating audio-visual integration at the perceptual level. This thesis presents a 
series of studies in which novel adaptations of the original audio-visual causality 
paradigm (Sekuler, Sekuler & Lau, 1997) are used to measure sensitivity to cross- 
modal causal perception phenomena in typical children, adults with several autistic 
traits and children with ASD. The primary aims of the thesis are to establish 
whether or not evidence exists for compromised perceptual integration in ASD, and
3
whether any such compromise may have relevance to the emergence of two aspects 
of cognition that have previously been associated with autism, namely intuitive 
physics and central coherence.
The key study in Chapter 2 (Experiment 3) with typically developing 
children demonstrates that the novel cross-modal perceptual causality task is 
sensitive to factors such as age and gender. This chapter also introduces a new 
intuitive physics task that is shown to measure intuitive physics abilities across a 
wide age range. The chapter concludes with an examination of the inter­
relationships between age, perception and cognition using these two new tasks.
Autism is highly heritable (Beaudet, 2007), and many relatives of probands 
exhibit autistic-like behaviours but with reduced severity (Bailey, Palferman, 
Heavey & Le Couter, 1998). The contemporary idea of autism is not as a category 
of ‘otherness’, but as representing the extreme end of a continuum along an autistic 
dimension that is normally distributed across the general population (Baron-Cohen, 
2008a). If cross-modal perceptual integration is compromised in ASD, evidence of 
this should be apparent in individuals with a relatively high number of ‘autistic 
traits’. In Chapter 3, aspects of cross-modal perceptual causality in young adults 
self-reporting several such traits is examined (Experiments 4 and 5).
Baron-Cohen (2002) has reconceptualised ASD as representing ‘extreme 
male brain’ function, based on converging evidence of inter-relationships between 
science ability, the male cognitive phenotype and autism. Baron-Cohen et al. (2006) 
states that autistic processing over-relies on ‘systemising’ (a masculine style of
4
thinking) at the extent of ‘empathising’( a predominant factor in feminine 
cognition). Systemising is purportedly the basis for physics ability; Chapter 3 
therefore includes an experiment in which associations between the broader 
phenotype, cross-modal integration and intuitive physics advantage is tested 
(Experiment 4).
Systemising is related in some respects to contemporary weak coherence 
theory (Happd & Booth, 2008), which characterises autistic cognition as a bias 
towards processing local detail over global form. In Experiment 5, superiority on a 
task in which piecemeal processing is an advantage, the Embedded Figures Task 
(EFT), is hypothesised to be associated with relatively high expression of autistic 
traits. Given evidence that visual search is associated with EFT performance in 
children with autism (Jarrold, Gilchrist & Bender, 2005), relationships between 
perceptual integration, EFT measures and autistic trait expression are also assessed 
in this study.
Gender influences both intuitive physics and EFT performance, in that males 
generally outperform females on these tasks. Correlations between perception and 
cognition are therefore also reported by gender subgroup in both experiments in 
Chapter 3, and findings discussed in the context of Extreme Male Brain theory 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002).
The hypothesised relationship between disrupted cross-modal integration 
and ASD is the basis of Chapter 4. In Experiment 6, cross-modal perceptual 
causality sensitivity is evaluated in children with ASD. As evidence of perceptual
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differences between autism and Asperger Syndrome has been reported with respect 
to emotional stimuli (Mazefsky & Oswald, 2006), it is important to assess whether 
findings reported in Experiment 6 are influenced by conflation of the two stimuli. 
The final analysis provided therefore contrasts data from diagnostic subgroups 
derived from Experiment 6a.
1.2 History of diagnosis of ASD, and its impact on empirical research.
The seminal account of autism was provided by Kanner (1943), in which he 
stated that the eleven boys he observed showed an “inability to relate themselves in 
the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning o f life." This sentence 
describes autism as fundamentally a social behaviour disorder that is present from 
birth. Independently of Kanner, Asperger (1944) also emphasised social disruption 
in his patients, listing a lack of empathy, little ability to form friendships, and one­
sided conversation as characteristics of "autistic psychopathy’. The social 
dysfunction he described therefore strongly suggests that his syndrome is associated 
with Kanner’s "early infantile autism’ (Wing, 1981).
Originally the definition of autism was unclear. Describing the regressive, 
withdrawn state associated with childhood schizophrenia as autistic (Bleuler, 1951) 
masked the different developmental paths of these disorders (Tidmarsh & Volkmar, 
2003). Also, psychiatric interpretation of autism as the result of disrupted mother- 
child relationships (Bettelheim, 1967) denied its genetic nature. Autism was 
therefore not clearly recognised as a distinct disorder until Wing and Gould (1979) 
produced a classification system that clearly delineated the condition from mental
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retardation with social dysfunction. They proposed that diagnostic confusion over 
the core features of autism could be reduced by focusing on a triad of social 
impairments: An abnormality of reciprocal social interaction; closely associated 
with impairment of communication, and constrained imagination, with the latter 
resulting in a narrow, repetitive pattern of activities.
In a meta-analysis of prevalence studies undertaken in diverse countries, 
Wing (1993) later found that the triad clearly described every case included in each 
report, irrespective of multiple classification systems and sub-types devised by 
research groups. She also concluded that inclusion or exclusion of general 
intellectual functioning as an autism criterion influenced rates found in the reviewed 
studies. Wing (1993) therefore extended the triadic definition of autism to include a 
wider range of children that was independent of intellectual ability, and the term 
‘autism spectrum’ was introduced.
The spectrum now comprises Autistic Disorder plus a subset of related 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders (Asperger Disorder/Asperger Syndrome, Rett’s 
Disorder and Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified ,or PDD-NOS), all of which have separate 
classification criteria under DSM-IV-R. Autistic Disorder is characterised by 
impairments in all three domains apparent before three years of age. Asperger 
Syndrome (AS) is qualitatively characterized by more subtle atypicalities in social 
reciprocity and restricted repetitive and stereotyped behaviour relating to a narrow 
range of interests and activities, despite apparently normal language and cognitive 
development prior to three years. The generic term PDD-NOS describes people who
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meet autism (but not AS) criteria outside of the normal age range, or who show 
severe challenges in some but not all domains with/without cognitive or language 
delay (Freitag, 2007). The term autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is now 
synonymous with any or all of these conditions.
The description of ASD at the behavioural level in terms of the triad 
generated a bias within empirical research towards examination of its cognitive 
origins, as social functioning relies on complex representational processing. 
Although fruitful in many respects, this emphasis on cognition as the foundation of 
the autistic phenotype has led to the marginalisation of other factors, such as 
perception and attention, that may also be important to ‘understanding the enigma’ 
(as Uta Frith described autism to be; Frith, 1996). Furthermore, the search for a 
single cognitive process to account for the every autistic behaviour has reduced 
emphasis on developmental aspects of the condition; the implication within some 
theories being that the systems supporting candidate cognitive processes are absent 
from birth, rather than fail to emerge as a consequence of developmental 
constraints.
As there is evidence of perceptual, sensory and multisensory dysfunction in 
ASD (section 1.3 below), compromised perceptual integration may have a 
fundamental role to play in explaining ASD within a developmental context. 
However, as not much is currently understood about multisensory processing in 
autism, first it is important to determine whether any evidence exists that integration 
is abnormal at the perceptual level in autism and related conditions. The purpose of
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this thesis is therefore to explore cross-modal perceptual integration, which, it is 
argued, is potentially important for multiple aspects of cognitive development.
1 3  Cognitive accounts of ASD: the search for a unitary cause
The search for a single cognitive account of autism has produced some 
highly cogent theories, the most influential being: Weak central coherence (WCC; 
Frith & Happd, 1994), atypical development of Theory of Mind (and 
‘mindblindness’; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), and executive dysfunction 
(Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). It is important to note that none of these 
single cognitive explanations has provided a true unitary account of autism, as no 
one theory describes all diagnosed individuals’ cognitive abilities or social 
behaviours, or can account for all components of the autistic behavioural triad 
(Happd, Ronald & Plomin, 2006).
Consideration of the impact of atypical perception on cognitive processing is 
putatively more relevant to weak central coherence theory. For instance, an 
important test of weak central coherence (the Embedded Figures Task) has been 
shown, using fMRI techniques, to be dependent on enhanced right primary visual 
cortex functioning in individuals with AS, whereas controls were shown to have 
high activation in left parietal regions (Manjaly et al., 2007). Therefore, although all 
three cognitive theories of autism are described below, most attention is directed 
towards weak central coherence in this section.
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1.3.1 Weak Central Coherence Theory
Kanner (1943) originally noted that his autistic children were obsessed with 
preservation of sameness due to, he thought, inability to experience global form 
independent of attention to constituent parts. Frith (2003) states that “In the normal 
cognitive system there is a built-in propensity to form coherence over as wide a 
range of stimuli as possible, and to generalize over as wide a range of contexts as 
possible” (page 159). In the weak central coherence (WCC) theory of autism, 
individuals with ASD are said to have a core deficit in such centralised information 
processing, with subsequent failure to comprehend the global meaning or form of a 
stimulus (Frith & Happ£, 1994). This deficit is associated with preferential 
processing of the local meaning/form/detail within the stimulus.
Kanner (1943) related detail-processing to restricted interests and insistence 
on repetition and patterns. Frith and Happe (1994) argued that weak central 
coherence also provides an explanation of the superiorities as well as deficits 
exhibited by many individuals with ASD. For instance, the Block Design Test (see 
Figure 1.1) has been found to be performed faster by children with ASD than by 
their peers (Shah & Frith, 1993). The cognitive explanation for this effect is that 
these participants could match the blocks to details in the pattern without the 
impediment of perceiving its overall form. This interpretation was corroborated by 
their finding that pre-segmentation of the block pattern significantly aided task 
speed in their control children.
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Figure 1.1: Block design task element and target pattern (from Shah & Frith, 1993)
Conversely, context-dependent task performance is compromised in ASD. In 
the homograph test, a word with two pronunciations and meanings but one 
orthographic form can only be read out loud correctly if the overall sentence context 
is comprehended. Children with autism reading a sentence using the word ‘tear’ 
were found not to know whether it referred to a rip or to crying, although the 
semantic context provided should have resolved this ambiguity (Frith & Snowling, 
1998).
Happe (1997) considered whether error rates in autism on homograph tests 
were reduced by supplying context information early in the ambiguous sentences. 
She found that her autistic group failed to benefit from the disambiguating effect of 
providing the context clause first for infrequently used homograph trials. As the 
control children did benefit from this ‘homograph-after’ sentence structure, she 
concluded that the target children could not use preceding context to alter 
homophone choice, therefore they displayed a preference for processing words over 
sentences. Similarly children with autism will use ‘local’ semantic associations to 
complete a sentence in a way that fails to make sense, rather than use a word that
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satisfies its global requirement for meaning (for instance, completion of “the sea is 
full of salt and ....” with “pepper”, not fish; Happe & Frith , 2006).
Weak central coherence is described as being cognitive in nature because 
context-based tasks suggest that detail-processing bias in autism does not simply 
apply to visual stimuli tasks. Rather, WCC is considered to be domain-general, 
hence superior performance of the block design test has been interpreted to reflect 
cognitive processing.
A major concern regarding Weak Central Coherence theory
Weak central theory is challenged by findings that global processing is not 
invariably absent in ASD. Several studies (Mottron, Burack, Stauder & Robaey, 
1999; Mottron, Burack, Iarocci, Belleville & Enns, 2003) demonstrate that 
individuals with autism have access to global representations, and can respond to 
stimuli at a global level if directed to do so explicitly. Mottron et al. (2003) 
contrasted responses of adolescents with high-functioning autism (HFA) with those 
of matched controls across a series of tasks using hierarchical stimuli comprising 
local and global letter forms. Their study showed that the target and control groups 
produced similar response times on configural grouping tasks (in which intact and 
visually-degraded letters had to be identified) and in hierarchical tasks. However, 
the adolescents with HFA showed no time cost in identifying letters embedded in a 
global word form in a disembedding task, whereas the control participants found 
this condition more challenging than when the target letters were presented in
12
isolation. Therefore the ASD group here displayed piecemeal processing superiority 
alongside intact global representation capacities.
The findings reported by Mottron et al. (2003) suggest possible limitations 
to the WCC theory, as global and local processing were framed originally as being 
oppositional. It would appear that global representations do not impede rapid 
processing of local-level information. Evidence of intact global processing has 
resulted in weak central coherence being redefined as a cognitive style, in which 
detail processing is substituted for global representational cognition as the default 
system (Happ£ & Frith, 2006). This suggestion implies that performance on tests of 
weak coherence may reflect recruitment of different strategies, and alternative 
dominant brain pathways, in autism.
Is weak central coherence actually weak perceptual coherence?
Another established test of WCC theory is the Embedded Figures Task 
(Witkin, Ottman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). Shah and Frith (1983) demonstrated that 
children with autism were better able than controls to recognise a simple shape 
camouflaged (or ‘embedded’) within a more complex illustration (Figure 1.2). 
Superior ‘visual disembedding’, i.e. better accuracy and reduced response times, has 
been repeatedly found in relation to ASD (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Morgan, 
Mayberry & Durkin, 2003; Shah & Frith, 1993; Van Lang, Bouma, Sytema, Kraijer 
& Minderaa, 2005).
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Figure 1.2: Example stimulus from Embedded Figures Task (from Witkins et al., 
1971).
However, the EFT can be solved using different strategies. Each of the 
distinct information types provided by a complex form (such as colour, or edge) is 
processed both independently and within integrative signalling in the visual system. 
The EFT puzzles therefore can be solved using a single visual dimension. Strong 
perceptual integration of the multiple features of the complex form would impede 
recognition of the target. Cognitive coherence weakened by poor feature integration 
at the perceptual level would, conversely, produce EFT superiority. Combined with 
concomitant enhanced feature processing, the edge outline of the target would 
therefore be relatively more salient than the product of visual integration in 
individuals with weak perceptual coherence.
Perceptual factors in EFT performance have been explored by Jarrold, 
Gilchrist and Bender (2005), who compared responses of children with and without 
autism on two versions of a search task, and correlated results to performance of the 
children’s embedded Figures task (CEFT; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). 
The first, a feature search task, directed participants to identify an element within an 
array according to a unique perceptual feature. This task is thought to involve 
generating a map of the single dimension’s distribution across the scene. In the
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second conjunction search task, two visual features (colour and shape) defined a 
single element amongst an array of items that shared either colour or shape with this 
target. Searching involves the application of visual attention to each element in turn 
to detect the unique feature combination. Feature search can be fast and efficient, 
unaffected by number of display elements, but conjunction search is affected by the 
number of elements present.
The study by Jarrold et al. (2005) showed that the autism group out­
performed the ability-matched controls across all tasks. It also produced evidence of 
a double dissociation apparent between groups when response times for each search 
task were correlated with CEFT response speed. Data from children with autism 
produced a positive correlation between feature search efficiency and CEFT 
rapidity; control children showed a positive relationship between CEFT and 
conjunction search speeds. The conclusion drawn by Jarrold et al. (2005) was that 
the resources recruited in response to CEFT stimuli differ between the two groups. 
Autistic individuals faster at single feature search were also faster at identifying the 
target in the EFT trials. For the control group, however, ability at the individual 
level to cohere non-target distractors together to identify the target was related to 
EFT speed, suggesting that EFT performance involved formation of higher-order 
integrated representations for these children.
This perception/cognition relationship study (Jarrold et al., 2005) requires 
replication with older participants; the age disparity between IQ-matched groups 
created by including low-functioning children with autism being unacceptably large. 
Also, no mention is made as to whether the target and control children were gender-
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matched (as the two sexes differ on EFT performance; Witkin, 1950). However, this 
research successfully raises the challenge that rapid embedded figure detection 
recruits different processes in ASD and typically developing (TD) children, a 
conclusion supported by evidence from fMRI studies in which individuals with 
ASD have been shown to have atypical brain activation patterns in response to EFT 
stimuli. Lee et al. (2007) found generally reduced cortical activation in children 
with autism, and concluded that EFT resolution was achieved parsimoniously by the 
autistic brain. Ring et al. (1999) detected the involvement of regions associated with 
lower-level perceptual processing in response to EFT stimuli in an ASD group, but 
not in the controls, and Manjalay et al. (2007) have reported that adolescents with 
AS/HFA show high right V 1 activation in response to EFT stimuli.
Findings of perceptual system involvement on EFT task performance argues 
against disrupted cognitive coherence as the process underpinning autistic abilities 
and behaviours across multiple domains. Furthermore, enhanced visual feature 
processing may develop in ASD at the cost of perceptual integration, in which case 
it should be possible to find an inverse relationship between sensitivity to cross- 
modal phenomena and EFT performance. This idea is explored by relating EFT 
measures to cross-modal perceptual causality scores in students with high 
expression of autistic traits (Experiment 5).
1.3.2 Theory of Mind and ‘Mindblindness’ Theory
An alternative cognitive account of ASD is that the autistic child fails to 
develop a Theory of Mind’, or the ability to process information regarding another
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person’s thoughts, feelings and knowledge (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). 
Individuals with ASD are thought not to “impute mental states to themselves and 
others’’ (Premack & Woodroof, 1978, p. 515), and consequently are not aware that 
the contents of another mind are different from their own. Being unable to 
understand the ways in which another person’s thinking differs from your own 
makes social behaviour unpredictable; many people with ASD find others 
incomprehensible as a result of such ‘mindblindness’ (Baron-Cohen, 1995). This 
difficulty relates purely to the social world, and is therefore domain-specific, 
allowing for evidence that cognitive processing in other domains (physical 
cognition, for instance) is intact or, indeed, superior in relation to ASD.
Robust evidence that individuals with autism lack a ‘theory of mind’ exists. 
For instance, in the Sally-Anne ‘false-belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) a doll 
(Anne) is shown to hide something belonging to another doll (Sally) in her absence, 
so that the object is not where Sally put it before leaving. When asked to predict 
where Sally will search for the item on her return, children of four years have shown 
that they know Sally will look in the area where she left it (Wimmer & Pemer, 
1983). The ability to distinguish between the doll’s belief and reality suggests these 
children could process knowledge at a metarepresentational level (i.e., I think she 
believes....).Children with autism, however, do not appear able to make this 
judgement, and instead have been shown to think Sally will go to the new location, 
unlike control children matched for age or general IQ (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985); they are thought therefore not to comprehend that Sally has a ‘false belief, 
suggesting that they think she knows what they know.
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In their original paper, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) reported that 
16 out of 20 children with autism failed to attribute a false belief to the Sally doll on 
this task. As Bloom and German (2000) state, though, a child may fail the task for 
reasons of attentional (failure to follow the two-character narrative fully), perceptual 
(failure to see that Sally had not seen the switch event), memory (first location of 
the object) or linguistic (confusion between where the doll will look with where the 
doll should look) constraints.
Also, assessing performance of second order theory of mind tasks by adults 
with Asperger Syndrome (Bowler, 1992) has revealed that processing chains of 
belief such as ‘I think that she thinks that he knows.. .’ was possible for the majority 
of participants (73%). Colvert, Custance and Swettenham (2002) found a correlation 
between embedded reasoning skills and false belief task performance in a group of 
high-functioning individuals with ASD, implying that any ‘default’ innate ability to 
form metarepresentational beliefs about the contents of others’ minds (Leslie, 2004) 
may be substituted by logical analysis. Use of logic could therefore account for 
performance on both first-and second-order belief tasks by both adults with 
Asperger Syndrome and children with autism in the earlier studies.
The Theory of Mind theory has therefore been undermined as the causal 
explanation of social domain behaviours in ASD as, if an abstract 
metarepresentational cognitive process (logic) can substitute for ‘natural’ theory of 
mind cognition, then it may be that this form of cognition is less reliant on 
metarepresentations and more reliant on input from downstream 
perceptual/attentional processes.
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Mindblindness, however, is a wider concept, extending beyond false-belief 
processing. It incorporates many other autistic behaviours, such as literal, non- 
imaginative rule-based play in children (Boyd, Conroy, Mancil, Nakao & Alter, 
2007), and the tendency of individuals with ASD not to pay attention to what is 
salient to someone else (children with ASD show reduced joint attention from an 
early age; Naber et al., 2007).
Tests of mindblindness relating to emotion (e.g., the ‘Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes’ task; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) reveal that 
emotional comprehension is challenged in adults with HFA/AS. This finding relates 
to reduced accuracy of recognition of subtle emotional expressions from eye region 
information in ASD, which implies that visual emotional representation is poor.
This interpretation, however, provides no explanation as to why emotional 
representational function is deficient in ASD.
As emotion in everyday social interaction is communicated by a complex set 
of auditory and visual information, it is reasonable to suggest that perceptual 
integration of multiple signals is a pre-requisite for the formation of accurate 
emotional representations. Support for this idea is provided by the finding that 
adults with ASD are inferior to controls when reading emotion from dynamic faces, 
but that they display the same drop in performance as controls when the eye 
information in these displays is frozen (Back, Ropar & Mitchell, 2007). This finding 
suggests that dynamic eye information is of equal importance in online emotional 
comprehension in people with ASD as it is in others; hence an alternative 
explanation is required for reduced emotional recognition in autism, and one
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possibility is that emotion template representations are not easily formed because 
cross-modal signal integration is weak.
To summarise, within the social domain it would appear that the autistic 
phenotype should be considered not as one social processing deficit, but of several 
system and subsystem atypicalities at both high and low levels of processing. A 
developmental account is required to consider how early difficulties between co­
operative processes recruited by social stimuli might interact to produce escalating 
problems in the emerging autistic mind. The studies in this thesis therefore 
investigate a putative link between autism and compromised cross-modal perceptual 
integration (Experiments 4, 5 and 6).
1.3.3 Executive Dysfunction
Of all the unitary cognitive theories of autism, Executive Function (EF) is 
perhaps the most difficult to relate directly to the heterogeneity of behaviours 
associated with autism spectrum conditions. Executive Function has myriad 
definitions, and has been argued by some simply to be a term that reflects problem­
solving behaviours which depend on many domain-general executive processes 
(Zelazo, Carter, Reznick & Frye, 1997). Hence, Hill (2004a) describes EF as an 
umbrella term encompassing general processes such as planning, inhibition and 
mental flexibility, all of which are required for goal-directed behaviour. With such a 
broad definition, it is unsurprising that the neural locus for EF cannot be constrained 
to specific regions, but it is thought instead to relate generally to frontal lobe 
function.
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With respect to autism, Executive Dysfunction is the unitary account that has 
been most closely associated with repetitive behaviours and restricted interests. 
However, in a review of extant research, Hill (2004b) stated that the nature and 
specificity of the relationship of EF with autism is unclear; results of many studies 
using biomarker EF tasks are inconsistent, and poor EF has also been associated 
with other developmental conditions such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (and the prevalence of ADHD comorbidity is high in ASD).
Assessment of planning ability has produced evidence that children and 
adolescents with autism show long-term impairments. For instance, the Tower of 
Hanoi task involves identifying and executing the shortest chain of moves needed to 
transfer three disks across three pegs, one at a time, to match a target pattern. 
Children with autism experience more difficulty with this task than do children with 
dyslexia, ADHD and Tourette’s syndrome when matched on intellectual ability 
(Hill, 2004a). The deficit does not improve with age, and is present whether or not 
the participants have normal levels of intelligence. However, although all of the 
group means in these studies were within the normal intelligence range, the spread 
of abilities in the ASD groups mean that the results may reflect poor functioning in 
only those target individuals with below average IQ levels, rather than representing 
impairment across the entire ASD sample in this study.
Autism has also been studied with respect to inhibitory control, where a 
prepotent over-trained response has to be suppressed in favour of execution of a less 
established behaviour. With the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935), the ability to suppress 
interference from a dominant modality whilst processing information from another
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modality is tested. For instance, stating the colour of the word red when it is written 
green assesses the ability to process visual information whilst suppressing semantic 
meaning. Many variants of the colour/word Stroop task have been used to 
investigate inhibitory control in ASD, but overall results indicate that people with 
ASD do not have reduced ability to inhibit irrelevant information, as children and 
adolescents with autism show levels of dominant information interference 
equivalent to typically developing controls (Eskes, Bryson & McCormick, 1990; 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). When autism is compared with ADHD, however, this 
latter condition has been found to be associated with exaggerated interference 
(Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), which suggests that these two development conditions 
differ in that inhibitory control is preserved in ASD.
Mental flexibility has also been found to be restricted in ASD. In the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), participants have to sort cards according to 
an unknown category rule based on one card feature such as shape, or colour. 
Participants determine the rule through the feedback given after each card 
categorised. At random intervals, the rule is changed, which participants discover by 
being told that their last card was wrongly sorted. Autism is associated with 
perseveration errors on this task; participants with ASD continue to sort cards 
according to a prior rule after being given more feedback that the rule has changed 
than is needed by control participants. Perseveration errors are significantly more 
numerous in autism, whether comparisons are made between ASD and typical 
development, dyslexia or ADHD (Liss et al., 2001; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Ozonoff et al., 1991). Also deficits during childhood were found to be maintained 
into adolescence in ASD (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Problems in WCST
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perseveration in ASD have been related to repetitive behaviours, although WCST 
errors do not predict the severity of such symptoms at the individual level (Hill, 
2004b).
It is hard, given the disparate cognitive processes recruited by the three tasks 
described above, to identify the neural candidates for those aspects of executive 
function that are impaired in autism, but the deficits indicated by the Tower of 
Hanoi task and the WCST identify in goal-directed behaviours have been related to 
failure of the frontal lobes to connect to other brain regions during maturation in 
children with ASD (Zilbovicius et al., 1995). Such neuro-anatomical disconnectivity 
during brain maturation provides the framework for a developmental model of 
executive dysfunction, and it is possible that restricted feed-forward signalling at an 
early age from the perceptual system may contribute to failure of the pre-frontal 
cortex to develop typically. However, compromised cross-modal perceptual 
integration can only be conceived of as one of myriad possible contributory 
components that could be implied in such a disrupted maturational process. 
Therefore, this thesis does not include any tests of relationships between cross- 
modal perceptual causality and executive cognitive function, as any hypothesis 
generated would have little specificity.
1.3.4 Universality is not attainable at the cognitive level
The conclusion to be drawn from the review of the three main theories of 
autism presented here is that, as no cognitive account describes all behavioural 
features of autism, none sufficiently explains autism and its associated spectrum of
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conditions. Rather, they each describe aspects of cognition which may, in turn, be 
the consequences of autistic genotype expression across the course of brain 
development.
Happd, Ronald and Plomin (2006) have stated that evidence of fractionation 
within the diagnostic behavioural triad, and the independent relationships observed 
between each characteristic behaviour and contributing genetic factors, are 
indicative of the need to segregate lines of enquiry so that each triadic aspect is 
independently investigated. Furthermore, Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin and Maley 
(2006) have presented evidence that theory of mind, central coherence and 
executive function deficits appear unrelated to each other at the individual level, 
once age and verbal/nonverbal abilities have been controlled, adding weight to the 
suggestion that a ‘multiple deficit account’ of ASD is required.
No cognitive account includes a comprehensive development model to 
explain failure of its proposed deficit to emerge, instead presenting its deficit as 
static across time. A ‘dynamic and developmental’ model has been called for by 
researchers such as Rajendran and Mitchell (2007), one which provides a 
neurodevelopmental account of autism in line. This proposal chimes with the 
neuroconstructivist perspective of Karmiloff-Smith (2007).
Perceptual development is one factor that may be of great importance to the 
maturation of the brain; perceptual abnormalities across several sensory modalities 
have recently been reported in relation to ASD (section 1.4), and evidence exists 
that sensory deprivation severely affects brain development, particularly with
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respect to neural region differentiation. In this thesis therefore, cognition is 
considered in terms of perceptual development and function. In particular, in 
Chapter 2 the focus is on a form of perceptual integration (cross-modal perceptual 
causality) that is hypothetically related to a specific cognitive function found to be 
superior in autism (intuitive physics). Consideration of developmental and 
individual effects in relationships between these two very different processes is an 
attempt to understand whether perceptual and cognitive development are yoked 
together.
Perception/cognition relationships are also examined in Chapter 3.
Extending the proposal by Jarrold et al. (2005) that EFT performance in ASD is the 
product of superior visual processing of single features, weak central coherence is 
re-examined in relation to atypical perceptual integration processing in Experiment 
5. Support for the ‘weak perceptual coherence’ hypothesis would provide impetus to 
the call for longitudinal examination of perceptual function on individual outcomes 
in autism.
1.4 The Perceptual Phenotype of ASD
To suggest that perceptual processing is of fundamental importance to the 
emergence of the autistic mind inherently reframes the cognitive phenotype of 
autism as an outcome of development, rather than the cause of the condition. That is 
not to say that behaviour and cognitive abilities are independent of each other in 
ASD, but rather that the limits of cognitive processing are developmentally 
determined by perceptual functioning and attentional training from an early age.
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Research interest directed at sensory behaviours and perceptual processing is 
beginning to converge; the consensus is that sensory sensitivities are generally 
abnormal for individuals with ASD, that these are associated with atypical 
perceptual processes, and that both may be linked to the general autistic phenotype 
and symptom severity at the individual level.
1.4.1 Sensory and Multisensory Processing in ASD
Sensory Imbalance
A recent review of biographical, anecdotal and empirical literature on 
sensory behaviours (Iarocci & McDonald, 2006) concludes that, potentially, an 
unique sensory profile of autism might differentiate the condition from other 
developmental disorders. The authors estimate the prevalence of abnormal sensory 
thresholds among persons with autism to be between 30% and 100%, and draw 
attention to the fact that parents frequently report noticing atypical sensory 
behaviours at an early stage of life. Indeed, anecdotal and autobiographical evidence 
of the association between sensory processing and autism conditions has existed 
since their original identification. Kanner (1943) found that many of his cohort 
showed hypersensitivity to sound, although they were unresponsive to social 
approaches made by their parents.
Sensory behaviours are not included in DSM-IV-R diagnostic criteria and 
are only described as associated symptoms within ICD-10 (Bogdashina, 2003). This 
exclusion of sensory responsiveness and behaviours from diagnosis means that they
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have been largely disregarded in past empirical ASD research, although these 
factors remain an important part of diagnostic assessment tools (Tadevosyan-Leyfer 
et al., 2003). Occupational therapists have stated for some time that many children 
with autism display ‘sensory dysfunction’ and/or have sensory integration issues. 
Also, many individuals with high-functioning autism or AS have described their 
sensory experiences (e.g., Grandin, 1992; Williams, 1994) although such accounts 
cannot be generalised across all individuals with ASD.
Research analysing questionnaire responses has indicated high prevalence of 
unusual sensory responsivity in early life in association with autism (Dahlgren & 
Gillberg, 1989; Gillberg et al., 1990). Early empirical investigation attempted to 
produce a definitive autistic sensory profile, but encountered difficulties as 
considerable heterogeneity in hypo- and hyper-sensitivities have been between 
individuals (e.g., Omitz, 1989). Sensory dysfunction in general was found to relate 
to symptom sensitivity, however (Dawson, 1983). For a review of these studies, see 
O’Neill and Jones (1997).
In a more recent study by Kern et al. (2007), data from 103 individuals with 
ASD aged between 3 and 56 years old was collected using the Sensory Profile 
(Dunn, 1999). Across 125 items provided by the scale, high threshold items 
measured obliviousness to stimuli and low items measured sensitivity to stimuli. 
High and low sensory threshold scores were obtained by parental or teacher report 
of typical response to frequent environmental stimuli.
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The conclusion that Kern et al. (2007) reached was that a general sensory 
impairment was present in most individuals with autism. More specifically, high 
(obliviousness) threshold scores for audition and vision were significantly related to 
symptom severity, but in opposing ways. It was found that, at the individual level, 
the greater obliviousness to auditory stimuli, the more severe the behavioural 
symptomatology in the target group. Conversely, symptoms worsened as visual 
over-responsivity increased. A reason for this dissociation between the two 
modalities was not given, although the authors provide a caveat that a distinction 
between observing social versus object stimuli is not made in the symptom 
assessment tool used, and so the positive correlation between visual function and 
symptoms obtained may be misleading.
Reported in the same study was the finding that age is important in terms of 
the relationship between sensory dysfunction and symptom severity. Dividing the 
sample into 3-12 years, 13-25 years, and >25 years revealed an age-dependent 
pattern; analysis produced a significant correlation between general sensory 
dysfunction and symptom severity in the youngest group only, whereas no such 
statistical relationship was found for the older groups. Hence the relationship 
between general sensory dysfunction and symptoms was apparent only before 
puberty. This discrepancy between groups may reflect either neurological 
maturation or adaptive processes, or an interaction between the two. The youngest 
group showed overall the lowest mean scores in symptom severity, yet this same 
group had the greater sensory abnormalities, an observation that adds weight to the 
idea that early sensory difficulties may have a long-term effect on behaviour. This 
thesis proposes that this connection is mediated via perceptual processes such as
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cross-modal integration, and seeks to find evidence that perceptual integration 
influences cognitive maturation (Chapter 2).
Multisensory Difficulties and Perceptual Incoherence
Donna Williams, an artist with autism, describes her early years as 
incoherent: “My senses and perception were chaotic, fragmented and constantly 
shifting and fluctuating” (Williams, 2008). The experiences of individuals like 
Donna Williams suggest that subjective incoherence in perceiving the world may be 
the result of sensory processing abnormalities. It remains unknown as to how 
sensory stimulation and maturation of perceptual systems within the brain interact, 
but evidence of poor integration across the sensory modalities would challenge the 
idea that coherence is predominantly a weakness at the cognitive level in ASD, in 
contradiction of WCC (Happd & Frith, 2006). Iarocci and McDonald (2006) 
propose that dedicated neuroscientific research based on a theoretical multisensory 
integration platform is warranted by both evidence of sensory dysfunction and 
perceptual atypicalities (section 1.4.2), and that this area should not remain of 
interest solely to practitioners and clinicians.
The Developmental Role o f Multisensory Processing in Cognition
The availability of research examining the ongoing development of cross- 
modal processing beyond the first few years of life is limited. Little longitudinal 
research can be found examining infant perceptual integration and socio-cognitive 
or cognitive functioning at a later age. However, some longitudinal studies have
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found relationships in individual differences between cross-modal development, 
impairments and cognitive outcomes. For instance, Rose, Feldman and Wallace 
(1992) found cross-modal transfer scores (in which discriminating between 
intensities of stimuli in one modality generalises to confer the same discriminatory 
ability in another modality) measured at one year of age were related to IQ scores at 
the age of six years. It would appear then that amodal information (i.e., intensity of 
touch and light in this study) is shared across modalities at a young age, and that the 
better such sharing is in infancy, the better the cognitive outcome for the child. In 
addition, in this study infants with poor cross-modal transfer processing were found 
to express learning difficulties later in life. Cross-modal signal transfer therefore 
appears to support general cognitive development (although it is unclear whether 
information sharing is a function of the perceptual system).
In addition to the contribution of cross-modal integration to the emergence 
of general cognitive functions, it has been found that arithmetical 
addition/subtraction ability in young children of five or six years can be predicted 
by such perceptual factors as sensori-motor (especially visuo-tactile) processing at 
an earlier age, irrespective of developmental effects (Fayol, Barrouillet & Marinthe, 
1998). The specificity of this longitudinal relationship concords with the 
neuroconstructivist idea that domain differentiation is the product, in part, of 
partialed processing of perceptual information from birth (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991; 
see Chapter 2 for elaboration).
Moreover, Fayol, Barrouillet and Marinthe (1998) conclude that 
neuropsychological signs of digital agnosia in the poorly-performing children in 
their study suggest that perceptuo-motor integration is important to representation of
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quantity. Representational formation of abstract concepts (for example, quantity or 
emotion) has also been found to be facilitated by audio-visual processing in infants. 
Jordan, Suanda and Brandon (2008) have found that multisensory numerical 
information allows babies of six months to make more precise numerical 
discriminations than is possible when the amodal dimension of quantity is conveyed 
by one modality only. They conclude that “Multimodal stimuli may thus boost 
abstract cognitive abilities such as numerical competence” (Jordan, Suanda & 
Brandon, 2008). This same ‘intersensory redundancy’ effect (Bahrick, Lickliter & 
Flom, 2004) is found in infants below one year of age when testing sensitivity to 
emotional affect (Flom & Bahrick, 2007), and so cross-modal integration may have 
influences on representational formation across multiple domains.
Taken together, these studies suggest that cross-modal integration has a role 
to play in individual development, in terms of facilitating representational 
development. Should this be the case then its contribution to both general 
development and domain-specific cognitive abilities may be of importance with 
respect to atypical developmental conditions, such as autism spectrum disorder.
This logic is applied to the main study presented in Chapter 2, in which the inter­
relationships between development, individual differences, perception and cognition 
are explored. For this study, a domain-specific hypothesis is described that predicts 
experience of cross-modal perceptual causality (arguably another amodal property 
specified by intersensory redundancy) is related to physical causal cognition (as 
inferred from intuitive physics ability). Evidence of such inter-relationships then 
informs later studies (Chapters 3 and 4) in which cross-modal integration is 
investigated in relation to ASD and the broader autism phenotype (see 1.5) as a 
possible contributory factor to the atypical cognitive phenotype of autism.
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1.4.2 Perceptual Models of Autism
Multiple theories that account for perceptual processing in ASD have been 
proposed, the majority of which have been developed on the basis of empirical 
findings from vision research. Research relating to cross-modal (particularly audio­
visual) integration is limited. Investigation into unimodal perception has not, to 
date, generated any developmental theories of ASD that explicitly state perceptual 
integration as being of fundamental and causal importance to these conditions, 
although investigation of the theoretical developmental connection between 
perception and cognition in ASD has often been recommended in perception papers.
Two influential perceptual theories are reduced generalisation (Plaisted, 
2001) and enhanced perceptual functioning (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & 
Burack, 2006), both of which challenge weak central coherence theory. Of 
particular relevance to this thesis, however, is Signal Integration Theory (Bertone & 
Faubert, 2006), as it can be extended to form hypotheses for cross-modal research in 
ASD.
Reduced Generalisation/Enhanced Discrimination
Children with autism show generalisation difficulties at a cognitive level; 
what they explicitly learn in one setting is not implicitly applied to the same set of 
contingencies in an alternative setting. There is also a superiority associated with 
ASD for individuals to be able to make finely-defined discriminations between 
similar objects in an array. Plaisted (2001) makes a connection between these two
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observations by suggesting that perceptual skill in discriminations is related to poor 
ability to generalise outside of context. She reports findings that support such 
‘enhanced discrimination" processing as being related to both enhanced visual 
search, in which the superior performance of an ASD group is purported to originate 
in attention to the details which separate target from distractors, and to worse 
categorisation efficiency (compromised prototype acquisition) in the training phase 
of a prototype task (Plaisted, O’Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 1998; Plaisted,
O’Riordan, Aitken & Killcross (submitted)).
Extending this line of argument to incorporate cognitive function across 
domains, Plaisted (2001) suggests that categorisation of all stimuli, social and non­
social, or familiar an unfamiliar, is consequently affected by seeing differences 
instead of commonalities; hence the ‘can’t see the wood for the trees’ tendency that 
originally generated ideas of weak central coherence in ASD. Whether these 
findings relate to bottom-up perceptual factors or attentional biases is under 
investigation, however I would argue that perceptual (signal) integration may be 
implicated in the mechanism that produces these effects (see below; this section).
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning
The enhanced perceptual functioning theory proposed by Mottron and 
Burack (2001) aims to account for both the social and non-social perceptual features 
of autism and to provide an alternative to WCC theory. It does so by recourse to 
eight principles (Mottron, Dawson, Soulidres, Hubert & Burack, 2006), which all 
relate to the potentially perceptually-driven life experiences of people with ASD,
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their superiorities on ‘lower-level’ cognitive tasks ( e.g., EFT performance), and 
autistic emphasis on perceptual strategies to complete complex cognitive tasks.
They suggest that EPF theory explains the development of difference in autism in 
terms of the “priority of perceptual flow of information in comparison to higher- 
order operations’’, stating that this information bias generates an atypical 
relationship between high and low order cognitive processes. Thus prioritisation of 
perceptual over cognitive processing from birth causes perception to disrupt the 
natural emergence of both cognitive abilities and responsive behaviours over time.
Enhanced perceptual functioning is therefore a ‘true’ developmental account 
of autism, and is firmly embedded in empirical evidence of atypical auditory and 
visual perceptual processing in autism. For instance, pitch acuity is often found in 
people with ASD (Bonnel et al., 2003), as is acuity in discriminating between 
high/low luminosities defining static stimuli (Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic & Faubert, 
2005).
A guiding principle (and one that is more hopeful for individual prognoses 
than static non-developmental theories of ASD) of EPF is that individuals with ASD 
have optional access to higher-order cognitive representations which are mandatory 
for ‘neurotypical’ people. This statement is supported by the research described 
above (e.g., Mottron et al., 1999) of intact global form processing and intact 
susceptibility to visual illusions (Ropar & Mitchell, 1999) in individuals with ASD.
Access to global information is not always possible in ASD, however. There 
are instances in which directing attention towards integrated information is
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insufficient to overcome perceptual over-processing. For example, speech-in-noise 
tasks are used to identify the decibel level at which participants recognise speech 
against background noise on 50% of the trials presented. Alcantara, Weisblatt, 
Moore and Bolton (2004) demonstrated that adults with HFA and AS require louder 
speech (higher speech reception thresholds) against each of five different 
background noise types than controls. In this case, then, it would appear that the 
global representation of speech is inaccessible, which suggests that, when 
environmental stimuli are complex, EPF serves to denigrate representation 
formation.
Signal Integration Theory
Minshew and Goldstein (1998) posited that the primary deficit causing 
deficits within and across domains in ASD arises from complex stimuli that 
generate multiple subsystem processing demands. They therefore characterised 
autism as a disorder in which ‘basic’ processing is intact but high-order 
sophisticated processes are disrupted (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998). Although 
attractive in many ways, this ‘complexity hypothesis’ is flawed in that it provides no 
explanation as to why visuospatial abilities (such as those used in featural visual 
search or visual disembedding) should be spared on any other basis than the 
processes involved are evoked by stimuli that are simple, relative to social stimuli. 
Furthermore, Mottron et al. (2006) review considerable evidence that formation of 
complex visual representations is intact in ASD.
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Bertone and Faubert (2006) have suggested that visuospatial superiority in 
ASD reflects an unique autistic perceptual phenotype, or ‘signature’ perceptual 
profile, in which simple information is prioritised over complex information at the 
perceptual level, as a consequence of perceptual integration failure. Integration 
failure is therefore not considered to be a cognitive level difficulty, as Minshew and 
Goldstein (1998) suggested, but originates at an early downstream phase of 
environmental stimuli processing.
The ‘complexity-specific’ hypothesis (Bertone & Faubert, 2006) therefore 
predicts that perception in autism reflects ‘diffuse or non-specific neural 
dysfunction of neuro-integrative mechanisms affecting complex perceptual 
processing in autism in general’. The visual system is broadly organised such that 
primary neurons in specialised regions are responsive to single feature stimulation, 
and integration of separate signals is provided by secondary sites elsewhere within 
the visual cortex, such as the extrastriate region (Hadjikhani et al., 2004). By 
contrasting responses to first and second order sinusoidal gratings (see Figure 1.3), 
in which the visual ‘noise’ variable between stimuli recruits either visual area V 1 
alone orV 1 plus V2/V3, Bertone and Faubert (2006) demonstrated that autism is 
specifically associated with enhanced processing of simple visual stimuli coupled 
with widespread reduction in sensitivity to complex visual stimuli.
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First-order Second-order
Figure 1.3: First- and second-order static sinusoidal grating stimuli (taken from 
Bertone. Mottron. Jelenic & Faubert. 2005).
The mechanism provided by Bertone and Faubert (2006) for their findings is 
one of atypical neural connectivity between visual areas. Neuronal organisation 
within primary cortex is columnar, such that neurons exhibit selective response 
patterns to aspects of visual stimuli; activation within one column suppresses 
activity in adjacent columns to heighten featural sensitivity. In autism, Bertone and 
Faubert (2006) suggest that reduced connectivity between visual cortex areas results 
in reduced modulatory feedback from secondary areas on V 1 activity, producing 
excessive ‘lateral inhibition’. Disconnectivity has been found between distal brain 
regions in association with autism (Castelli et al., 2002); Bertone and Faubert 
(2006) have provided evidence of its potential role in autistic perception in relation 
to visual cortex activity.
Consequently Bertone and Faubert (2006) have proposed a condition- 
specific aetiology for autism that relates to a ‘signature’ perceptual profile that does 
not position visuospatial superiority simply as a byproduct of poor integration
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within high-order processing (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; Frith, 2003). Instead, 
poor integration in signal modulation within visual cortex is thought to contribute to 
complexity difficulties in cognition. They have not as yet extended this hypothesis 
to consider abnormal auditory processing (pitch acuity versus speech-in-noise 
threshold elevation), or the implications for multisensory processing of poorly 
integrated unimodal information. Signal integration theory therefore provides both a 
rationale for exploration of cross-modal perceptual integration in autism, and a 
potential neurophysiological mechanism for any results produced by such research. 
Signal integration will be discussed again in Chapter 4, in relation to cross-modal 
perceptual integration in autism.
1.4.3 Perceptual Integration in ASD
The current volume of published research into integrative systems in relation 
to autism is small, but growing. Reports have, however, produced conflicting 
interpretations to date. This may possibly be because some tasks used involve 
complex cognitive stimuli such as vocal/facial speech or emotion, and others 
present simple, tone/object perceptual stimuli. Of note in the former category is a 
study by Hall, Szechtman and Nahmias (2003), which demonstrated that, 
irrespective of congruency/incongruency between facial expression and speech 
prosody, adults with autism exhibit difficulty in processing cross-modal emotional 
stimuli.
Using an fMRI technique, Hall et al. (2003) found that such stimuli evoked 
more recognition errors in the target group on trials in which emotions
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communicated by the face/voice pairs were congruent, and diminished activity in 
the right fusiform region coupled with exaggerated activity in the anterior cingulate 
region whether the emotion signalled by the face/voice pairing corresponded or not. 
Recruitment of the anterior cingulate region is associated with selective attention to 
sensory features of the environment. In particular, it supports direction of attention 
to one modality or another under competing audio- visual conditions. Thus 
emotional cross-modal stimuli appear to be processed effortfully in the ASD group, 
producing competing rather than complementary signal patterns. The facilitatory 
effect normally produced by the intersensory redundancy inherent in such stimuli 
failed to support emotion recognition in ASD in this study.
Conversely, the Shams (or fission) illusion appears to be intact with respect 
to ASD. This phenomenon describes the influence of a series of beeps on the 
perception of a series of flashes presented in the visual periphery (Shams, Kamitani, 
Thompson & Shimojo, 2002). In typical subjects, when more beeps than flashes are 
presented they evoke additional illusory flickers. In the autism study based on this 
illusion (Van der Smagt, van Engeland & Kemner, 2007) fifteen adult participants 
meeting DSM-IV criteria for autism, and fifteen controls matched for age and IQ 
reported comparable numbers of illusory flashes in relation to the number of beeps 
presented. Van der Smagt et al. (2007) concluded that any multisensory integration 
difficulties discovered in association with Autism Spectrum Disorder must therefore 
originate in processing stages beyond low-level perception in high-functioning 
adults with autism.
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The phenomenon utilised in the research in this thesis (cross-modal 
perceptual causality) is thought to be predominantly driven by perceptual 
integration activity, a choice that was made specifically to investigate this aspect of 
perception through minimising recruitment of multiple cognitive systems. A more 
comprehensive description of the neural mechanism underpinning this multisensory 
effect is provided in Chapter 4, alongside further description of empirical 
multisensory research in ASD.
1.5 The Behavioural Genetics of ASD and the Broader Autism Phenotype
1.5.1 Heritability and Familiality
Kanner (1943) reported that, through studying 200 children who evidenced 
autistic disorder to a greater or lesser degree, “we also got to know their parents and 
other relatives of theirs and found abnormal traits in their relatives”. This 
observation presaged the description of the Broader Autistic Phenotype (BAP), or 
the clustering of autistic-like traits in an individual to the extent that their behaviour 
can be described as existing somewhere on a continuum with ASD.
The heritability of ASD is well established through epidemiologic twin 
studies. Several studies have reported significantly different concordance rates for 
autism between monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins, indicating that shared 
genes are more important in the expression of the disorder than shared environment 
on the basis that monozygotic twins share 100% of DNA, whereas dizygotic twins 
have 50% of their genotype in common. The concordance rate between MZ twins
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for ASD is high; the likelihood of the twin of a diagnosed proband also reaching 
diagnostic threshold for autism has been rated between 60 to 90%. For DZ twins, 
the concordance rate is estimated to be as low as 0 to 10%. Contemporary 
approaches to behavioural genetics (ref) now also account for the impact of shared 
versus non-shared environments, allowing for the life experiences of MZ twins to be 
more similar than those of DZ twins, however
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
When a broader phenotypic criteria is applied, this genetic relationship 
becomes more apparent; Bailey et al. (1995) used a ‘softened’ phenotypic 
description to determine whether the MZ twins of probands also experienced 
unusual disruption of social functioning, and found a concordance rate of 90%. 
Furthermore, the recurrence risk of autism among the younger siblings of probands 
has been found to range between 2% and 6%. Although this does not appear high, 
when compared to current population incident rates of <0.5%, it indicates that 
siblings of children with autism are at a much higher risk of ASD than children in 
general.
Further examination of proband families suggests that the Broader 
Phenotype, in which relatives do not reach threshold of impairment for clinical 
diagnosis of ASD but are hampered in aspects of their social interaction, is a robust 
concept that argues for the redescription of ASD as being in continuum with the 
general population (Bailey & Parr, 2003; Baron-Cohen, 2008b; Dawson et al., 2007; 
Piven & Palmer, 1997).
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1.5.2 The Broader Phenotype as an Analogue Model: The Autism Quotient.
The broader autism phenotype (BAP) construct concords with the 
understanding that heritability of ASDs is polygenetic. Therefore it should represent 
a proportion of the ‘normal’ population who have inherited several autism genes 
without achieving the threshold required for expression of diagnosable ASD; these 
individuals should manifest many of the traits associated with behaviours 
characteristic of autism spectrum conditions.
Identification of people with relatively high trait expression provides an 
opportunity to expand empirical ASD research; the BAP therefore represents an 
‘analogue’ model of autism (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2006), in 
which quantitative comparison of individuals expressing the BAP with controls can 
inform clinical studies.
One tool that identifies individuals with a trait profile comparable to the 
BAP is the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin & Clubley, 2001a), which is a 50-item, 5 subscale self-report questionnaire. 
Studies validating use of the Autism Spectrum Quotient to measure autistic-like trait 
expression show that people with Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism 
report significantly higher scores than adult controls, and that the total number of 
traits itemised in the AQ is normally distributed in the general population (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 2001a). Both the Japanese and UK distribution of total AQ scores have 
been found to resemble normality (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & 
Tojo, 2006). Hence, the AQ appears not to assess cultural behaviours, but instead
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provides a measure of the degree to which normal adults express autistic traits at the 
individual level.
The AQ has good internal reliability in terms of the full-scale score and the 
social skills subscale (Austin, 2005), although four sub-scales (attention to detail, 
attention switching, social communication and imagination) fell short of the 
standard criterion value of 0.7. However, factor analysis of the 50 items in the 
questionnaire produced three significant factors (Austin, 2005). These factors 
accounted for 28% of the total variance in AQ scores obtained from 304 non­
diagnosed adults, and were highly correlated with scores for the social skills, 
communication and attention-to-detail subscales. These analyses indicated that 
further development of the scale is required to ensure equivalence across subscales, 
but suggest that the AQ is sufficiently reliable to assess the presence of the broader 
autism phenotype at the individual level from total scores.
Wakabayshi, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2006) have investigated the 
relationship between AQ scores and expression of the ‘Big Five’ personality factors 
(measured by the NEO-PR-I; Costa & McCrae, 1992), arguing that independence of 
variance in total AQ scores from these factors supports the idea that ‘autistic-ness’ 
is a personality dimension in its own right, and therefore ASD diagnosis equates to 
one extreme tail of the variance distribution for this dimension. A joint factor 
analysis was undertaken in which the eigen values of the five subscales of the AQ 
and six facets of each of the five personality factors were calculated in relation to 
six factors. This analysis showed that AQ subscales load onto one independent 
factor, suggesting that AQ scores are independent of established major personality
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dimensions. It also showed, however, that two of the AQ subscales did not load onto 
the independent AQ total factor; these were attention-to-detail and imagination.
Similarly, Bishop, Maybery, Maley, Wong, Hill and Hallmayer (2004) 
found that these two subscales and attention-switching did not significantly 
differentiate between parents of probands with ASD and parents of control children. 
She concluded that, as social skills and communication scores both inter-correlated 
and independently discriminated between control and proband parents, that the 
‘true’ broader autism phenotype was obtainable from the AQ as long as its criteria 
was restricted to these two subscales. Yet it is possible that individuals with 
conditions such as depression, or with schizotypal personalities, would also score 
highly on these two subscales. As evidence exists for an unique autism dimension 
that accords with presence of several traits across each of the five subscales of the 
AQ (Wakabayashi et al., 2006), and as fathers of autistic children self-report detail- 
focussed interests and abilities that correlate highly with their asocial tendencies 
(Briskman, Happd & Frith, 2001), it is argued that the BAP should not be reduced 
simply to describing asociability.
Given the paucity of cross-modal integration research and the relative rarity 
of individuals with ASD in child populations, two studies provided in this thesis 
(Experiments 4 and 5 in Chapter 3) therefore used the AQ to identify individuals 
with high autistic trait expression in order to utilise the BAP as an analogue model 
of ASD, prior to examining cross-modal integration in a clinical population 
(Experiment 6, Chapter 4 ).
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1.6 The Influence of Gender: The Extreme Male Brain Theory of Autism
1.6.1 Comparative Neurobiology, Cognitive Phenotypes and Gender
Gender differences have been established with respect to many disparate 
areas of human functioning. The neurological explanation for such differences is 
that the male brain shows a greater degree of morphological asymmetry than the 
female brain, with a greater white matter to corpus callosum volume ratio (Allen, 
Damasio, Gabowski, Bruss & Zhang, 2003). This exaggerated male asymmetry 
reflects a more strongly lateralised organisation of the neural architectures 
supporting specific cognitive (and possibly perceptual) systems, with less inter- 
connectivity between hemispheres and distal regions (Baron-Cohen, Knickermeyer 
& Belmonte, 2005). The psychological consequences of asymmetrical lateralisation 
differences are that the male cognitive phenotype shows a tendency for domain- 
specific focus. The reduced lateralisation in the female brain, however, generally 
produces a different cognitive profile, including an ability to distribute attention 
across domains.
The cognitive differences found between genders have been 
psychometrically defined by Baron-Cohen in terms of two general dimensions: 
Systemising and Empathising (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Systemising refers to a general 
preference for deconstructing complex stimulus/event material according to its 
perceived regularities to determine the rule set that defines its underlying system 
(and, conversely, to construct such systems in a drive to create organisation). 
Empathising is defined as the ability to understand and associate with others on the
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basis of their emotional and social mental states, an ability that incorporates both 
‘theory of mind’ and affective comprehension. Both general dimensions reflect how 
an individual makes sense of their environment. However, empathising is 
considered to be the overarching dimension that supports social interaction, whereas 
systemising relates to all non-social domains (mathematics, mechanics and business 
analysis, for example).
Brain types
Type8<E = S> □
Type E (E > S)
TypeS«S>E. M
Extreme Type E
Extreme Type S
Figure 1.4: Systemising versus Empathising dimensional distribution (taken from 
Baron-Cohen, 2002).
Defining ‘types’ on the basis of the balance between empathising and 
systemising, it is possible to construct a model to account for cognitive processing 
preferences between genders (Figure 1.4). As this figure shows, all individuals can 
be defined as being one of five types. People whose cognitive styles suggest that 
they process stimuli more on the basis of empathising than systemising are denoted
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E>S, and are said to have a ‘female brain’, whereas the reverse construct (S<E) 
represents people with a preference for systemising, who could be said to have a 
‘male brain’. Baron-Cohen is careful to state that the model does not support 
prediction o f brain type according to an individual’s gender, as not all women will 
be found to have a bias towards the empathising dimension, nor will all men rely 
more on cognitive processes relating to the systemising dimension. Some 
individuals are balanced between the two styles (E =S).
People who rely on one system at the expense o f  the other should show 
quantifiable behavioural and cognitive differences. The extreme empathisers 
( E » S )  may be ‘system -blind’; unable to process sufficient detail to determine rules 
in any regularly organised structure, but good at generally extracting relevant 
emotional and social content from situations that produce considerable ‘signal 
noise’, such as work, school, family or other social environments. The extreme 
systemisers ( S » E )  should therefore demonstrate the reverse relationship (i.e., a 
focus on regularity between details to produce rules) to the extent that systemising is 
detrimental to empathising.
In his ‘Extreme Male Brain’ theory, Baron-Cohen (2002) proposes that 
individuals with ASD express this extreme systemising phenotype. The ‘extreme 
male brain’ (EMB) type is therefore a cognitive characterisation of ASD 
underpinned by neurobiological differences between men and women. It is a theory 
of ASD that accommodates the cognitive phenotypes described by both the ‘theory 
of m ind’ and weak central coherence theories. The difficulties with effective 
processing of social and affective stimuli for a person with a high drive for
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systemising but low empathising may be because these types of information fail to 
reduce to robust rules; such a person might then exhibit ‘mindblindness’ (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995). The attention to detail at the expense o f the global picture described 
by the weak central coherence theory of ASD marries cleanly with the drive to 
recognise order. Yet the construction/deconstruction aspect of systemising 
accommodates the finding that global order can be recognised when attention is 
explicitly directed towards it in ASD (unlike WCC theory, which originally 
predicted global meaning to be compromised in ASD).
1.6.2 An *Extreme Male Brain * Perceptual Phenotype in ASD?
Evidence that, at a population level, the systemising/empathising model 
accurately reflects the distribution of these two dimensions is provided through 
reframing existing cognitive/behavioural research on gender differences in terms of 
either dimension. For instance, women are generally superior to men in terms of 
emotional recognition (Thayer & Johnsen, 2000). Male infants, conversely, 
demonstrate a preference for gazing at mechanical mobiles rather than faces from 
the day of their birth (Connellan, Baron-Cohen, W heelwright, Batki & Ahluwalia, 
2000) which may indicate that a bias towards systemising is innate in males and 
responsible for the over-representation of men in science vocations (for a review, 
see Halpem et al., 2007).
Many perceptually-driven tasks exhibit sex differences, including the 
Embedded Figures Task (W itkin, 1950), and many cognitive tasks are resolved 
using different strategies which have a more perceptual bias in men than in women
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(e.g., men use visuospatial working memory on navigation tasks, whereas women 
use verbally-mediated landmark strategies; Voyer, Voyer & Bryden, 1995; Soucier 
et al., 2002). If, therefore, autism reflects the operation of an extreme male brain, 
then women with several autistic traits should behave like exaggerated men, and 
vice versa, when tested on perceptually-driven tasks known to exhibit gender 
differences.
Furthermore, if perceptual cross-modal integration is important for female- 
style cognitive processing (language and emotion), cross-modal function should 
evidently be stronger for women. It should also be relatively weaker in men and 
participants with the broader phenotype. If, however, it is of equal developmental 
relevance to both genders, the information produced by perceptual integration may 
support different cognitive functions known to exhibit sex differences, such as 
psychological versus physical causal reasoning.
The main study in Chapter 2 (Experiment 3) looks for evidence of sex 
differences either at the perceptual integration level, or in relation to 
perceptual/cognitive inter-relationships in typically developing (TD) children, using 
cross-modal perceptual causality and intuitive physics tasks. Gender differences and 
the perceptual male/female phenotypes are also examined in Chapter 3, in which the 
performance of individuals with and without several autistic traits (as measured by 
the AQ) is also contrasted; Experiment 3 relates EMB theory and the BAP to cross- 
modal perceptual causality and intuitive physics, and in Experiment 4 the same 
approach is applied to a study using the Embedded Figures Task.
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1.7 Summary
It has been argued that no single cognitive account has yet been found to 
account for the multiplicity of behaviours linked to autism, and the range o f abilities 
found between individuals diagnosed with ASD. Many atypicalities in vision and 
audition have been established in association with autism, some of which appear to 
be specific to an autistic perceptual ‘signature’. They may also be associated with 
task performance superiorities in ASD (e.g., on visuospatial tasks such as the EFT). 
Perception research has, further, challenged cognitive theories such as weak central 
coherence and mindblindness, leading to the proposal that the developmental 
phenotype o f autism is perceptually-dependent (e.g., Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning theory; Mottron et al., 2006).
Flowever, little research has yet to be reported that considers whether 
integration o f sight and sound information is of fundamental importance to 
cognitive development in autism spectrum conditions. This is surprising as the 
perceptual feature density of stimuli such as emotion and speech implicate 
weakened cross-modal (audio-visual) integration as being a possible root of 
cognitive difficulties in the social domain. The hypothesised mechanism for this 
proposed W eak Perceptual Coherence autistic phenotype is enhanced salience of 
single feature processing, due to reduced feedback modulation/enhanced lateral 
inhibition within primary sensory cortices (by extension of Signal Integration 
Theory; Bertone & Faubert, 2006). The resulting reduced salience of integrative 
cross-modal signalling over single-mode perceptual processing would mean failure
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of intersensory redundancy mechanisms to facilitate complex representational 
processing.
Multisensory processing weakness provides an explanation for the 
‘developm ental’ aspect o f autism, as disruption to domain-specific relationships 
between perceptual function and cognitive development would produce the spiky 
cross-dom ain heterogeneity often found in individuals with ASD. Both EPF theory 
(M ottron et al., 2006) and neuroconstructivist accounts of development (Karmiloff- 
Smith, 2007) support this interpretation.
Furthermore, reconceptualisation of autism both as a condition that exists in 
continuum with ‘norm al’ phenotypes along an independent ‘autistic’ dimension, and 
as the product o f ‘extreme male brain’ function together suggests that a) any cross- 
modal integration system thought to develop atypically in ASD should be 
demonstrable in individuals with several autistic traits, and b) any sex differences on 
classic tasks associated with superior performance in ASD should not differentiate 
between men and women who express the broader autism phenotype.
This thesis therefore presents a series of studies relating to cross-modal 
development and functioning, in relation to cognitive superiorities found in ASD. In 
Chapter 2, a hypothesised domain-specific relationship between cross-modal 
perceptual causality and intuitive physics is investigated in typically developing 
children, and sex differences in physics ability are also examined. Chapter 3 focuses 
on the broader phenotype, and investigates cross-modal perceptual causality and its 
relationships with intuitive physics and visual disembedding, in order to consider
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whether deficiencies in perceptual integration exist, and whether any differences 
found might provide support for EMB theory. The final studies in Chapter 4 
investigate cross-modal perceptual causality in ASD, and across autism and AS.
As Iarocci and McDonald (2006) conclude “The next step in the quest for a 
comprehensive theory of perception in autism is to address the consequences of 
enhanced feature detection or discrimination, weak central coherence or temporal 
binding, and atypical neural modulation or connectivity on perception in the context 
of the multisensory world” .
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Chapter 2: Perceptual Development and Cognitive Outcomes
2.1 Overview
O ’Riordan and Passetti (2006) stated that “Although there are numerous 
reports o f unusual perceptual processing in autism, the mechanisms underlying such 
phenomena and the possible relationship between these and the characteristic social 
and communicative deficits remain poorly understood” . By suggesting that atypical 
perception may be related to atypical behaviours and cognitive functioning in ASD, 
O ’Riordan and Passetti presuppose that aspects of perceptual processing impact on 
the developm ent of specific higher-level cognitive systems. If this assumption is 
valid, then evidence of universal relationships between perception and cognition 
should be available from typical developmental studies. However, the impact, 
generally or specifically, o f perceptual development on cognitive development is a 
matter o f considerable debate.
This chapter introduces two novel tasks designed to explore whether a 
specific perceptual function is related to a defined cognitive ability. One task is 
designed to test children’s development of cross-modal perceptual causality, and the 
second to assess their physical causal cognition (i.e., intuitive physics). As evidence 
of a relationship could also be interpreted as reflecting a universal, rather than 
specific, aspect of development, the cognitive task is one in which males should 
demonstrate superiority over females; a difference between gender subgroups in 
terms of the relationship between perceptual causality and intuitive physics would
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argue against it being the consequence of general brain maturation, as if this were 
the case no sex differences should be discernible.
In this chapter, the literature regarding general theories of 
perception/cognition relationships is overviewed, prior to consideration of the 
impact of experiencing causality on development of intuitive physics, and 
presentation o f an argument regarding the likely influence o f gender. The design 
constraints of the two new tasks involved are provided in advance of reporting three 
studies. Experiments 1 and 2 verify that the novel tasks effectively measure the 
abilities under investigation. Experiment 3 addresses the relationship between them 
(and its hypothesised modulation by gender) using data obtained from typically- 
developing children across a wide age range.
The motivation for developing these tasks and exploring the theoretical 
inter-dependence of these particular processes is to provide a basis for investigation 
of the same abilities and relationships in autism spectrum disorders (Chapter 
4).Finding a difference between sexes in the hypothesised perception/cognition 
relationship during development (Experiment 3) would support the hypothesis that 
the emergence of domain-specific abilities is reliant, at least in part, on perceptual 
development.
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2.2 Introduction
2.2.1 Developmental relationships between cognition and perception
Most researchers accede that cognition is hierarchically organised to a 
greater or lesser extent (Demetriou & Raftopoulos, 2004). Models draw on ideas of 
either Fodorian modules (Fodor, 1983) or cognitive domains (Wellman & Gelman, 
1992), to distinguish between specialist cognitive systems that have evolved 
independently of general cognitive systems and over-arching processes, such as 
executive function or working memory (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). In 
developmental terms, the relationship between perceptual organisation and the 
emergence and operation o f such modules or domains is not clearly specified. For 
instance, at one extreme, modular models state that the environment provides 
‘triggers’ that identify and set module parameters, the prototypic example being the 
development of grammar through exposure to local language in human speech 
(Pinker, 1994). Such a nativist stance is based upon the a priori assumption that the 
specific modular representational knowledge which guides thought and behaviour is 
held independently, is genetically specified and is impervious to modulation by 
perceptual processing.
The alternative view is that all representational knowledge is acquired 
through sensory interaction with the environment, irrespective o f knowledge type. 
The classic model for such a general learning theory was provided by Piaget (1964), 
whose central thesis assumed that the earliest stages of cognitive development are 
only obtainable through sensorimotor interaction with the world. This initial stage
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of exploration (from 0 to 2 years of age) facilitates the gradual formation of 
representations based on perceptual experience; hence ‘concrete’ representations are 
the basis of cognition from 6 to 10 years, and act to constrain conceptual thinking 
(about number or volume, for instance). Perceptually-dependent thought is 
gradually replaced by perceptually-independent abstract representations, allowing 
more sophisticated theoretical cognitive capabilities from age 12 onwards. Piaget 
therefore links children’s attainment of conceptual thought to their perceptual 
processing (Spelke, 1991, page 133).
The original assertion by Piaget (1964) that cognition is developmentally 
achieved via perception has been challenged by evidence that infants are sensitive to 
some highly specific conceptual properties of environmental stimuli, such as 
causality (Scheier, Lewkowicz & Shimojo, 2003), or quantity (Xu, Spelke & 
Goddard, 2005), indicating that humans are capable of abstract representational 
manipulation at a very young age.
Evidence of domain-specific cognition in infants has been interpreted to 
mean that innate cognitive representational knowledge exists which serves to parse 
perceptual information, allowing differentiated cognitive processes to operate on 
different aspects of environmental stimulation from birth. For instance, the ‘core 
knowledge’ model describes innate principles that rule each domain and serve to 
“individuate the entities in its domain and to support inferences about the entities’ 
behaviour” (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007, page 89). According to this model, cognitive 
expertise increases as knowledge is captured; development in a specific ability
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therefore reflects the enrichment of the core principles governing that domain from 
birth.
Karmiloff-Smith (1991) considers nativist approaches such as the core 
principle model (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) to lack clarity regarding developmental 
process. She argues that building upon original knowledge demands learning from 
the environment, and so proposes that development is governed by innately 
determined biological constraints which serve to parse stimuli into classes of inputs 
according to specific cognitive function. She states that ‘The human infant is 
biologically set to process constrained classes of inputs that are numerically 
relevant, linguistically relevant, relevant to the physical properties of objects, of 
cause-effect relations, and so forth” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991, page 172).
Hence Karmiloff-Smith (1991) considers perceptual system organisation and 
its maturation to be crucial for development of cognition. She also proposes that 
cognition is initially undifferentiated, but specialises over time to produce 
dissociable domains as a consequence of processing environmental information that 
is sub-divided on this domain-by-domain basis. In terms of knowledge, Karmiloff- 
Smith (1991) stated representational reorganisation is brought about by 
progressively-defined separable sets of perceptual information. Neurobiological 
constraints on maturation are therefore put forward as the developmental 
mechanism here; genetically-specified neurological maturation patterns generate 
increasingly sophisticated architectures that each support a specific domain’s 
function. Karmiloff-Smith therefore espouses a Piagetian constructivist argument 
for the emergence of cognitive abilities, in that sensori-motor interaction with the
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environment is essential for both neural paths and representational processing to 
develop, but she does not ascribe to the idea of a general learning mechanism.
Neuroconstructivist theory is relevant to the study of developmental 
disorders such as ASD. Karmiloff-Smith (2007) posits that the high 
interconnectivity between neural regions in very young brains mean that small 
variations in perceptual development may have widespread disparate consequences 
for cognitive differentiation. Development itself therefore is thought to have a 
crucial role in shaping phenotypical outcomes, in both typical children and those 
with developmental conditions.
With the neuroconstructivist approach, individual differences in perceptual 
functioning supporting the development of a given domain should be related to 
individual differences in that cognitive ability, because the two are interdependent. 
Individuals with a heightened perceptual processing efficiency should therefore 
demonstrate elevation of a related cognitive ability. This point is important, in that 
such an individual differences effect might, in part, explain why some children 
display aptitudes for specific cognitive skills, such as physics, from an early age. 
Further, differences between the genders in particular perception/cognition 
relationships might partly account for differing patterns of behaviours and skills in 
males and females (see 2.2.5), with exaggeration of such gender-based biases within 
an individual related to a cognitive profile of deficiencies and superiorities. Extreme 
Male Brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 1999; 2002) posits that an exaggeration of this 
nature may explain an association apparent between families of ASD probands and
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scientific vexations (see also Baron-Cohen, Bolton, Wheelwright, Short, Mead, 
Smith & Scahill, 1998).
2.2.2 Perceptual causality and the development of intuitive physics
To investigate perceptual and cognitive developmental interdependence, it is 
necessary to consider a single cognitive domain. Causal cognition is the production 
of multidimensional representations capturing causal relationships that we derive 
from our environment. Some theorists consider causal analysis to be domain- 
specific (Leslie, 1984), so that the cognitive process for explaining causal 
relationships between people and their actions involves psychological constructs of 
intention and motivation, whereas analysis of an umbrella being blown out of a 
hand involves the action of forces on physical objects.
The development of causal reasoning about physical objects has been linked 
to perceptual causality by Michotte (1963). Perceptual causality is the process by 
which spatio-temporal correspondences between sources of sensory information 
give rise to percepts of physical relationships. Michotte (1963) observed that 
particular spatial and temporal contingencies in physical events consistently produce 
the phenomenon of causality, such that one object is perceived to act on another in 
order to evoke change in its behaviour or state. In particular, he described 
‘launching’ events in which one object seen to approach a second is perceived to 
cause it to move (launch) only if the objects touch and the second moves off 
immediately on contact.
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The spatio-temporal constraints on visual properties required for perceptual 
causality to be generated led Michotte (1963) to the idea that a perceptual analyser 
mechanism existed to transform these ‘privileged’ visual inputs into a ‘genuine 
causal impression’. That this mechanism operates at the perceptual rather than the 
cognitive level is indicated by the fact that explicit representational knowledge does 
not detract from subject experience. For example, when the visual stimuli provided 
are lights playing across a wall, not solid objects or images of objects, a launch 
percept can be induced by recreating the necessary spatio-temporal contingencies, 
despite the known impossibility of a physical collision occurring between the 
stimuli (Michotte, 1963).
Michotte (1963, as cited by Spelke, 1991, page 136) made the strong claim 
that the origin of all causal representations lay in the formation of causal 
impressions via operation of this innate perceptual system; object-based causal 
cognition is produced from early perceptual causality experience, and this then 
facilitates generalised thinking about abstract causal relations outside of the physical 
realm. In a sense this idea mirrors Piaget’s sensori-motor stage, but posits a specific 
perceptual learning mechanism exists that is restricted to causal cognition, in line 
with the neuroconstructivist perspective (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991).
Perceptual causality and causal representations have been tested in infants 
using looking-time habituation methodologies. Responses to launch events show 
that adult-like spatio-temporal sensitivities to visual object properties do exist in 
infants (Leslie, 1984; for a review, see Cohen, Amsel, Redford & Cassola, 1998). 
The habituation methodology adopted in these studies is simple. By repeatedly
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watching stationary object B start to move upon being contacted by moving object 
A, babies are habituated to launching. They are then shown either more launch 
events, or events in which expectations of ‘contact produces motion’ are violated by 
the introduction of either a temporal or spatial gap between object A’s motion 
desisting and object B’s motion commencing. These violation events retain the 
same information in terms of motion trajectory/durations and sequence, but do not 
give rise to the percept of causality in adults. Infants as young as 4 months have 
been found to pay increased attention (as measured by gaze durations) to both 
spatial and temporal violations of cause and effect, and so it has been concluded that 
the perceptual causality mechanisms operating in adults also function in infants 
(Leslie, 1984; Cohen, Amsel, Redford & Casasola, 1998).
As Michotte (1963) predicted, the representations generated by perceptual 
causality stimuli in infants are more complex than simple associative learning of 
correspondences between sight and sound events. Babies’ causal representations 
also include concepts of agent and recipient, such that the agent causes the recipient 
to move. Leslie and Keeble (1987) demonstrated that reversing causal launch 
events so that B causes A to move after contact is surprising to babies habituated to 
A launches B events, but those who have been habituated to non-causal events in 
which A stops and then B moves after a temporal gap do not exhibit dishabituation 
when this event sequence is reversed. Reversing the sequence of causal events 
appears to reverse the agent/recipient assignments for the first group of infants, 
which is why they show recovery from habituation. Leslie and Keeble (1987) 
concluded that this research supported the idea of an innate perceptual causality
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analyser, redefining it in Fodorian module terms (see also Kovotsky & Baillargeon, 
1998).
It could be argued that such cognitive knowledge is accessible too soon in 
life for it to be the consequence of perceptual experience (Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber & Jacobson, 1992). Therefore, the suggestion that causal cognition is 
developmentally dependent on perceptual causality (Michotte, 1963) appears overly 
strict. It can be argued though that the perception of causality derived from object 
interaction is a potential source of information that allows causal knowledge of the 
world to be enriched over time from birth. If so, consideration of perceptual 
causality and physical causal cognition during development should provide 
evidence of a perception/cognitive relationship, in support of the perception- 
dependent neuroconstructivist view (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991). If physical causal 
cognition depends on perceptual causality processing, then a positive correlation 
should be demonstrable between the two. Furthermore, individuals with enhanced 
perceptual causality processing should demonstrate enhanced physics knowledge 
above and beyond any developmental effects that may simply represent general 
brain maturation. Experiment 3 therefore presents a multiple regression analysis that 
investigates the relationship between the perceptual causality task and the intuitive 
physics tasks at the individual level, after controlling for age.
2,2.3 Cross-modal Perceptual Causality
Much of the research into perceptual causality has been undertaken using 
ambiguous stimuli, in which the similarity of stimulus components is sufficient to 
impair generation of causal percepts. For an example, when an object moves along
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a horizontal plane towards an identical stationary object, occludes it and continues 
without pausing or varying speed (Figure 2.1), only 15% to 20%.of events are 
perceived as collisions by observers (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002).
Ball 1 Ball 2
Balls 1&2
Ball 1 or 2? Ball 1 or 2?
O  (3  - .......
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of an ambiguous launch/pass event
However, manipulation of dimensions such as spatial and temporal 
relationships between stimuli elements, or the presence or absence of contextual 
cues (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002; Guski & Troje, 2003), causes the frequency of 
causal percepts reported in response to ambiguous stimuli to vary. For example, 
Sekuler, Sekuler and Lau (1997) reported that an auditory signal can reorganise 
visual perception of an ambiguous perceptual causality event to generate a causal 
percept, i.e. the sound can make two balls that seem to pass through each other
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(‘pass’) appear to collide and reverse (‘launch’). By varying the timing of auditory 
signal presentation in relation to the point at which two converging disks occlude, 
this study therefore demonstrated that cross-modal reorganisation occurs under 
spatio-temporal constraints that parallel those originally determined for purely 
visual (unimodal) stimuli (Michotte, 1963).
The same auditory induction of the perception of causality has been 
demonstrated to emerge in infants before they reach one year of age (Scheier, 
Lewkowicz & Shimojo, 2003). In this study, when 4-, 6- and 8-month old babies 
were tested to determine whether they could discriminate between an ambiguous 
visual display and one in which an auditory signal was presented at the point of the 
moving objects’ spatial coincidence, the two groups of older infants gazed longer at 
the cross-modal trials than the ambiguous trials, although this response pattern was 
not found for the youngest group. The emergence of cross-modal perceptual 
causality therefore appears to occur after the first few months of life.
By using cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli to test a wide age range of 
typically developing children, it should be possible to determine if this particular 
cross-modal effect increases in strength from mid-childhood into adolescence. 
Further, if perceptual integration facilitates physical causal cognition (as tested by 
assessing intuitive physics ability), strength of cross-modal perceptual causality 
effects should be related at the individual level to physics reasoning during this 
period. Evidence of a specific perception/cognition relationship is important to this 
thesis because such a finding would suggest that extant findings of autistic 
superiority in physics ability (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1998) may be related to
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heightened cross-modal integration, which counters the current thinking that 
disrupted multisensory processing may be of fundamental importance in this 
developmental condition (Iarrocci & McDonald, 2006). This possible contradiction 
will be returned to in Chapters 3 and 4, in which cross-modal perceptual causality 
and intuitive physics ability is tested in individuals either displaying the broader 
autism phenotype, or with a diagnosis of ASD.
2,2,4 Relationships between Gender and Cognitive Domains
Exploration of any putative perception/cognition relationship in isolation 
could be argued to be of little relevance to the developmental domain differentiation 
model proposed by Karmiloff-Smith (1991); any correlation found might merely 
reflect universal brain growth, or general improvement in neural processing 
efficiencies with age. One way to address this difficulty is to look for evidence of a 
sex difference moderating the perception/cognition relationship under investigation. 
Evidence of gender moderation of the relationship under study would counter the 
objection that its basis lies with any general factor that develops across childhood 
as, if this were the case, the influence that factor exerts would apply equally to the 
performance of both genders on both tasks.
Many cognitive differences have been empirically established to exist 
between the sexes, with men thought to have a profile favouring spatial and 
numerical abilities and women exhibiting superiorities in verbal and socio-cognitive 
skills (for a review, see Halpem, Benbow, Geary, Gum, Hyde & Gemsbacher 
2007). One developmental explanation for disparities between the genders’
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cognitive phenotypes is that males and females are predisposed from birth to learn 
about different facets of the environment, with male infants focused on objects and 
their mechanical relationships, and female infants instead attending to social stimuli; 
people, emotions and relationships (Baron-Cohen, 2003; Brody & Hall, 2008).
When male and female infants are compared with respect to selective 
attention, males showed a preference for an inanimate object next to an active and 
expressive human face, whereas females were seen to direct their attention more to 
the animated face (Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Batki & Ahluwalia, 
2000). However, Shutts and Spelke (2004) outline several limitations to the study, 
querying whether these relationships generalise to other object/face pairs, or 
whether using an alternate still face/animated object pairing would produce different 
results. Spelke (2005) also asserts that the finding of these attentional biases in 
infants has not proved replicable.
Counter to the object salience rationale, Spelke (2005) argues that there 
should be no cognitive developmental reason as to why men should show any 
advantage over women in science-based tasks, as no differences in object 
perception appear present at birth, and no sex-based differences in mechanical 
representation formation are discernible either (Baillargeon, 2004). Furthermore, in 
tasks testing knowledge of basic physics (such as an object travels further when hit 
by a heavier object) females have been shown to access such information before 
males (5.5 months, as opposed to 6.5 months; Kovotsky & Baillargeon, 1998). 
Spelke (2005) concludes that early representational knowledge of physical systems 
is available to both male and female infants, and that other factors, such as societal
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expectations, are primarily responsible for the idea that men are generally superior 
to women in this regard.
It remains, though, that men and women do show distinct neurobiological 
differences by adulthood (Baron-Cohen, Knickermeyer & Belmonte, 2005), and that 
beliefs about simple mechanical principles are more often erroneous in women than 
men (Baron-Cohen, 2002). For instance, more women than men fail the water-level 
task where participants shown a tipped glass of water are asked to indicate the 
orientation of water if it were placed upright (Robert & Ohlmann, 1994), reflecting 
better processing of physical systems in males. Also, men, who generally have 
superior visio-spatial representation skills, use geometric environmental information 
for navigation, whereas women prefer to rely on salient landmarks in the visual 
scene (Rahman, Andersson & Govier, 2005).
If perception is important to cognitive development and the cognitive 
profiles of men and women are distinct, then, hypothetically, developmental 
differences between genders should be demonstrable when testing a 
perception/cognition relationship where the cognitive ability exhibits an advantage 
for one sex. The relationship between cross-modal perceptual causality and intuitive 
physics is a good candidate for testing this hypothesis, given the bias towards 
systemising in males suggested by Baron-Cohen (2002), and evidence of object- 
orientated selective attention preference in male infants reported by Connelan et al. 
(2000). Experiment 3 therefore presents separate multiple regression analyses for 
each sex, so that any moderating effect of participant gender on the developmental 
relationship between perceptual causality and intuitive physics can be examined.
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Evidence of a gender dissociation in this relationship would support the ‘privileged 
relationship’ argument within the neuroconstructivist model of cognitive 
development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1991).
2.2.5 Hypotheses: Developmental effects o f  perceptual integration on intuitive 
physics, and the influence o f  gender
In this chapter, the experiments report data from measuring cross-modal 
perceptual causality and intuitive physics in children across a wide range of ages. 
The perceptual causality task used is an adaptation of the paradigm described by 
Sekuler, Sekuler and Lau (1997), and the intuitive physics task is a novel test that 
assesses physical causal cognition. Hypothetically, it is suggested that sensitivity to 
the phenomenon of audio-visual perceptual causality will be shown to increase with 
age (Experiment 1). It is also proposed that knowledge of physical causality will 
increase with age (Experiment 2).
In terms of the putative relationship between them, it is argued that children 
who are more prone to experiencing cross-modal perceptual causality will also have 
better access to physical causal representations, and will hence demonstrate superior 
intuitive physics above and beyond any age-mediated relationship. The hypothesis 
is tested in Experiment 3.
Evidence of correlation between the two tasks both across age and between 
individuals would provide partial substantiation that perceptual processing is 
important to cognitive development. Evidence of gender dissociation would 
strengthen this argument. Any evidence of differential perceptual causality/physical
68
causal cognition relationships between genders would suggest male and female 
brains develop along different trajectories with respect to domain differentiation. 
Furthermore, as the particular domain chosen is a cognitive function related to 
physical systems, any sex difference obtained would support the idea that male and 
female brains are organised to support different interactions with the environment, 
which is the basic concept behind the Extreme Male Brain theory of autism (Baron- 
Cohen, 1999).
Establishing that a perception/cognition relationship exists will partly justify 
the hypothesis that the behavioural and cognitive profiles seen in autism may be the 
consequence of perceptual atypicalities during development, as suggested by 
O’Riordan and Passetti (2006) and by Karmiloff-Smith (2007). Results from 
Experiment 3 reported here will therefore be used to generate hypotheses in 
Chapters 3 and 4, where cross-modal integration is considered in the broader autism 
phenotype and in autism spectrum disorders in relation to perceptual causality and 
physical causal cognition. Autism as an expression of an extreme male brain 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002) will also be considered in Chapters 3 and 4 in the light of the 
gender analysis presented in this chapter.
2.3 Cross-modal Perceptual Causality: Task development
2.3.1 Task constraints
Sekuler, Sekuler and Lau (1997) developed an ambiguous perceptual 
causality stimulus in which two identical two-dimensional disks approach each
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other at the same rate, spatially coincide and then continue along the same paths. 
This dynamic event can either be perceived as streaming (one passing over the 
other at coincidence) or bouncing (each reversing direction as a consequence of 
collision). By introducing a click at the point of spatial coincidence, the experience 
of bouncing was induced in over 60% of trials observed by ten naive participants, 
compared to a frequency of 22% produced when no click was presented. When a 
click was sounded at 150 milliseconds prior to or after occlusion of one object by 
the other, the numbers of bounce percepts reported were approximately 45% and 
37% respectively (exact data not provided). Hence Sekuler et al. (1997) 
demonstrated that the cross-modal bouncing effect was dependent on the temporal 
relationship between presentation of the auditory signal and spatial coincidence of 
the two dynamic objects onscreen.
This effect has been replicated with alternative disambiguating cues in 
several adult psychophysical studies. These have identified many of the parameters 
necessary to generate the illusion of causality (Remijn, Ito & Nakajima, 2004; 
Sanabria, Correa, Lupianez & Spence, 2004; Sakurai & Grove, 2006). 
Dishabituation research with infants has also indicated that the cross-modal 
perceptual causality phenomenon is experienced in the first few months of life 
(Scheier, Lewkowicz & Shimojo, 2003).
Consideration of the neural regions and comparative weightings of stimulus 
component properties involved in producing the experience of bouncing suggests 
that these percepts reflect integration of perceptual signal information, rather than 
any cognitive response biases (Bushara et al., 2003; Zhou, Wong & Sekuler, 2007).
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The perceptual causality paradigm is therefore a good vehicle for examining the 
development of cross-modal perceptual causality in typical children and its 
relationship to causal cognition, as it satisfies the following criteria: Bounce 
percepts reflect integration within the perceptual system; they are inducible from an 
early age (and so may be related to cognitive development); recruit object 
perception systems and so are related, in theory, to intuitive physics, and the cross- 
modal effect in adults is large, thereby allowing for detection of large degrees of 
variation across individuals and ages.
Stimulus property considerations
Temporal parameters are obviously important to the task. Sekuler et al. 
(1997) selected stimulus offset synchronies (SOAs) of 150 milliseconds before and 
after disk occlusion, in addition to a simultaneous condition. Here it was decided to 
extend these offsets of the auditory signal to 250 ms before and after the point of 
visual coincidence, the reasoning being that children may not have the same 
temporal resolution of cross-modal integration as adults, and so age might moderate 
any SOA effect.
Most psychophysical research on cross-modal perceptual causality has 
related to dynamic convergence, with two identical objects approaching each other. 
However, simply replicating these stimuli might introduce possible attentional 
confounds. Although adults have been shown to be able to track up to five visual 
objects at a time (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988), research into development of 
attentional spread across object number and space in older children and adolescents
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suggests that increasing the area over which dynamic objects are simultaneously 
tracked can affect this ability in pre-adolescents (Trick, Audet & Dales, 2003).
Also, tracking two converging items across a wide screen area might be difficult for 
children with autism, who have been shown to experience difficulty in shifting 
attention from smaller to larger spatial areas in a cross-hair length discrimination 
task (Mann & Walker, 2004), thus to use disks that converge and then separate 
might influence their performance of this task (Chapter 4). A launch rather than 
bounce version of the illusion, in which one dynamic object could be perceived to 
either pass over or launch a second, stationary object, was therefore developed so 
that difficulties with spatial flexibility and simultaneous object tracking that might 
influence responses differentially between ages or groups were avoided (see Figure
2.1 above).
The difficulty with altering the paradigm in this way was that it could lead 
to two strategies for observing the events; observers could either track the dynamic 
object across the screen, or focus on the stationary object. The dynamic object 
flickered three times before moving to attract exogenous attention away from the 
stationary object to minimise the effect of strategy choice between participants.
Recent investigations (Zhou, Wong & Sekuler, 2007) of the stimulus 
properties that are required to induce perceptual causality indicate that auditory 
influence is, in part, a product of signal intensity. This factor had been anticipated 
as a possible contributor of error variance, and so it was decided to calibrate decibel 
output prior to each testing session to ensure consistency between participants. It 
was also decided that auditory signal duration should be brief in order not to exceed
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the duration of visual object occlusion, as bounce illusions disappear when the 
duration of the auditory stimulus exceeds duration of visual coincidence (Remjin,
Ito & Nakajima, 2004).
Developmental considerations in task design
Given that only two responses are possible in a perceptual causality task, 
learning response rules was not considered to be onerous for young or less able 
participants. However, there are several problems presented by adapting the 
paradigm reported by Sekuler et al. (1997) for testing perceptual integration in 
children across a wide range of ages and intellectual abilities. Paramount of these is 
related to the ambiguous nature of the stimuli. Data obtained from children can be 
influenced by their over-sensitivity to demand characteristics, in that they often 
strive to produce the ‘right’ answer and so want to be told exactly what constitutes a 
correct response when tested. Percepts are inherently neither right nor wrong, so 
participation could induce anxiety in some participants unless it is made clear that 
no correct response exists. Rather than evoke the sense of being tested in children, 
the task was designed to look and sound like an easy computer game, called the 
Crash or Miss Game (CoMG). The simple instructions (Appendix A) were provided 
by voice-over supported by simple visual graphics onscreen to minimise any social 
demand characteristics.
Demand characteristics sensitivity could be exacerbated by a desire for 
response consistency; having decided that a particular response to certain stimulus 
characteristics is ‘right’, a child may attempt to apply an heuristic rule in order to be
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correct on most trials. Given that one hypothesis to be tested is that perceptual 
integration will develop as a consequence of perceptual experience, the task had to 
be carefully designed so that learnt associations would be hard to acquire. 
Development of personal rules was made difficult by varying the event start 
positions; trials began with the dynamic object either moving from the right or left 
of the screen.
In the original design (Sekuler et al., 1997), each of the four stimulus types 
was presented twenty times. Below this number of trials, significant differences 
between conditions would be hard to obtain for reasons of statistical power, 
although the effect size induced by simultaneous presentation of the sound signal at 
the point of occlusion is large. Our final design had to include comparable trial 
numbers, in order to allow for comparative analysis in studies using group 
categorisation as an independent variable (for instance, when comparing response 
patterns between children with ASD and age-matched controls). The obstacle here 
is that ability to continue to pay attention during a repetitive task is limited at young 
ages, and some individuals are unable to maintain attention consistently no matter 
what their ages. The task therefore had to be designed to minimise boredom and 
motivate children to complete multiple repetitions. This was achieved by dividing 
trials into five blocks of twenty trials, interspersed with rest screens that presented 
ticks and stars indicating how many blocks had been completed; these were 
accompanied by motivating voice-over messages.
The instructions simply asked participants to press a red mouse button when 
they saw a ‘crash* or the yellow button whenever they saw a ‘miss’. Experimental
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trials used either identical green or identical white disks to generate ambiguity. In 
addition, to provide a means to identify individuals who failed either to acquire the 
task rules or to apply them consistently, unambiguous control trials were included 
(see Figure 2.2). These trials used non-identical (differently-coloured) disks to 
provide within-task controls; children who inconsistently followed the rules 
produced low accuracy scores for these conditions, and so their data could be 
removed post-hoc from analysis. For unambiguous misses, a white or green disk 
passed over the alternate colour disk without stopping, and for unambiguous 
crashes one disk stopped as its outer boundary touched the alternately-coloured 
stationary disk, which moved on contact.
Ball 1
- O
Ball 2
O
Ball 1 occludes 2
O  (
Ball 2 Ball 1
Figure 2.2 : Schematic representation of an unambiguous pass event
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Inclusion of unambiguous trials in itself generated a further problem as the 
experimental trials became obvious as they were accompanied by sound. An early 
explorative pilot of the task with very small groups of typical and autistic children 
strongly suggested that differentiation between experimental cross-modal trials 
(with sound) and unimodal control trials (without sound) led to development of a 
rule-based heuristic in some children that was related to world knowledge (i.e., 
objects that contact usually make a sound, and so hearing a sound must mean that 
those objects crashed). By including the auditory signal on all control trials 
irrespective of whether the objects crashed or missed, this heuristic was implicitly 
demonstrated to be false. Further, the instructions included examples of control and 
experimental stimuli that were presented without labelling to avoid teaching 
children what a crash or miss ‘should’ look like.
2.3,2 Experiment 1: Adult pilot of the Crash or Miss Game 
Participants
Sixteen adult student participants were recruited through the participant 
payment scheme at Cardiff University School of Psychology. This pilot sample 
included 7 men aged between 21 and 22 years, and 9 women aged between 20 and 
25 years. All participants had normal or corrected vision and normal hearing. The 
following diagnostic exclusions were applied: Dyslexia; colour blindness; Attention 
Deficit (Hyperactivity) Disorder; Asperger’s Syndrome and High Functioning 
Autism. Participants were each paid £3 to complete the Crash or Miss Game 
(CoMG), which took between 5 and 10 minutes.
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Apparatus
The CoMG was written in Python and presented using VisionEgg software. 
The game was presented on a Toshiba SPM30 laptop, with a flatscreen refresh rate 
of 60Hz and high specification RAM and video and sound cards for reduced 
variance in trial presentation timings. Sound was output via Sennheiser HD-205 
headphones. Data from this task were recorded via laptop internal mouse button 
presses; red and yellow stickers were used to highlight the mouse key to push for 
either a crash or miss response, respectively.
Stimuli
Trial stimuli were two-dimensional green, white or a combination of green 
and white disks, each subtending a visual angle of 2.1 degrees, presented against a 
black background, moving along the horizontal plane. The speed of the moving disk 
was set at 24 degrees per second (at a viewing distance of 57cm). The start position 
for the moving disk varied between left and right screen positions, and the position 
of the stationary disk was consistently set at the central point of the vertical plane. 
All trial durations were set to 800ms. The auditory stimulus used was a ‘click’ noise 
with peak frequency of 2137 Hz and duration of 5.5 milliseconds. To ensure that 
sound presentation intensity equivalence, the system sound level was set to an 
average level of 68 decibels (range 63 -  72 dBs) for each testing session by 
measuring nine decibel readings taken from practice session trials, using a Precision 
Gold N05CC sound meter, and resetting volume controls accordingly.
Unambiguous crash or miss events involving one green and one white disk 
were coded as control crash and control miss trials. Ambiguous trials involving two 
disks of the same colour were coded as experimental trials. Three levels of SOA
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were used to define click presentation timing for each trial type. These were at Oms, 
-250ms and +250ms relative to the point at which the disks were occluded. The 
number of trials per trial type is provided in Table 2.1 below. Over the session an 
equal number of trials began from left and right starting positions, with the moving 
disk coloured green in half the presentations and white in the other half. These two 
factors (starting position and colour of moving disk) were counter-balanced within 
each trial type. Equal numbers of each trial type were allocated to each of five test 
blocks, so that blocks were equivalent in terms of the number of unambiguous and 
ambiguous events they each presented. The trials within each block were then 
pseudo-randomised before fixing their order, so that no trial type was presented 
twice in a row. All trials started with a 200 ms offset, after which the first moving 
disk in the horizontal plane ‘flashed’ three times for 500 ms (with two stimulus 
offset durations of 50 ms between flashes); flashing served to direct attention 
exogenously to this ball prior to the start of the trial. Participants completed a total 
of 9 practice trials (one of each trial type/SOA combination) and 100 test trials (see 
below for details).
SOA Unambiguous Control Trials: 
Crash Miss
Ambiguous
-250 ms 5 5 10
Oms 20 20 20
+250ms 5 5 10
Totals 30 30 40
Table 2.1: Trial type distribution in the CoMG (Experiment 1: Adult Pilot). 
Procedure
All test sessions were completed within a well-lit sound-proofed laboratory. 
Participants read and completed an informed consent form prior to starting. Each
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participant sat approximately 57cm from the presentation laptop, as measured from 
the bridge of their nose to centre-screen, in order to ensure that subjective disk 
speed and size were partially controlled. Participants were given the headphones to 
wear and told to press the spacebar to begin the onscreen instruction presentation 
when they were comfortable. The instructions were provided as a slow voice-over 
with participants watching static graphics that reiterated the rules (Appendix A). 
These were to press the red mouse button whenever they saw an onscreen event 
they perceived as being a crash (launch), or the yellow mouse button for a miss 
(pass). Participants completed a practice set of nine trials (one of each trial 
type/SOA combination in fixed pseudo- randomised order) before proceeding to the 
experimental session. After each response, the message ‘press the space bar to 
continue’ was presented. This message did not appear until a response had been 
made; each trial’s presentation had to be completed before a response was accepted, 
and pre-emptive button presses were implicitly trained out of early responders as 
the session did not continue until they responded again after the disks stopped 
moving. After the practice session participants were prompted to start the 
experimental session by pressing the space bar; this break between practice and test 
sessions allowed any misunderstandings to be corrected.
During the experimental session, red and yellow response prompts remained 
onscreen during each trial. The trial order was invariant to prevent repeat 
presentation of any one trial type (as this could generate a perceptual learning 
confound or lead to development of a response strategy). Trials were divided into 
five blocks, each of which comprised 20 trials. Participants proceeded through all 
five test blocks until all 100 test trials had been presented. Blocks were delineated
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by the presentation of onscreen graphics and voiceover messages, allowing 
participants to rest briefly and to choose (by pressing the spacebar) when they 
wanted to continue. The experiment concluded with onscreen presentation of a 
thank you message. Following completion, the purpose of the pilot was explained.
Results and conclusion
The purpose of the pilot was to determine whether this novel cross-modal 
perceptual causality task produced an illusory launch percept comparable to the 
bounce effect originally reported by Sekuler et al. (1997).
Control Trial 
Type
Auditory
Timing
Mean
Accuracy
Score
Std.
Deviation
Range
Unambiguous -250 ms .96 .08 .6 0 - 1.00
Crash 0 ms .97 .04 .65-1 .00
+250 ms .95 .09 .50-1 .00
Unambiguous -250 ms .95 .12 .8 0 - 1.00
Miss 0 ms .91 .12 .90-1 .00
+250 ms .96 .11 .8 0 - 1.00
Table 2.2: Accuracy scores for Unambiguous Crash and Miss Control Trials, bv
Auditory Timing (Experiment 1: Adult Pilot).
Control trial analysis indicated that one participant’s accuracy scores for 
both unambiguous launch (crash) and pass (miss) conditions lay outside two 
standard deviations of the mean, and so their data were removed. Means and 
standard deviations for accuracy scores obtained from the unambiguous crash and 
miss control trials are provided in Table 2.2; these values indicate that accuracy 
across both control trial types and all three levels of auditory signal timing were 
high, with little variance across the sample (n = 15). A two-factor repeat measures 2 
x 3 ANOVA, with control trial type (unambiguous crash or miss) and auditory 
timing (-250ms, Oms or +250ms relative to disk occlusion) as the within-group
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factors was performed. No main effect of trial type (F < 1), or auditory timing 
condition (F < 1), or interaction between trial type and auditory timing condition 
(F(2, 28) = 1.23,p>.05) was obtained.
0.8
-250ms 0 ms +250ms
Figure 2.3: Crash reports produced by Crash or Miss Game ambiguous stimuli, by 
SOA condition (Experiment 1: Adult Pilot).
Figure 2.3 shows that the highest mean crash report score was produced in 
response to the simultaneous (0 ms) experimental trials (i.e., those ambiguous trials 
in which the auditory signal was presented as the moving disk occluded the 
stationary disk). Presentation of the auditory signal before or after the point of 
occlusion produced comparatively fewer crash reports.
A repeat measures one-way ANOVA with auditory signal timing as the 
repeat factor produced a significant main effect; F(2, 28) = 42.67, p  <.001. Pairwise 
post-hoc analysis (t-tests adjusted using the Bonferroni method for multiple 
comparisons) indicated that all conditions significantly differed from each other,
p<.001.
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These findings demonstrate that the ambiguous stimuli used in the Crash or 
Miss Game frequently induce the phenomenon of cross-modal perceptual causality. 
Furthermore, the data indicate that a higher number of crash percepts was 
experienced in adult observers when the auditory stimulus was spatio-temporally 
co-occurent with visual occlusion, but not when it was presented asynchronously. In 
these respects, the CoMG parallels the paradigm developed by Sekuler et al. (1997). 
However, rather than generating the impression of two disks bouncing, the auditory 
stimulus here serves to create the causal impression of one disk launching the other.
2.4 Intuitive Physics: Task Development
2.4.1 Existing methodologies
Much research into physical causal cognition has involved testing infants’ 
representational abilities using habituation-dishabituation methodologies (for 
example, Baillargeon, 2008). Tasks measuring children and adolescents’ physical 
causal reasoning beyond infancy range from a ‘single concept’ test (e.g. Hood, 
1998), to small sets of causal reasoning trials (e.g., Binnie & Williams, 2003) to 
tests that resemble a physics multiple-choice exam (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Scahill, Lawson & Spong, 2001b; see Figure 2.4 below). Although 
suited to the research purposes for which they were designed, the former two types 
of test are limited in terms of evaluating generalised causal physics reasoning, and 
would not allow sufficient variance in scores for continual measurement across a 
wide age range. The latter is overly-sophisticated with regards to conceptual 
breadth, reliant to some extent on language ability with a high degree of trial
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difficulty. Neither type of task is therefore suitable to measure the development of 
intuitive physics.
9.
V
Figure 2.4 : Sample question from Intuitive Physics Task ( taken from Baron-Cohen 
et al.. 2001)
2.4.2 Task design considerations
In order to examine the development of physical causal cognition over a 
wide age range, task design had to allow for visual presentation of a range of 
physical concepts, with trials graded according to levels of difficulty. Verbal 
instructions had to be kept to a minimum so that younger children and children 
whose physical reasoning exceeded their verbal abilities were not disadvantaged. 
Multiple choice answers were restricted to two, rather than four, options to avoid 
mapping difficulties in younger and less able children. A stop criterion needed to be 
included so that less able children would not be frustrated by having to complete 
trials beyond their competence, and so that total score distribution would not be 
overly affected by guessing. To test general rather than specific physics knowledge, 
trial content relating to several physical phenomena and mechanical functions 
(including friction, gravity, refraction, fulcrum mechanics, density, and cog 
operation) was compiled. Examples of each of the forces or systems selected were
V Y
Which gear wheel goes in the 
same direction as the driver, V? 
(a)X (b)Y (c)Z
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redrawn from teaching materials used at primary, secondary and higher levels of 
education (see example, Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Sample trial illustration showing possible effects of a heavy weight on 
identical wooden planks supported in different positions (adapted from Baron- 
Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & Lawson, 2001).
2.4.3 Trial ranking data
Introduction
The trial material developed was tested on adult psychology students to 
obtain difficulty rankings, prior to piloting with typically developing children. This 
allowed trials of comparative complexity to be assigned to difficulty levels, so that 
young children in the pilot were not made to feel anxious by being tested on 
material far beyond their ability.
Participants
Eleven adult psychology students, three male and eight female and aged 
between 18 and 21 years, were recruited from the School of Psychology’s 
participant panel, and received 1 credit for their participation.
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Materials and stimuli
The ranking task comprised 24 trials in which coloured illustrations of 
physical forces and systems were presented on paper sheets. Participants were 
provided with the trial set, a pen and an answer sheet to record their responses. Each 
trial comprised three separate images; a ‘before’ picture of a force about to act or a 
system about to operate, and two possible ‘after’ pictures (labelled A and B), only 
one of which accurately represented the outcome of the action of the force or 
operation of the system depicted. Trial order was randomised between participants.
Procedure
Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent form before 
starting the ranking task. They were verbally briefed to look at the ‘before’ picture, 
and its two possible ‘after’ pictures for each trial, and then record either A or B on 
the answer sheet to indicate which picture they considered to be an accurate 
representation of the outcome of the event depicted (see Figure 2.6). Participants 
were allowed to work through the trial set in isolation, before being debriefed as to 
how the trials would then be ranked by difficulty.
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A B
Figure 2.6: Trial example; participants select either A or B as the picture that 
accurately represents the action of friction on different objects moving down a 
slope.
Results
Participants’ accuracy scores ranged from 12 to 23 out of a possible 24 
points, suggesting that trials varied in difficulty. The total number of correct 
answers was summed for each trial, allowing a ranking according to difficulty to be 
obtained. The trials were then allocated to one of six difficulty levels for use in the 
pilot with typically developing children. Wherever ranking failed to produce a 
discrete boundary, trials were arbitrarily assigned to a lower or higher level. For 
levels with trials of mixed difficulty, higher-ranked trials were placed after lower- 
ranked trials in presentation order.
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2.4.4 Experiment 2: What Happens Next? Task Pilot with typically developing 
primary school children
Introduction
The task was called the ‘What Happens Next?’ task (WHN?T), and piloted 
with primary school children aged from six to eleven years, to determine whether 
the accuracy scores it produced varied systematically with age.
Participants
Two primary schools were approached for participant recruitment for the 
WHN?T child pilot. Information letters were distributed to all children in years 1 to 
6; parents who agreed to their children participating signed and returned consent 
forms. Parents were asked not to consent if there was any familial history of 
developmental disorders. Consequently, 37 participants (19 males; 18 females) were 
recruited.
Materials and stimuli
The trial difficulty ranking obtained from adults was used to allocate the 
twenty-four trials to one of four levels of difficulty, so that six trial sets were 
produced.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their school. They were 
sat at a desk with the researcher and informed that they were going to look at a 
puzzle game called ‘What Happens Next?’ as part of a science experiment that their
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parents had agreed to let them help with; it was made clear to the participants that 
they were not being tested and that their school would not know their individual 
scores.
The first trial was used to explain the instructions (Appendix B). After 
having examined the ‘before’ image, the participant was prompted to say whether 
picture A or B showed ‘what happened next’ on each trial. Presentation order 
remained consistent between participants. A stop criterion was applied to prevent 
any individual performing at chance level from progressing through the levels (i.e., 
no more than 2 mistakes per level were allowed). Responses were recorded by the 
researcher on a sheet with response spaces colour-coded by correct answer, to allow 
number of right answers to be assessed covertly at the end of each level. Age in 
months and gender were also recorded, and response sheets coded to ensure 
anonymity. Test sessions were terminated as soon as the stop criterion was reached, 
or all the trials had been presented. Each child was reassured at the end of each test 
session that they had performed very well.
Results and conclusion
Age group 
(years)
n Age mean 
(years; months)
Score
mean
C/24)
Std.
Deviation
Range
6 - 7 15 7;5 7.53 3.04 4 - 1 5
8 - 9 8 9;3 10.25 5.31 3 - 2 0
1 0 -1 1 14 l l; l 15.43 4.65 8 -2 1
Total 37 9;2 11.12 5.45 3 - 2 1
Table 2.3: Participant Drofile and task score data bv Aee Group (Experiment 2:
WHN7T Child Pilot).
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Score
Table 2.3 provides age ranges, mean ages and mean scores by age group for 
the WHN7T pilot, suggesting that mean WHN7T scores do increase as children 
become older. A one-way ANOVA with age group as the between group factor and 
score as the dependent variable confirms this observation (F  (2, 34) = 12.82, p 
<.001).
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Figure 2.7: Scatterplot of Age in Months versus WHN7T scores
A scatter plot of the data from the pilot is provided in Figure 2.7. Analysis 
of the data using the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) method 
produced a positive correlation between age of participant and total score (r = 0.62, 
p  <.001) across all participants, with age accounting for 38.7% of the variance in 
scores. From this result, it can be concluded that the task accurately measures the 
development of intuitive physics in children.
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Participants n Age range Age mean Score mean 
(/24)
Std.Dev. Range
Male 19 6; 10 — 11 ;9 9;1 11.16 5.26 4 -2 1
Female 18 6;6 — 11 ;9 9;3 11.06 5.79 3 - 2 1
Total 37 6;6 -11 ;9 9;2 11.12 5.45 3 - 2 1
Table 2.4: Participant profile and task score data bv Gender (WHN7T Child Pilot).
Age ranges, mean ages and mean scores are comparable between genders 
(see Table 2.4). Independent samples r-tests between the between male and female 
subgroups in the sample support this observation (fAge(35) = -0.33, fscore (35) = 0.06; 
p > .05 in both cases). However, the relationship between age and task performance 
appears to differ between them, with r = .75, p  <.001 for the boys and a value of r = 
.50, p  <.05 obtained for the girls. A comparison of these values using Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation method indicated, however, that they are not significantly different 
(z = 1.18, p  >.05); hence their distributions are comparable. It can be concluded 
from the pilot that the method devised for this task is appropriate for measuring 
developmental effects, in that it does not introduce any bias that might advantage 
one gender over the other.
2.5 Experiment 3: Cross-modal perceptual causality, intuitive physics and
gender
2.5.1 Introduction
Having determined that both novel tasks fulfil their design objectives, 
typically developing children could then be tested to investigate the hypothesis that 
the development of susceptibility to cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli and 
the development of intuitive physics ability are related.
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This study was conducted at the Techniquest Science Museum in Cardiff.
An advantage of recruiting from this unique participant pool was that both the boys 
and girls recruited could be assumed to like engaging with science, thereby ensuring 
to some extent that motivation levels and enjoyment during participation were 
controlled across genders. Any moderation of the hypothetical relationship between 
gender subgroups found is therefore less likely to be confounded by social factors, 
than would be the case if the study was undertaken in schools.
2.5.2 Method
Participants
Children aged between 5 and 13 years old visiting Techniquest Science 
Museum (Cardiff) were recruited by approaching their parents for consent to 
participate. Participation requests were not made at random; wherever possible, 
recruitment of a girl was followed by approaching a family with a boy of equivalent 
age, so that the age range and number of children in the sample were balanced 
between genders. Parents were requested not to agree to participation if there was 
evidence of any developmental disorder in their family history, or if their child had 
had any hearing or sight difficulty that required medical intervention. On this basis, 
67 children participated (see Table 2.5 below).
Group N Age range 
(months)
Mean age 
(months)
Std. Deviation
Male 34 67-157 106.4 24.0
Female 33 72-155 106.7 25.5
Total 67 67 -157 106.5 25.1
Table 2.5: Sample age distribution bv Gender (Experiment 3).
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Apparatus. Materials and Stimuli
Apparatus, materials and stimuli were identical to those used in the pilots for 
both the CoMG and the WHN?T (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.4, respectively), the 
only differences being that the average decibel output for each experimental session 
was set to between 62 to 65 decibels (to avoid possible startle responses in younger 
children), and the inclusion of a feedback questionnaire (Appendix C) following the 
Crash or Miss Game. The purpose of the questionnaire was to assess whether or not 
participants had consciously adopted a rule-based response strategy.
Procedure
All testing took place in a quiet, well-lit laboratory. Parents were asked to 
read an information sheet and sign the consent form while the children were 
verbally briefed on what they would be doing. Task order was counterbalanced 
within gender, and counterbalancing matched between genders. Following 
participation, the child and accompanying family were provided with both a verbal 
and written debrief, and any questions they had were answered. The children were 
also given a small Techniquest gift.
2.5.3 Results
Outlier analysis and accuracy data
Analysis of standardised z-scores for the both the unambiguous crash and 
unambiguous miss control trials of the CoMG led to the removal of five participants 
(three male and two female) on the basis that their accuracy scores lay more than 
two standard deviations outside of one/both of the control trial accuracy means for
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the total sample. Outlier removal reduced the sample size to 62, generating an equal 
number of male and female participants but producing no marked change in either 
the range or mean age of the sample distribution2. No participants reported 
developing any individual response rules, and so none was removed on this basis.
Control Trial 
Type
Auditory
Timing
Mean
Accuracy
Score
Std.
Deviation
Range
Unambiguous -250 ms .94 .08 .65-1.00
Crash 0 ms .95 .11 .60 -  1.00
+250 ms .98 .07 .60-  1.00
Unambiguous -250 ms .95 .07 .70-  1.00
Miss 0 ms .95 .10 .60-  1.00
+250 ms .98 .06 .80-1.00
Table 2.6: Accuracy scores for Unambiguous Crash and Miss Control Trials, bv
Auditory Timing Condition (Experiment 3).
Means and standard deviations for accuracy scores obtained from the 
unambiguous crash and miss control trials are provided in Table 2.6. As was 
observed for the pilot with adults, these values suggest a high degree of accuracy 
across both control trial types and all three levels of auditory signal timing, with 
little variance across the sample (n = 62). A two-factor repeat measures 2 x 3  
ANOVA, with control trial type (unambiguous crash or miss) and auditory timing 
condition (-250ms, 0ms or +250ms relative to disk occlusion) as the two within- 
group factors was performed to validate this observation. No main effect of trial 
type, or interaction between trial type and auditory timing condition (both F  < 1), 
were obtained. However, a main effect of timing was determined; F(2, 122) = 8.32, 
p  < .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons between means (adjusted for multiple 
comparisons) indicated that the +250 ms condition (in which the auditory signal is
2 Mean ages per gender are not significantly different; f(60) = .11,/? >.05.
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presented after the moving disk has passed over the stationary disk) produces 
greater response accuracy in observers than is found for the either of the other two 
levels of this factor. Repeating this analysis separately for each of the gender 
subgroups revealed the same pattern of results as reported for the entire sample, 
with only the auditory timing factor producing a significant main effect, and post- 
hoc tests confirming that the +250 ms generated the highest accuracy levels for both 
sexes.
Experiment 3a: Crash or Miss Game Crash Report Analysis by Auditory Timing 
Condition and Gender
Group n Mean crash reports 
-250ms 0ms -(-250ms -250ms
Range
0ms +250ms
Male 31 .41(.31) .45(.34) .29(.31) 0 - 1.0 0 -  .95 0 - 1.0
Female 31 .36(.29) .40(.30) .24(.25) 0 - 1.0 0 - 1.0 0 -  .90
Total 62 .39(.30) .43(.32) .26028) 0 - 1.0 0 - 1.0 0 - 1.0
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for Crash or Miss? Game Experimental Trials
(Experiment 3a).
The means and standard deviations of crash report scores for the 
experimental trials are supplied in Table 2.7. It can be seen from these data that the 
simultaneous (0 ms) auditory timing condition of the CoMG produced the greatest 
number of crash reports across both genders, and that the male participants reported 
more crashes across all timing conditions than were reported by the females. The 
pattern of response apparent across conditions for the entire group was broadly 
equivalent to that obtained from the adult pilot (see Figure 2.3, section 2.3). 
However, the increase in crashes (launches) reported in response to the 
simultaneous (0 ms) condition compared to presentation of the auditory signal prior 
to occlusion (-250 ms) was of a lower magnitude than that seen for the adults (4%
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increase over the predictive +250ms condition mean response, as opposed to 21% in 
adults).
A repeat measures one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the auditory 
timing factor was conducted to determine whether the elevated number of crashes 
reported in response to the simultaneous condition trials was significantly larger 
than those elicited by the other timing conditions. A main effect of trial was found 
for this analysis (F (2, 122) = 31.70,/? <.001).
Timing Condition 1 Timing Condition 2 Mean
Difference
Std. Error
-250 ms 0 ms -.04 .02
+250 ms .12* .02
0 ms +250 ms .16* .02
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level, after Bonferroni adjustment.
Table 2.8: Pairwise comparisons between means from Auditory Timing Conditions 
(Experiment 3a).
Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc mean comparisons in Table 2.8 show that the 
+ 250ms condition differed significantly from both the -250ms and simultaneous 
(0ms) conditions, confirming that trials from both these conditions elicit more crash 
responses than trials in which the auditory signal is presented after the moving disk 
has passed over the stationary disk. However, the other two auditory timings 
generate crash reports to comparable extents, as responses do not significantly differ 
between the simultaneous (0 ms) and -250 ms conditions. This finding differs from 
analysis of the adult pilot data, in which these two conditions did differ 
significantly; co-occurence of the auditory signal and the point of occlusion
producing significantly more crash responses than presentation of the sound prior to 
occlusion.
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Figure 2.8: Crash report means by Auditory Timing Condition and Gender 
(Experiment 3a).
Figure 2.8 represents the mean numbers of crash reports obtained from each 
gender at each level of auditory timing condition. A mixed 2 x 3  ANOVA, with 
gender as the between-group factor and auditory timing as the within-group factor, 
was performed to assess whether the general increase in crashes reported by the 
boys over the girls was significant. This analysis, however, showed no significant 
main effect of gender, or interaction of gender and timing condition (F< 1), and so 
no effect of gender on either the total number of crashes reported, or the pattern of 
crash reports across auditory timing conditions, was evidenced.
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Experiment 3b: What Happens Next? Task Gender Analysis
Group N Mean score Std. Deviation Range
Male 31 9.90 5.71 2 - 2 2
Female 31 10.39 5.64 4 - 2 2
Total 62 10.15 5.63 2 - 2 2
Table 2.9: Descriptive statistics for What Happens Next? Task (Experiment 3b).
Table 2.9 provides the descriptive statistics for the WHN7T results; these 
data suggest that the female subgroup shows a minor advantage over the male 
subgroup. Analysis of the scores provided by each gender subgroup by independent 
samples f-test revealed that this slight superiority of female over male scores was 
not significant (f(60) = -0.34, p> .05).
Experiment 3c: Relationships between simultaneous auditory signal presentation, 
age and intuitive physics scores.
Variable Age WHN?T
Score
Crash
Reports
Age R .64**
P .000
WHN?T R .38**
Score P .002
Crash R .33**
Reports P .008
* *  Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
Table 2.10: PPMC correlations (r) between key variables (Experiment 3c).
The largest effect of auditory signal presentation was found for the 
simultaneous (0ms SOA) condition3, and so data from this condition were selected 
for the purpose of considering correlations amongst the three main variables of
3 This same result was reported by Sekuler, Sekuler & Lau (1997), and was found for the adult pilot 
data (Chapter 2, section 2.2).
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interest: CoMG crash reports; age in months, and WHN?T scores. As can be seen 
from Table 2.10, each of these correlations was found to be significant. Moderate 
positive effects were found for the relationships between the proportion of crashes 
reported in the simultaneous condition of the CoMG with age in months (r = .33, 
pc.Ol), and with WHNT scores (r = .38, pc.Ol). A large effect size was found for 
the positive relationship between age and WHNT scores (r = .64, p  <.001), 
replicating the results from Experiment 2.
Variable Age WHN?T
Score
Crash
Reports
Age R .74**
P .000
WHN?T R .46**
Score P .01
Crash R .29
Reports P .12
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
Table 2.11: PPMC correlations (r) between key variables for the male subgroup 
(Experiment 3c).
Variable Age WHN7T
Score
Crash
Reports
Age R .55**
P .001
WHN?T R .31
Score P .09
Crash R .38*
Reports P .03
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
♦Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed)
Table 2.12: PPMC correlations (r) between key variables for the female subgroup 
(Experiment 3c).
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show that correlation of WHN7T scores with age is 
significant for both gender groups, replicating the findings from Experiment 2. 
However the results presented in these tables also show that the pattern of
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relationships yielded by the group data is not replicated within the gender sub­
groups. Within the male data, significant correlations are apparent between the 
CoMG and WHN?T scores (r = .46, p  = .01). No significant relationship was found 
between age and simultaneous CoMG crash reports. Analysis of the female data, 
however, indicated that age significantly correlated with both WHN?T score (r = 
.55, p  <.001) and CoMG crash reports (r = .38, p  <.05), but no significant 
relationship between CoMG crashes and WHN?T scores was derived.
Removing the variance in WHN?T scores attributable to age allowed the 
variance of WHN?T in relation to CoMG crash report proportion data to be 
analysed. The first-order partial correlation obtained between these two variables in 
the group data was found not to be significant after controlling for the effect of age 
(r = .23, p  = .07); this result suggests that age is generally a mediating factor.
For the male subgroup (n = 31), removal of variance relating to age simply 
reduces the partial correlation between crash reports and WHN7T scores to r = .38, 
p  <.05. As this result is significant, age only partially mediates the relationship in 
typically developing males. The equivalent partial correlation in the female data is 
r -  .13, p  > .05. Testing the difference between male and female partial correlations 
using the Fisher’s r-to.-z transformation produces z -  -1.01, p  >.05, indicating that 
the values of r  between the male and female groups are not significantly different.
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Effect o f gender on the relationship between CoMG crash reports and WHNT 
scores
The original hypotheses were that both age and CoMG crash report scores 
would predict WHN?T scores. As both these variables were found to be 
significantly correlated with WHN?T scores, they both attained criteria for inclusion 
in a regression model. A stepwise multiple linear regression analysis for the entire 
data set was therefore conducted to determine the best fit model for the dependence 
of WHN?T scores on the predictor variables, age and crash reports. Using an entry 
parameter of p<.05 and a removal parameter of p>.l, the only predictor to be 
included in the model was age; P = .639, t{60) = 6.44, pc.OOl. This variable 
predicted a significant amount of variance in WHN?T scores (R2 = .41,F(1,61) = 
41.45, pc.001).
Categorising the data according to participant sex allowed for comparison of 
linear regression models on the basis of gender. Sex differences in the predictor 
variables were first examined using independent samples r-tests (equal variances 
assumed). No significant differences were found between male and female 
participants for either age (f(29) = 0.105, p>.05), or number of crashes reported 
(t(29) = 0.677, p>.05). For means, standard deviations and ranges for both 
predictors by gender, see Tables 2.5 and 2.7, above.
Conducting step-wise regression analyses within each sex (using the same 
entry/removal criteria) investigated the role gender plays in moderating these 
predictive relationships. In the stepwise regression model for boys, both age (p = 
.661, pc.001) and crash report scores (P = .267, p<.05) were retained as significant
100
predictors, and together accounted for a large significant proportion of the variance 
in WHN?T scores (Z?2 = .61, F(2,30) = 21.91, p  <.001). Analysis of the female 
subgroup data produced results equivalent to the pooled-gender data model. Age 
was the single predictor included in the linear regression model, p = .546, p  =.001. 
The variance in WHN7T scores accounted for by age was 30% in this group (R2 = 
.30, F (l, 30) = 12.34, p = .001).
For all analyses presented here, generalisation assumptions were met; there 
was no evidence of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the 
models generated for either the entire sample, or for the gender-based subsets. Case 
diagnostics indicated that the entire sample contained two cases (both female) for 
whom the standardised residual values of the outcome variable (WHN7T score) had 
values greater than two. These cases could therefore be considered outliers, but tests 
of the degree to which they had influenced analyses showed that neither affected the 
models produced, and so they were not excluded4.
2.5.4 Results Summary and Discussion
This study was designed to investigate the developmental courses of 
perceptual causality and intuitive physics, their possible inter-dependence and the 
role of gender within this context. The predictions that both intuitive physics ability 
and perceptual causality processing would increase systematically with age were 
tested (Experiments 2 and 3c, respectively). In the initial children’s pilot of the 
WHN7T (Experiment 2) scores were significantly and positively correlated with 
age, with Z?2 = 38.7% . In Experiment 3c, the significant amount of variance in
4 Cook’s, Mahalanobis and leverage distances were examined (Field, 2005)
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WHN?T scores (R2 = 41%) accounted for by age also confirmed this hypothesis. In 
the same experiment, crash reports in the simultaneous condition of the CoMG task 
were also found to increase systematically with age, albeit to a lesser extent (R2 =
11%). More importantly, in Experiment 3c, susceptibility to cross-modal perceptual 
causality stimuli was found to be positively related to intuitive physics ability (r = 
.38, p  <.05, Z?2 = 14.5%).
Further regression analysis indicated that age mediates the relationship 
between cross-modal induction of perceptual causality and intuitive physics. 
However, although age is a mediator in the general model, the two sexes were found 
to differ, in that the correlation between perceptual causality and cognitive physical 
causality scores remains significant after controlling for age in the male subgroup 
alone.
This sex difference is also found when comparing the gender subgroup 
regression models; in the male model, after the effect of age has been controlled, the 
number of crashes reported is retained as a significant predictor of intuitive physics 
score. The positive regression co-efficient in this model indicates that, above and 
beyond age, the more frequently a boy experiences cross-modal perceptual 
causality, the better his understanding of physical causality at the cognitive level. 
However, prediction of intuitive physics scores by cross-modal perceptual causality 
sensitivity is not apparent from the female data, after controlling for age.
With respect to perceptual causality, the significant main effect of auditory 
signal timing found for the group sample ANOVA indicated that sound influenced
102
visual processing to produce the percept of causality in this sample. The effect of 
co-occurrence of the auditory signal and occlusion was not as pronounced in the 
study sample as it had been for the adult pilot (Experiment 1). This difference might 
be a consequence of the lower level of auditory signal intensity used in the child 
study, as decibel variation has been recently shown to increase the probability of 
experiencing cross-modal causality (Zhou, Wong & Sekuler, 2007).
Alternatively, reduced response levels could be indicative of incomplete 
maturation of the distributed neural system activated by these stimuli. This 
suggestion appears valid in that CoMG crash reports are significantly and positively 
correlated with age in this sample (Experiment 3c), indicating that the strength of 
the perceptual causality induction under these circumstances increases over the 
course of development (although this relationship is significant only in the female 
subgroup data, when the gender subgroup data are analysed). The finding of 
developmental change in sensitivity to cross-modal illusory phenomena 
(Experiment 3c) has previously been demonstrated with respect to the McGurk 
effect in infants and children (McGurk & McDonald ,1976; Massaro, Thompson, 
Barron, & Laren, 1986; Rosenblum, Schmuckler & Johnson, 1997). This effect 
describes how auditory presentation of one syllable can be distorted by visual 
presentation of an alternative syllable, so that the syllable experienced is a blended 
distortion of the two (for instance, auditory presentation of /ba/ as lips are seen to 
mouth the syllable /ga/ produces the percept of /da/).
Developmental McGurk effect studies reported that sensitivity to the illusion 
is generally weaker for children than for adults, as reported in Experiment 3a.
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Tremblay, Champoux, Voss, Bacon, Lepore and Theoret (2007) have recently 
reported similar findings of reduced effect strength during development with respect 
to cross-modal perceptual phenomena. They found that, by comparing three groups 
of children and adolescents (aged 5 - 9 ,  1 0 -1 4  and 15 -  19 years), maturational 
evidence for the McGurk effect was replicated, in that the youngest age group 
perceived significantly fewer blended syllables than found for the older categories. 
They also found that the Shams illusion (where auditory presentation of a series of 
beeps increases the number of flashes observed in a stream of light; Shams, 
Kamitani & Shimojo, 2002) could be induced in these participants. In addition, 
induction of the fusion illusion, in which a single auditory stimulus causes two 
visual flashes to be perceived as a single event (Andersen, Tiipana & Sams, 2004), 
was found at each age category level. However, Tremblay et al. (2007) found no 
evidence of developmental trajectories for either the Shams or fusion phenomenon; 
homogeneous performance on the non-speech illusory tasks used was observed 
across the three age categories tested.
Tremblay et al. (2007) argue that perceptual integration is established early 
in infancy, and therefore is invariant by the age of 5 years in typical individuals. 
They then cite evidence of neural substrates implicated in both audio-visual speech 
processing (Champoux et al., 2006) and non-speech perceptual integration (Stein, 
2005) to suggest that the three illusory effects they tested have early perceptual 
mechanisms in common, but conclude that audio-visual integration required for 
speech comprehension continues to develop, as it involves structures not recruited 
by the non-speech cross-modal stimuli. Therefore, susceptibility to the McGurk
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phenomenon continues to increase in line with brain maturation across 
development.
The findings from Experiment 3c contradict the study by Tremblay et al. 
(2007); susceptibility to cross-modal stimuli that generate causal percepts (a non­
speech phenomenon) was found to increase with age. The early emergence of this 
specific causality illusion (Scheier et al., 2003) therefore does not appear to 
preclude its further development. A possible explanation for the conflict between 
studies is that the non-speech Shams and fusion phenomena may recruit simpler 
neural networks than that activated by the cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli 
in the CoMG task. Connectivity with areas beyond the perceptual system may 
continue to mature during childhood so that subjective experience of the cross- 
modal perceptual causality phenomenon strengthens during development.
In terms of theoretical inter-relationships between the development of 
cognition and perception, as proposed by Michotte (1963) and Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992), the results of Experiment 3c could be interpreted to mean that the operation 
of perceptual causality processing serves the development of intuitive physics (a 
cognitive function). Continual development of audio-visual integrative pathways in 
the brain beyond early childhood would therefore be important to this specific 
perception/cognition relationship, much as the developmental trajectory of the 
McGurk effect implies that early perceptual integration supports the development of 
a complex distributed neural network for speech comprehension.
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The findings that age is correlated with both perceptual causality and 
intuitive physics, and that the two are also significantly inter-related are ambiguous 
(Experiment 3c). Once unique variance attributable to age is controlled, the 
remaining partial correlation between perceptual and cognitive task performance is 
no longer significant (although a trend in the hypothesised direction is obtained). 
More importantly, the regression model for the group data indicates that there is no 
significant unique contribution of perceptual causality variance that accounts for 
variation in intuitive physics scores.
Age mediation between the perceptual predictor and cognitive outcome may 
therefore reflect parallel or conjoined developmental trajectories. One parsimonious 
explanation of age mediation here is that general neurological maturation takes 
place during development that affects both perceptual and cognitive processing. 
This view would position relationships between perception and cognition as an 
epiphenomenon, contradicting the prediction of a privileged relationship between 
the subjective experience of causality and the ability to understand physical cause- 
and-effect made by Michotte (1963). There are empirical precedents for such a 
‘universal factor’ interpretation of the data. Nettlebeck and Wilson (1985), Hale 
(1990) and Kail (1991) have all proposed that processing speed improves 
developmentally, facilitating improvement in universal intellectual ability. 
Processing speed is derived from inspection time tasks, which measure the time 
required to discriminate between two simple visual stimuli (e.g. two lines of 
differing length) at a given level of accuracy under varying presentation durations. 
Systematic decrease in inspection time thresholds (ITs) is negatively related to 
chronological age, and inversely correlated with mental age.
106
Given the basic perceptual nature of the stimuli used in IT tasks, a simple 
explanation of the age-mediated relationship between perceptual causality and 
physical causal cognition in Experiment 3c is that as processing speed increases, 
audio-visual integrative efficiency improves, as does development of neurological 
processes supporting faster recall of stored information. However, the ‘general 
factor’ interpretation fails to account for the gender difference found between 
subgroup regression models, which suggests that male and female developmental 
trajectories differ in terms of the relationships between perceptual causality and 
intuitive physics. A gender-specific individual difference effect exists for boys; 
elevated experience of cross-modal perceptual causality predicts better aptitude in 
the causal physics task in the males alone. No unique relationship between 
perceptual causality and intuitive physics measures was found for the girls after 
controlling for age variance, and so there is no evidence of an individual differences 
effect within the female data. If the correlation between scores on the CoMG and 
WHN?T tasks in the overall analysis was simply the product of a general factor that 
improves with age, then no such gender-specific finding should be obtained.
Michotte (1963) predicted that the perceptual causality and causal cognition 
would be related, although he asserted that this association between perceptual 
experience and generalised representational knowledge would hold across all 
domains, physical and psychological. That this perception/cognition relationship 
appears to relate to boys’ development alone (or is more tightly yoked together 
during development in boys than in girls) argues against this idea. Spelke and 
Kinzler (2007) maintain that a privileged relationship between object perception and
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physical causal cognition has its basis in innate knowledge. Use of geometric 
relationships, numerosity discrimination, and knowledge of the physical properties 
of objects do not emerge at significantly different times or demonstrate significantly 
different levels of achievement at any given age between sexes during early 
development (Newcombe, Huttenlocher & Learmonth, 1999; Xu & Spelke, 2000; 
Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998). On the basis of this evidence, Spelke (2005) states 
that the innate knowledge that initiates concept enrichment and representational 
flexibility across development is common to both sexes, and hence there is no 
‘innate’ male predisposition towards science at the cognitive level.
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) alternatively speculated that relationship between 
perception and cognition in the physical domain is driven by perceptual processing 
of environmental stimuli. As neurobiological differences are established in adult 
male and female brains (Baron-Cohen, Knickermeyer & Belmonte, 2005), the 
finding that boys and girls differ in terms of relationships between age, perceptual 
causality and intuitive physics could be argued to support her arguments; variation 
in male aptitude for physical science appears to have its origins in individual 
differences in recovering causal organisation from perceptual stimuli, but women’s 
scientific ability appears to be related to brain maturation and development of 
general intelligence. This interpretation leaves open the question of whether 
perceptual processing generates maturation of cognitive architectures, or whether 
cognitive processing of perception supports maturation of neural connections, so 
that perceptual signalling is enhanced by top-down factors, as Spelke and Kinzler 
(2007) imply.
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Issues of neural connectivity will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5, 
within the context of developmental disorders. If such a feedback/feedforward 
subsystem exists so that subjective experience and cognitive ability are inter-related 
with respect to the physical domain, then it can be inferred from the data obtained in 
Experiment 3 that this architecture is more relevant to the general male phenotype 
than the female, as indicated by evidence of a unique significant individual 
difference effect between CoMG and WHN?T scores in the male subgroup only. 
Innate representational knowledge of physics may be equivalent between genders 
(Spelke, 2005), but implicit knowledge acquisition through perceptual causality 
exprience would provide a natural male advantage in later development, or at least 
orientation of larger numbers of boys than girls towards physical sciences. Review 
of statistics and research into the relative proportions of each gender represented in 
science academia and related career fields (Halpem et al., 2007) concords with such 
an extrapolation.
The alternative explanation of the sex difference found between the 
regression models in Experiment 3c is that an undetected sampling bias may exist 
between the gender subgroups, such that more intellectually talented boys than girls 
were recruited. The sexes are known to vary in that the normal frequency 
distribution curves for IQ scores contain a disproportionate number of men at both 
tail ends, with greater variance in male IQ than in female IQ across the population 
(Jackson & Rushton, 2006; Deary, Thorpe, Wilson, Starr & Whalley, 2003), and so 
this is a possible alternative explanation.
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By no means can the data presented here be said to point unequivocally to 
the interpretation presented of sex differences in maturational development of 
cognitive domains. Experiment 3 represents solely an exploration of the 
hypothetical relationship between perceptual and cognitive development in a 
specific domain in which males are thought to exhibit superiority. The interpretation 
of the findings from Experiment 3 is that physics knowledge is naturally acquired in 
males from processing causal spatio-temporal relationships between objects, but 
that females have to learn this same knowledge explicitly. Such an implicit 
acquisition process would generate substantially more knowledge in male 
individuals with more efficient cross-modal processing, and so individual difference 
effects would arise across time in boys, leading to a positive correlation between the 
subjective experience of cause and effect and explicit knowledge of physical 
causality. Evidence of this individual difference effect was obtained in boys, but not 
girls.
Given the fact that IQ was not controlled in this study, it remains to be seen 
whether the findings represent a ‘true’ gender difference; the male 
perception/cognition relationship may be mediated by a cognitive factor such as 
non-verbal IQ, which has not been controlled in this study. Development of a 
universal processing factor and general neural maturation common to both genders 
but masked by a sampling bias (caused by higher frequency of talented boys 
amongst the science museum visitors) may also have distorted results. Further 
research is suggested in which talented individuals with high verbal and non-verbal 
IQs of both genders are tested on measures of cross-modal integration and a battery 
of socio-cognitive and cognitive tasks. However, assuming that the two gender
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groups are equivalent in this study, this exploration has been fruitful, as it has 
yielded early evidence that perceptual differences may be related to cognitive 
performance variation, and that cross-modal perception does develop (in some sub­
populations at least) outside of infancy.
2.6 General Discussion and Conclusion
At the start of this chapter, the view that autism reflects a developmental 
perceptual phenotype that generates the specific behavioural and cognitive profile 
characteristic of ASD (O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2006) was considered in terms of 
what is currently understood about the inter-related development of perception and 
cognition, within the context of brain maturation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; 2007). As 
a research area, neuroconstructivism is far from established, and so the study 
presented in this chapter represents an early exploration of some of the issues 
pertinent to typical development implicit within this idea.
The cognitive domain chosen to examine was that of intuitive physics. This 
is relevant to this thesis in general because it is thought that individuals with ASD 
may generally exhibit superiority in this ability, relative to other skills. Furthermore, 
this function is considered to relate more to the male cognitive phenotype than the 
female (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Given the evidence of neurobiological differences 
between genders and their disparate cognitive profiles (Baron-Cohen, Knickermeyer 
& Belmonte, 2005; Halpem et al., 2007), it is plausible to suppose that biases exist 
in cross-modal integration systems such that integrative products activate socio- 
cognitive processes in ‘female type’ brains, and non-social cognitive processes in 
‘male type’ brains. This conjecture is an extrapolation from the Extreme Male Brain
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theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002), in which he asserts that the biology of the 
male brain is distorted in ASD to the extent that small differences in neural 
architecture biasing some cognitive processes over others in males are exaggerated. 
Individuals with ASD, irrespective of gender, therefore generally present a 
cognitive phenotype that reflects an extreme version of the typical functioning of 
the ‘male-type’ brain, in which intuitive physics is over-developed to the detriment 
of development of socio-cognitive functions such as emotional comprehension.
Applying that logic to results from Experiment 3 generates a theoretical 
conflict. The original motivation for this thesis was to consider whether, as Iarocci 
and McDonald (2006) predict, the ‘perceptual incoherence’ reported by many 
people with ASD reflects multisensory processing problems at the perceptual level 
that are related to the distinctive cognitive and behavioural phenotypes associated 
with ASD. If, however, ASD is related to a superior male ability that is in part the 
product of perceptual integration, as concluded in Experiment 3, then tests of cross- 
modal perceptual causality should reveal no difference between groups of children 
matched for age, gender and intelligence. Yet if cross-modal integration is generally 
compromised at the perceptual level, then the facilitating effect cross-modal 
perceptual has on development of intuitive physics found in boys (Experiment 3) 
should not apply. Therefore, any superiority an individual with ASD exhibits with 
respect to intuitive physics must have developed through an alternate maturational 
process, in which case such they would not represent an ‘extreme male’.
Consideration of this theoretical conflict is the motivation for examining 
cross-modal integration in relation to the Broader Autism Phenotype (Chapter 3)
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and ASD (Chapter 4). In both chapters, cognitive performance on tasks in which 
ASD is thought to confer an advantage is measured in addition to assessing cross- 
modal perceptual causality, so that both cross-modal perceptual integration in 
relation to ASD, and hypothetical ‘privileged’ perception/cognition relationships 
relevant to ASD can be investigated.
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Chapter 3: The Broader Autism Phenotype, cross-modal integration and
cognitive superiorities.
3.1 Overview
Autism is known to have a strong genetic component (Bailey et al., 1995). 
Many relatives of individuals with ASD have been shown to exhibit the Broader 
Autism Phenotype (BAP; Bailey, Palferman, Heavey & Le Couteur 1998), in which 
behavioural aspects of the spectrum are represented in milder form as traits. If 
cross-modal perceptual integration is broadly deficient in ASD, then it should be 
possible to identify a weakness in this respect within BAP adults.
It has also been argued that aggregation of autistic traits is related to 
scientific talent (Baron-Cohen, 2008b), and superior visual disembedding with 
respect to the EFT (Happe, Briskman & Frith, 2001). Hence the BAP provides a 
non-clinical analogue model sample for testing both perceptual integration, and its 
relationships with the autistic cognitive phenotype (Wakabayashi et al., 2006). 
Autistic traits are distributed normally across the population (Baron-Cohen, 2008b), 
and so individuals expressing the BAP should be identifiable in a student sample 
using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a).
In the first study, the perceptual causality task from Experiment 3 is adapted 
in Experiment 4 to incorporate trials with visual cues known to evoke causal 
percepts. This adaptation allows audio-visually induced perceptual causality to be 
contrasted with its generation by visual ‘causal capture’ (i.e., where an 
unambiguous visual cue elicits the same phenomenon; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002),
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to establish whether any deficit found is specific to cross-modal integration. This 
study also includes data from the Intuitive Physics task (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Scahill, Lawson & Spong, 2001), in order to determine whether 
heightened ability in physics is associated with the BAP, and to explore whether it 
relates to perceptual integration both within and across modes.
Experiment 5 repeats the task used in Experiment 3 to determine the 
temporal pattern of response to cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli associated 
with the broader autism phenotype, to determine whether spatio-temporal 
contingencies constraining autistic perceptual integration might be atypical. 
Reported superiority of people exhibiting the BAP in terms of Embedded Figures 
Task performance (Happe, Briskman & Frith, 2001) is also re-investigated in this 
experiment. Weak central coherence theory (Happe & Frith, 2006) states that 
elevated accuracy levels and reduced response latencies on this task reflect a general 
cognitive bias towards detail processing. However, performance of the EFT by 
participants with ASD could be argued to be perceptually-driven (Jarrold, Gilchrist 
& Bender, 2005; Pellicano, Gibson, Maybery, Durkin & Badcock, 2005). Enhanced 
visual detail processing is potentially related to compromised audio-visual 
integration; hypothetically performance on the EFT should show an inverse 
relationship with performance on the cross-modal perceptual causality task. The 
study therefore also allows exploration of a proposed link between weak central 
coherence, the BAP and perceptual integration.
Given evidence of sex differences with respect to both cognitive tasks used, 
the analytical approach taken includes consideration of male versus female
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performance as well as BAP vs. non-BAP group performance on both the EFT and 
the Intuitive Physics tests, in order to determine whether results are simply 
indicative of male: female ratio biases in low and high AQ scoring groups. 
Comparison of male versus female performance within these groups is also 
undertaken in order to evaluate the claim within Extreme Male Brain theory (Baron- 
Cohen, 2002) that autism represents an exaggeratedly male brain. Many of the 
concepts relating to this chapter have not been provided in Chapter 1, and so 
Chapter 3 includes a literature review prior to presentation of Experiments 4 and 5.
3.2 Introduction
Across the last decade, the parameters and components of Broader Autism 
Phenotype have been widely debated. The triad of behaviours at the centre of ASD 
diagnosis has been evidenced in the BAP in relation to pragmatic and 
formal/cognitive aspects of language, impaired social skills (ability to form 
friendships and atypical social play) and repetitive or obsessive tendencies (Bailey 
et al., 1998; Fombonne, Bolton, Prior, Jordan & Rutter, 1997; Murphy, Bolton, 
Pickles, Fombonne, Piven & Rutter, 2000). The repetitious and obsessive traits 
discovered generally appear in association with either social or communication 
challenges (Bolton et al., 1994). In addition, behavioural self-report of parents with 
sons with autism indicate that some parents and siblings have patterns of social and 
non-social preferences and abilities similar to the affected child (Briskman, Happd 
& Frith, 2001).
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Similarly, outside of triad-related behaviours, Happe, Frith and Briskman 
(2001) investigated whether cognitive markers associated with ASD are also found 
in relation to the BAP. Their research has indicated that family members of children 
with ASDs tend to exhibit a similar cognitive profile in relation to tests for weak 
central coherence, including the Embedded Figures Task and the Block Design Test 
(Kohs, 1923, cited in Shah & Frith, 1993). Performance on both of these tasks was 
found to be superior in fathers in comparison with mothers of target children, and 
with control parents of either TD or dyslexic children.
Generally, then, continuity exists between the fundamental cognitive and 
behavioural profiles typifying ASD and the BAP. It is thought that the continuum 
between individuals with ASD and their families extends into the general 
population, in which case it should be possible to identify the BAP in individuals 
whose families do not have direct connections with the diagnosis of ASD. A 
proportion of the ‘normal’ population who have inherited several autism genes 
without reaching the threshold required for expression of diagnosable ASD should 
be identifiable; these individuals should manifest many of the traits associated with 
diagnostic criteria. Such people can be identified through screening using the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient, a scale used by Wakabayashi et al. (2006) to determine 
that ‘autistic-ness’ is an independent personality trait. Most people (93%) without a 
diagnosis have an AQ score between 0 and 25, and 99% of individuals with ASD 
score 26 or above, with 80% scoring above 32 (Baron-Cohen, 2008b). Mapping the 
broader phenotype onto the top 10% of the ‘normal’ range of autistic trait 
expression therefore provides an opportunity to expand empirical ASD research 
using the BAP as ‘analogue’ model (Wakabayashi et al., 2006).
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3.2.1 The Broader Autism Phenotype and perceptual causality
Research into the broader phenotype has been focused on relating 
behavioural and cognitive characteristics with the autistic genotype, and so little 
extant research can be outlined here regarding the BAP and perceptual processing. 
However, there is early evidence that perceptual differences associated with ASD 
can also be found at an attenuated level within families of affected individuals. For 
instance, Dalton, Nacewicz, Alexander and Davidson (2006) have used eye-tracking 
techniques to show that the unaffected siblings of children with autism produce 
fewer fixations to the eye regions when viewing static pictures of faces than do 
controls.
This finding has been supported by a study of eye fixation during social 
interaction, in which at-risk six month old infants were found to gaze less than 
controls from unaffected families at their mother’s eyes and more at their mouths 
(Merin, Young, Ozonoff & Rogers, 2007). Similarly, scores on the AQ were found 
to negatively correlate with reflexive attentional shifts when viewing faces with 
averted eye gaze in a student sample (Bayliss, di Pellegrino & Tipper, 2005), 
suggesting insensitivity to this perceptual cue. Fathers of autistic children have also 
been shown to have general reaction time delays relative to control fathers on a task 
assessing reflexive attentional responses to visual cues, irrespective of the social 
(eyes) or non-social (arrows) nature of the cues (Scheeren & Stauder, 2008).
Although these studies mainly use social stimuli, together they suggest that 
the BAP may represent an intermediate stage along a continuum with ASD in terms
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of a common perceptual-attentional profile. This suggestion is supported by recent 
evidence (McCleery, Allman, Carver & Dobkins, 2007) showing a link between 
familial risk of ASD and enhanced low-level perceptual processing (as assessed by 
luminance contrast sensitivity).
Induction of perceptual causality phenomena by unimodal and cross-modal 
cues has not been examined in relation to ASD previously, to my knowledge. With 
respect to unambiguous perceptual causality, however, recent comparison of the 
ability of children with ASD, TD children and children with MLD to correctly 
discriminate between movies of causal launching events and non-causal control 
events (in which launching was delayed) produced evidence of atypical causal 
perception in the target group alone (Ray & Schlottman, 2007). The children with 
ASD in this study were equally likely to categorise the control and launching events 
as being physical in nature, unlike both groups of control children who viewed the 
causal trials as being physical more frequently than the delayed launch trials. Ray 
and Schlottman (2007) concluded that the critical factor influencing autistic 
performance in their study was the short duration of the information critical to 
generating causal percepts in their stimuli (an interval of 21 milliseconds), hence 
suggesting that the temporal encoding of perceptual information may be corrupted 
in ASD. On the basis of this interpretation, varying auditory signal presentation in 
cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli is hypothesised to generate an unusual 
pattern of causal percept experience in individuals with high autistic trait expression 
(Experiment 5).
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Taken together, these studies suggest that the frequency of experiencing 
causal perception may be reduced in relation to the BAP, given that children with 
ASD may have unusual temporal parameters constraining perceptual causality and 
that individuals with the BAP have been shown to have some perceptual 
atypicalities in common with ASD. Both Experiments 4a and 5a measure sensitivity 
to perceptual causality in the BAP under a range of conditions designed to consider 
the influence of perceptual and temporal factors.
3,2.2 The Broader Autism Phenotype and Intuitive Physics
Science aptitude is thought to be related at the genetic level to Asperger 
Syndrome and autism. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stott, Bolton and Goodyer 
(1997) found that fathers of children with autism are over-represented in 
professional engineering. Autism prevalence is also exaggerated in families of 
engineers, mathematicians and physicists (Baron-Cohen, Bolton, Wheelwright, 
Scahill, Mead & Smith, 1998; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Burtenshaw & Hobson, 
2007). Parents of ASD probands were also found to score highly on the social and 
communication subscales of the AQ (Bishop, Maybery, Maley, Hill, Wong & 
Hallmayer, 2004, but see also Scheeren & Stauder, 2008). Groups of students taking 
scientific degrees produce significantly higher total AQ mean scores than control 
groups of students whose subjects are not science-related (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Thus academic and vocational 
aptitudes may be related to autistic-like perceptual, attentional and social 
behaviours, reflecting an association between the broad autism genotype and
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domain-specific cognitive abilities, found within both families and student 
populations.
The connection between science and the BAP is further substantiated by 
individuals with autism who exhibit dissociated ‘savant’ skills in relation to 
calendrical or mathematical calculation (Hermelin, 2002), high-functioning 
individuals with autism who excel in technical and mathematical fields (Baron- 
Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone & Rutherford, 1999) and empirical findings of spared 
or superior innate intuitive physics ability in several studies of children and adults 
with ASD (see Chapter 4).
Taken together, the evidence of science- and maths-related ‘islets of ability’ 
outside of general intellectual functioning, and the relationship between familial 
BAP and science aptitude suggests that specific alleles exist within the autistic 
genotype that confer scientific aptitudes. Students with relatively high autistic trait 
expression should therefore generally produce high Intuitive Physics task scores, 
irrespective of gender (Experiment 4b).
3.2.3 Weak central coherence and the Broader Autism Phenotype
Weakened central coherence, or the tendency to process local details at the 
expense of forming global representations, has been found to characterise the 
Broader Autism Phenotype in relation to fathers of diagnosed children (Bolte & 
Poutska, 2006; Briskman, Happe & Frith, 2001), although fathers within families
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with an autistic child do not always do better on the Block Design Test (Fombonne, 
Bolton, Prior, Jordan, & Rutter, 1997; Piven & Palmer, 1997)
Evidence that global processing is not necessarily deficient in ASD (e.g. 
Mottron, Burack, Stauder & Robaey, 1999) led to weak central coherence theory 
being redefined as a cognitive preference or bias for processing detail (Happe & 
Booth, 2008). Local processing superiority, rather than a global deficit, may 
therefore be the mechanism underpinning elevated autistic performance, reflecting a 
particular perceptual profile specific to autistic perception. Jarrold, Gilchrist and 
Bender (2005) found that enhanced single visual feature search performance was 
correlated with EFT latencies in ASD, whereas it correlated with conjunction search 
in typically-developing controls, suggesting that this idea has merit. Also, Pellicano, 
Gibson, Maybery, Durkin and Badcock (2005) have tested the association of global 
motion coherence thresholds with EFT measures in children diagnosed with ASD. 
Relative to typically developing children, children with ASD took less time to 
resolve CEFT trials and showed higher global motion thresholds when tested with 
dynamic global dot matrix (GDM) patterns. These researchers also found that the 
two tasks to be inversely related in the ASD group; faster (i.e., superior) visual 
disembedding was found to be related to greater difficulty with processing motion.
This relationship between motion processing and EFT superiority is relevant 
here because the cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli are dynamic; weakened 
processing of motion information is therefore a potential mechanism for the audio­
visual integration deficit predicted to be related to the BAP. In Experiment 5c, the 
inverse correlation between motion and detail processing in ASD reported by
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Pellicano et al. (2005) serves to suggest that enhanced EFT performance will be 
related to decreased cross-modal perceptual causality sensitivity in the broader 
phenotype sample.
3.2.4 Extreme male brain theory and the Broader Autism Phenotype
In accordance with Extreme Male Brain theory and gender imbalances 
evident in ASD, the broader autism phenotype appears to be more prevalent among 
men than women. This gender bias towards males is corroborated by the fact that 
more male students than females score highly on the AQ (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001), and in general males’ AQ scores 
are significantly higher than females’, although women with ASD score similarly to 
men (Wheelwright, Baron-Cohen, Goldenfeld, Delaney, Fine, Smith, Weil & 
Wakabayashi, 2006).
However, general gender differences in performance of tasks relating to ASD 
research have been well-established, and so consideration must be given to whether 
any BAP differences highlighted in Experiments 4 and 5 are due simply to gender 
effects reflecting sex imbalances between groups. Baron-Cohen (2002) is careful to 
argue that ‘male brain’ females (i.e., with the Broader Autism Phenotype) do exist, 
but that they are relatively rarer than men displaying this phenotype. Correlation 
between AQ totals and scores on the Systemising Quotient (SQ) which looks at 
tendencies to think at detail-level in systematic ways suggests that women with 
many autistic behavioural traits generally resemble extreme systemisers, just as high 
AQ scoring men do (Wheelwright et al., 2006). Therefore females with the BAP 
from a student population should perform similarly to equivalent males on cognitive
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tasks in which autistic performance is generally superior, such as Intuitive Physics 
tests or the EFT (Experiments 4b and 5b).
3.2.5 Summary of Hypotheses
The primary aim of this chapter is to determine whether the BAP is 
associated with compromised perceptual integration, as evidenced by reduced 
susceptibility to cross-modal perceptual causality. The secondary motivation is to 
consider perceptual/cognitive relationships associated with the BAP.
The BAP group should manifest compromised sensitivity to cross-modal 
perceptual causality stimuli in Experiment 4 (by extension from Iarocci & 
McDonald, 2006). In Experiment 5 this group should produce an atypically flat 
response to varying temporal correspondence between auditory and visual 
components (by extension from Ray & Schlottman, 2007). Conversely, low AQ 
scorers should present relatively heightened sensitivity and normal temporal 
response patterns in these two experiments, on the basis that they represent the 
opposite end of the autistic continuum within the normal population.
According to EMB theory and known gender differences, performance on 
tasks in which individuals with autism generally show superiorities (Intuitive 
Physics and EFT) should be elevated in men, who should generally outperform 
women. Individuals with the BAP (high AQ scorers with exaggeratedly male 
brains) should show significant differences from low AQ scorers, (i.e., who
124
represent ‘extreme female brains’). These hypotheses are tested in Experiments 4b 
and 5b.
A significant positive correlation between intuitive physics scores and 
perceptual causality responsiveness was found in TD boys in Experiment 3. 
However it is hypothesised that high AQ scoring participants will show both 
atypically low responsivity to cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli (Experiment 
4a) and superior physics ability (Experiment 4b). If the same perception/cognition 
relationship found in Experiment 3 is obtained in typical men (Experiment 4c) then 
on the basis of EMB theory it should also be found in the BAP group, therefore the 
prediction for Experiment 4c conflicts with the hypotheses in Experiments 4a and 
4b.
In Experiment 5c it is predicted that suppressed cross-modal perceptual 
causality responsiveness will be related to faster response latencies on the EFT with 
respect to the BAP data, based on findings from EFT/global motion processing 
research (Pellicano et al., 2005) that the degree of compromise in processing 
dynamic visual stimuli is negatively related to EFT performance in ASD.
3.3 Experiment 4: The BAP, Perceptual Causality and Intuitive Physics.
3.3.1 Introduction
The objective in this study was to determine whether cross-modal perceptual 
integration is compromised in relation to the broader autism phenotype. Responses
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to audio-visual stimuli inducing the percept of causality were therefore contrasted 
with responses to simple ambiguous stimuli (in which no disambiguating cues were 
presented) across groups categorised by either Low, Medium or High total AQ 
scores (with high scores representing BAP). An additional visual condition was 
added to the task so that any cross-modal effects found between groups could be 
compared to the effects generated by a within-mode (visual only) cue. The visual 
cue used mimicked the causal capture stimuli developed by Scholl and Nakayama 
(2002; see Figure 3.1), in which an unambiguous causal launch event is presented 
immediately below the ambiguous event. In the original study, Scholl and 
Nakayama (2002) reported a launch percept percentage of 92.1% in response to 
similar stimuli, and concluded that an inference of causality automatically 
generalises to the ambiguous event when it is presented alongside an unambiguous 
contextual causal event. Such stimuli offer an opportunity to run a within-group 
comparison condition to ensure that any deficits in cross-modal perceptual causality 
found in relation to the BAP are specific to cue type, and not simply a reflection of 
poor perceptual causality per se in this group.
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Ball 1 Ball 2
o- -Oo- ~ * o
Ball 3 Ball 4
Ball 1/Ball 2
Ball 3/Ball 4
Ball 1 or 2? Ball 1 or 2?
Ball 3 Ball 4
Figure 3.1: Visual capture stimulus (derived from Scholl & Nakayama. 2002).
3.3.2 Method 
Participants
Participant recruitment and data collection in this study was supported in 
part by undergraduate psychology students under the supervision of L. Grayson and 
Prof. S. Killcross. A total of 114 Cardiff University undergraduate participants were 
recruited, 109 of whom completed all 3 tasks. This volunteer group comprised 48 
males and 60 females aged between 18 and 49 years. All participants had normal or 
corrected vision and normal hearing. The following diagnostic exclusions applied:
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Dyslexia; colour blindness; Attention Deficit (Hyperactivity) Disorder; Aspergers 
Syndrome and High Functioning Autism.
Group N Age range Mean age Standard
(years) (years;months) Devations
Male 49 19-41 21;0 3;2
Female 60 19-49 21 ;3 4;8
Total 109 1 9 - 4 9 21;2 4;1
Table 3.1: Sample age distribution by Gender (Experiment 4)
Apparatus
The AQ (Appendix D) was provided as a 50 item pen and paper self-report 
questionnaire for which a 4 point Likert-type scale applied; scores were entered into 
a spreadsheet template to avoid reversal mistakes by the researchers. The 
launch/pass perceptual causality task (the Crash or Miss Game) was presented on 
20 identical flat-screen LCD monitors on flat measuring 33.8 by 26.9cm, with a 
screen resolution set to 800 by 600 pixels and screen refresh rate of 60Hz, running 
from generic PC hard drives. To ensure that sound presentation intensity was 
equivalent between participants, the system sound was set to a defined level for 
each experimental session, and sounds were presented via headphones at a pressure 
level of 68dB5. The task was presented in VisionEgg and programmed in Python. 
The programme collected data from each participant as a separate text file, allowing 
for collation in Excel. Data were recorded via PC mouse button presses; a standard 
IntelliMouse Optical 1.1 A USB mouse was provided for each PC on which a red 
sticker had been placed to indicate the left button, and a yellow sticker had been 
attached to highlight the right button.
5 Dominant frequency 2719 Hz; auditory stimulus duration measured at 5.5ms.
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The Intuitive Physics6 task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b) was provided as a 
pen and paper exercise (Appendix E). This task comprises 20 multiple-choice 
items, each asking the participant to identify which of four options correctly 
answers a question in relation to a diagram of a mechanical system. A correct score 
total was provided for each participant by marking responses against the answer set 
supplied by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b).
Crash or Miss Game Stimuli
All trial stimuli comprised two-dimensional green, white or a combination of 
green and white disks, each subtending a visual angle of 2.1 degrees7 , which were 
presented against a black background, moving along the horizontal plane. The 
speed for disk movement was set at a constant of 24 degrees8 per second for half the 
practice trials and 35 degrees per second for the remaining practice and all session 
trials. The ten practice trials were a mixture of trial types to be included in the 
experimental session and some unique trials included to prevent any explicit ‘rule 
learning’ that might evoke cognitive interpretation of later trials.
Control trials provided unambiguous launch displays and unambiguous pass 
displays. In the first of these, a disk in either green or white moved towards a 
second stationary disk in the alternative colour and stopped adjacent to it, at which 
point the second disk moved at the same speed for the same duration. For the 
second, a disk of one colour moved towards a second stationary disk in the
6 Downloaded from http://www.autismresearchcentre.com/tests/intuitive physics test.asp. on 23rd 
November, 2005.
7 At an estimated average viewing distance of 57cm (Viewing distance between participants could 
not be constrained).
8 At a viewing distance of 57cm
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alternative colour until this disk was completely occluded, and then continued its 
trajectory.
Experimental trials were categorised as either Ambiguous (both disks being 
the same colour), or Visual (an ambiguous event presented in conjunction with a 
contextual unambiguous launch; Figure 3.1), or Audio-Visual (an ambiguous event 
in which a click was provided at the point of the disks’ spatial coincidence). The 
context event in the Visual trials was presented one disk height below the horizontal 
plane, with the point of adjacency set to coincide with spatial occlusion of the 
ambiguous event above.
Trials within each trial type (10 crash; 4 miss; 30 Ambiguous; 20 Visual; 20 
Audio-Visual respectively) were counterbalanced in terms of starting point (screen 
left or right) duration (either 650, 700 or 750ms) and first moving disk colour 
(either green or white). All trials started with a 200ms offset, after which the first 
moving disk in the horizontal plane ‘flashed’ three times for 5ms (with two 
stimulus offset durations of 500ms between flashes); this served to direct attention 
exogenously to this ball prior to the start of the trial. Starting positions also varied; 
three start points were provided for both right and left presentations of each trial 
type, with event distances for both the main and any context event calculated on the 
fly to maintain a speed constancy of 35 degrees per second, as prescribed by the 
specific duration set for each trial. The start positions of the context capture events 
were adjusted automatically at programme level to ensure adjacency of the 
colliding disks coincided with the point of total disk occlusion within the 
ambiguous event presented above, such that both events’ stationary disks were
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aligned at the trial start. The start and stop positions for all events, irrespective of 
trial type, were equidistant from the midline of the presentation screen. Variation in 
start positions, in conjunction with left/right presentation and random alternation 
between colours for the first moving disk, prevented observers from making pre­
emptive judgements based on learnt associations from prior experience.
Experimental trials assigned to each trial type therefore varied according to 
the start position, disk colour and right/left screen presentation of the moving disk. 
As far as possible, these different factors were counterbalanced within and across 
trial types. For each trial type, the trials were randomised prior to being assigned to 
one of five blocks. Each blocked therefore comprised 17 trials (apart from the final 
block, which was reduced to 16 trials). Within-block order was then randomised for 
each participant. This method ensured that an equal number of trials of each type 
was presented per block, to avoid generating any perceptual biases that may have 
affected high and low AQ scoring participants differentially.
Procedure
Task presentation order was invariant across participants. The AQ was 
completed prior to the CoMG, which was followed by the Intuitive Physics task. 
The CoMG task was presented in a well-lit computer laboratory at varying times of 
the day. Instructions were provided onscreen. Participants were instructed to press 
the red mouse button whenever they saw an onscreen event they perceived as being 
a crash (launch), or the yellow mouse button for a miss (pass). Participants 
completed a practice set of 10 trials before proceeding directly to the experimental 
session. Red and yellow response prompts remained onscreen during each trial.
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After each response, the message ‘press the space bar to continue’ was presented. 
This message did not appear until a response had been made. No response was 
accepted by the program until each trial had completed presentation; pre-emptive 
button presses were implicitly trained out of early responders as the session did not 
continue until they responded again after the disks stopped moving.
Blocks were delineated by the presentation of onscreen graphics and 
voiceover messages, allowing participants to rest between blocks and to choose (by 
pressing the spacebar) when they wanted to continue. The experiment concluded 
with onscreen presentation of a thank you message.
3.3.3 Results
Outlier analysis and group allocation
Four outliers (three female and one male) were identified through analysis 
of total errors produced by collapsing the ‘crash’ and ‘miss’ control trial data; total 
accuracy scores for each of these participants exceeded 2 standard deviations below 
the mean for the entire group. After outlier exclusion, all participants reported 10 
out of 14 unambiguous trials correctly. Six participants were identified as having 
accuracy scores that fell more than 1 standard deviation below the group mean for 
the unambiguous control variable, but as this variable showed a strong ceiling effect 
it was considered that their removal would reduce power if an over-stringent 
exclusion criterion was applied. Mean accuracy scores between gender subgroups 
did not differ significantly (//(male) = 1.87; //(female) = 1.79; /(103) = 0.85,/?
>.05).
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Group N Range Mean AQ
score
(/50)
Standard
Deviations
Men 48 2 -2 7 14.3 5.7
Women 57 3 -2 7 13.1 5.3
Totals 105 2 - 2 7 13.7 5.5
Table 3.2: Total AO scores by Gender (Experiment 4).
The 105 remaining participants produced total AQ scores ranging from 2 to 
27. Mean scores and standard deviations by gender are provided in Table 3.2 (for 
subscale statistics, see Appendix F). The mean and standard deviations obtained 
were comparable with those produced by testing a population of 174 adults (16.4 
and 6.3, respectively; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b), although the distribution derived 
from these data displayed a slight bias towards the lower end of the scale. 
Assessment of values obtained for kurtosis {ifo = -.49) and skewness (rji = 1.01) 
indicated that these data were normally distributed (as were the distributions 
obtained from each gender sub-group). Mean AQ scores obtained from each gender 
sub-group (Table 3.2) were not significantly different (?(103) = 1.11, p>.05).
It was decided to use one standard deviation above and below the AQ 
distribution mean as the method to define group boundaries for analysis. As the AQ 
produces integer scores, the decimal places criterion was set at zero meaning that 
the standard deviation of 6 produced an upper score limit of 20 and a lower limit of 
8. Participants within and including these scores were considered as falling into the 
medium score group, participants with scores of 21 or above were allocated to the 
high AQ score (BAP) group, and those with scores of 7 or below were grouped as 
low AQ scorers. The groups obtained corresponded with those that would be
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generated using top and bottom ten percentile criteria. Table 3.3 provides 
descriptive data for the groups generated on this basis.
Group N Gender
ratio
(M:F)
Range AQ 
scores
Mean AQ 
scores
Standard
Deviations
Low AQ 12 1:2 2 - 7 4.9 1.7
Medium AQ 80 1:1.22 8 - 2 0 13.4 3.4
High AQ (BAP) 13 1.6:1 2 1 -2 7 23.4 2.1
Totals 105 1:1.2 2 - 7 13.7 5.5
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics by AO Group (Experiment 4).
A one-way ANOVA of AQ scores by group confirmed that there was a 
significant effect of Group (F(2,102) = 110.1, p  <.0005)9. Dunnett t-tests (using the 
medium AQ group as the control group) indicated that the mean total AQ scores for 
the high and low scoring groups both significantly differ from the mean obtained 
for the medium-range AQ score group. High (BAP) and Low AQ groups showed 
gender imbalances, with two-thirds of the high group being male, and two-thirds of 
the low group being female. There was comparatively equal distribution between 
genders for the medium-scoring group. Comparison of the means of the collapsed 
control trial data between genders indicated that there was no significant difference 
in overall accuracy when making unambiguous crash and miss judgements between 
the male and female participants in this study (//(male) = 1.89; //(female) = 1.86; 
f(103) =0.85, p > .05). A one-way ANOVA with AQ Group as the between factor 
and total accuracy as the dependent variable also indicated that the groups 
categorised according to AQ scores did not differ in this respect (//(low AQ) = 1.89; 
//(medium AQ) = 1.87//(high AQ) = 1.86, F <1).
9 Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant, but no adjustment has been made on the 
basis that the F  statistic obtained is very large.
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Experiment 4a: Gender and AQ Group Crash Report Analysis for the CoMG task.
For the experimental data, there were three conditions of the within-subjects 
factor, Trial. These were defined by trial type: Ambiguous (no cue), Audio-Visual 
(‘click’ cue) and Visual ( ‘capture’ cue). The dependent measure was the proportion 
of crashes reported.
Analysis 1: Crash Reports by Gender
Trial type Gender N Mean Std. Deviation
Ambiguous Male_______ 48 .18___________ .22
_____________ Female 57 .14___________ A5_
_____________ Total 105 .16___________ .79
Audio-Visual Male 48 .66___________ 35
_____________ Female 57 .75___________ 31_
_____________ Total 105 .71___________ .33
Visual_______ Male 48 .69___________ 34
_____________ Female_____ 57 .78___________ .26
Total 105 .73 .30
Table 3. 4: Means and standard deviations of crash report proportions for each 
CoMG experimental Trial type, by Gender (Experiment 4a).
The descriptive statistics for the crash report proportions for each trial type 
according to gender are provided in Table 3.4. Performing a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA 
with Gender as the between-group factor and Trial as the within-group factor 
demonstrated that gender is not influential; neither a main effect of Gender 
(F( 1,103) = 1.88,/? >.05) nor an interaction between gender and trial type (F(2, 206) 
= 2.08, p  >.05) were obtained. However, a main effect of Trial (the within-subjects 
measure) was obtained (F(2,206) = 165.48, p < .0005)10. Bonferroni-adjusted post- 
hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that the Ambiguous trials produced
10 Statistic reported with Huynh-Feldt adjustment, as Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant.
significantly fewer crash reports than both cue-based trial types: (f(104) = -16.62, 
p<.0005 for Ambiguous vs. Audio-Visual trials; f(104) = -19.59, p<.0005 for 
Ambiguous vs. Visual trials). The Audio-Visual and Visual trial types were not 
found to be significantly different (f(104) = -.55, p > .05).
Analysis 2: Crash reports by AQ Group
□ Low AQ score (n =12)
■ Medium AQ score (n = 80)
■ High AQ score (n=13)
Ambiguous Audio-Visual Visual
Figure 3.2: Crash Reports by Trial Type and AQ Group (Experiment 4a).
The cell means and standard error values of crash responses for each trial 
type obtained from each AQ group are represented in Figure 3.2. With respect to 
the Ambiguous trials (no cue) the High AQ group perceived more crashes than the 
other two groups, whose crash report scores were comparable. However, high 
scorers reported the fewest crashes in response to both cue-based trial types, more 
so in the audio-visual than in the visual condition. The low AQ group reported more 
crashes than medium range group in response to both types of cue-based trials.
A 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA was performed to test the effect of categorisation 
by total AQ score (the between-group factor) on crash reports obtained for each
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trial type (the within-group factor). The main effect of Trial was significant 
(F(2,204) = 78.10, p  <.0005), confirming that the scores between trial types 
differed. No main effect of AQ group was found (F(2,102) = 1.21, p  >.05). 
However, a significant interaction between Trial and AQ group (F(4, 204) = 2.46, p 
< .05)11 was obtained, indicating that the specific pattern of responses to trial types 
varied significantly between groups.
Analysing the simple main effects for the within-subject factor established 
that trial type influenced the proportion of crashes reported for each AQ group 
(F(2,204) = 30.15, F(2,204) = 139.85, and F(2,204) = 7.84, for the Low, Medium 
and High scoring AQ groups respectively, p  <.005 for each value). Post-hoc mean 
difference analysis (Bonferroni-adjusted) at each level of AQ group showed that the 
Ambiguous condition was associated with significantly lower crash report 
proportions than either of the cue-based conditions ip <.001 for all comparisons), 
which did not significantly differ from each other.
Analysis of the simple main effects of AQ group (the between factor) at
each level of the within-subject factor obtained a significant result only within the
Ambiguous condition (F(2,102) = 5.14, p <.01). There were no significant effects
of AQ group on the proportion of crash responses found for either the Audio-Visual
or Visual trial types. Dunnett’s method for testing responses against a selected
group was used for post-hoc analysis of responses to the Ambiguous trial condition
because the number of crashes reported by the High AQ group looked unusually
elevated. The analysis established that crash response scores for both the Low and
11 The large discrepancies between cell sizes resulted in Mauchley’s test of sphericity being 
significant; Huynh-Feldt adjustment reduces this p value to a trend rather than significance (p =
.059).
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Medium scoring AQ group were significantly reduced in comparison to those 
obtained from the High AQ group for ambiguous trials.
As there was also some indication that crash response scores vary by AQ 
group with respect to the Audio-Visual condition, a direct comparison between 
crash report proportions for this condition obtained from the Low and High AQ 
groups was conducted. An independent samples /-test revealed a trend towards 
significance (t(23) = 1.87, p  =.07). This trend is in the hypothesised direction, and 
the Cohen’s d for this t-value is .78; an effect size of such high magnitude (Cohen, 
1988) suggests that power was too weak in the general analysis for this comparison 
to be revealed as significant at post-hoc level, and so a Type II error cannot be 
discounted.
Experiment 4a: Gender and AO Group Response Latency comparisons for the 
CoMG task
For this set of analyses, it was decided to include a reaction time measure 
derived from unambiguous trial types (the control conditions), in addition to 
latencies obtained from ambiguous trial types (the experimental conditions), to 
ensure that any differences in response latencies found between gender or AQ 
groups are not simply indicative of any general speed factor differences. Analysis of 
the reaction times for the unambiguous crash and miss control trials pooled across 
the entire data set indicated that they were not significantly different, but were 
correlated (//(crash) = 360.9ms; // (miss) = 385.7; /(104) = -.93,/? > .05; r=.58,p 
<.01). Therefore data from these two control conditions were averaged to create a
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baseline latency variable (Unambiguous), against which the experimental data could 
be compared.
Analysis 3: Latencies by Gender
Trial type Gender Mean Std. Deviation n
Unambiguous Male 359.40 265.43 48
Female 384.74 242.45 57
Total 373.15 252.29 105
Ambiguous Male 376.31 273.72 48
Female 425.42 326.97 57
Total 402.97 303.37 105
Audio-Visual Male 514.58 446.71 48
Female 533.93 509.95 57
Total 525.09 479.90 105
Visual Male 473.54 333.13 48
Female 480.37 321.02 57
Total 477.25 325.05 105
Table 3.5: Means and standard deviations of CoMG resDoni
(milliseconds) bv Trial Tvne and Gender (Experiment 4a).
Descriptive statistics for response latencies obtained for each trial type split 
by gender are provided in Table 3.5. Mean responses between genders and across 
trial types did not appear to vary considerably within genders or across trial types, 
the exception being that the audio-visual trials were generally longer (irrespective of 
gender). Analysis of response latencies using a 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA , with Gender 
as the between-group factor and Trial as the within-group factor, indicated that there 
was a main effect of Trial (F(3,309) = 10.79, p  <.001 after Huynh-Feldt 
adjustment). There was no evidence of significant difference between male and 
female subgroups; no main effect of Gender, or significant interaction between 
Gender and Trial, were obtained (F<1, in each case).
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Trial type Pairs Mean Differences 
(milliseconds)
T-test
Values
Significance*
Unambiguous vs. Ambiguous -29.82 -1.44 p > .05
Unambiguous vs. Audio- 
Visual
-151.93 -3.80 /?<.001
Unambiguous vs. Visual -104.10 -4.81 p  <.001
Ambiguous vs. Audio-Visual -122.11 -4.14 p<.001
Ambiguous vs. Visual -74.28 -3.29 p  =.001
Audio-Visual vs. Visual 47.84 1.26 P > 05
♦Significance level of two-tailed paired t-tests after Bonferroni adjustment.
Table 3.6: Post-hoc comparisons between Trial Type response latencies means in 
(Experiment 4a).
The main effect of trial was analysed further (Table 3.6). Post-hoc tests 
adjusted for multiple comparisons between trial types showed that response took 
longer in relation to the two cue-based experimental conditions than when no cue 
(Ambiguous trials) or ambiguity was present (Unambiguous trials). However, no 
significant differences between either Audio-Visual and Visual experimental trial 
types, or Ambiguous and Unambiguous trial types, were found.
Analysis 4: Latencies by AQ Group
Prior to analysis of the effect of AQ group on response latencies, outliers 
whose average response times relating to the Unambiguous latency variable were 
greater than two standard deviations away from the entire sample mean were 
removed, in order to exclude data that might disproportionately distort means (given 
the low sample sizes for the High and Low AQ groups). This led to four women and 
two men being omitted, all bar one High AQ female belonging to the Medium 
scoring group.
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Figure 3.3: Response latencies (Milliseconds) by Trial Type and AO Group 
(Experiment 4a).
As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the three AQ groups were broadly similar 
in terms of their averaged response times to unambiguous control trials. The Low 
AQ group latencies are generally consistent across all trials, and this group is shown 
to produce the fastest response times. Presentation of the audio-visual and visual 
cues appears to generate slower responses from the Medium AQ group. Across all 
three levels of ambiguous trials, the High AQ group produced the longest response 
times, particularly with respect to the audio-visual condition. Hence the pattern of 
latencies across trial types looks to vary between groups.
A 3 x 4 mixed ANOVA was conducted to consider the effect of AQ group 
(between-group factor) on response latencies by trial type (within-group factor) to 
test these observations. This analysis confirmed that there was a significant main 
effect of AQ group (F(2,96) = 3.17,/? < .05). The main effect of Trial remained 
significant (^(3,288) = 7.90, p <.005 after Huynh-Feldt adjustment to correct for 
sphericity problems); time to respond generally varied across trial types. A 
significant interaction was also found between Group and Trial, verifying that
B Low AQ score (n = 12)
B Medium AQ score (n = 80) 
B High AQ score (n = 13)
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patterns of response latencies across trial types did differ between AQ groups; 
F(6,288) = 3.32, p  < .05 (after Huynh-Feldt adjustment).
Further analyses were therefore performed to understand these patterns. 
Simple main effects analysis of the within-subjects factor (trial type) confirmed that 
response durations differ significantly between AQ groups for the Ambiguous 
(F(2,96) = 6.09, p  <.01), and the Audio-Visual trials (F(2, 96) = 3.40, p  <.05). 
Analysis of each AQ group across trial types produced significant simple effects for 
the Medium and High AQ groups, but not for the low AQ group (F(3, 288) = 9.48, 
p  <.001, F(3, 288) = 9.44, p  <.001 and F< 1,respectively). Thus the differing trial 
types had no significant effect on Low AQ group latencies, but did influence the 
pattern of latencies produced for these other groups. The significant interaction 
therefore reflects differences between Medium and High AQ groups, and between 
Ambiguous and Audio-Visual trials.
k
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AQ Group Trial type 1 Trial type 2 Mean 
Difference (ms)
Std. Error Sig.
Low Unambiguous Ambiguous 57.33 56.56 1.00
Audio- -16.75 112.65 1.00
Visual
Visual -11.42 56.34 1.00
Ambiguous Audio-
Visual
-74.08 86.92 1.00
Visual -68.75 59.89 1.00
Audio-Visual Visual 5.33 109.14 1.00
Medium Unambiguous Ambiguous -15.41 22.63 1.00
Audio- -141.31 45.06 .01*
Visual
Visual -124.77 22.54 .00*
Ambiguous Audio-
Visual
-125.89 34.77 .00*
Visual -109.36 23.96 .00*
Audio-Visual Visual 16.53 43.66 1.00
High Unambiguous Ambiguous -229.17 56.56 .00*
Audio- -428.58 112.65 .00*
Visual
Visual -119.67 56.34 .22
Ambiguous Audio-
Visual
-199.42 86.92 .14
Visual 109.50 59.89 .42
Audio-Visual Visual -308.92 109.14 .03*
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level, adjusting for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni)
Table 3.7: Comparisons between estimated marginal means of response latencies 
(Milliseconds) by Trial Type within AO Groups (Experiment 4a).
Further post-hoc tests were undertaken to understand the results obtained 
from the simple effects analyses. Adjusted comparisons between marginal means 
for trial type latencies by AQ group are presented in Table 3.7. Confirming the fact 
that no simple effect was found for the Low AQ group, no significant differences 
were obtained when comparing latencies from any two trial types for this AQ 
category. For the Medium AQ group, the Unambiguous and Ambiguous trials 
differed significantly from both the Audio-Visual and Visual trial types (in that they 
elicited faster responses). However, Unambiguous and Ambiguous latencies did not
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differ from each other for this group. This finding verifies the observation that cues 
elicit a time cost in conjunction with ambiguity for this group.
A different pattern was obtained for High AQ-scoring participants (the BAP 
group). Responding to Ambiguous and Audio-Visual trials took longer than 
responding to Unambiguous trials for participants with high AQ scores. A 
significant difference was also obtained between Audio-Visual and Visual trials 
within the High AQ group, with auditory cues eliciting slower responses than visual 
capture cues.
Trial type AQ
Group 1
AQ
Group 2
Mean
Difference
(ms)
Std.
Error
Significance
Unambiguous Low Medium -43.28 56.67 1.00
High -53.67 74.45 1.00
Medium High -10.39 56.70 1.00
Ambiguous Low Medium -116.03 76.99 .41
High -340.17 101.10 .00*
Medium High -224.14 76.99 .01*
Audio-Visual Low Medium -167.84 139.95 .70
High -465.50 183.77 .04*
Medium High -297.66 139.95 .11
Visual Low Medium -156.64 85.84 .21
High -161.92 112.71 .46
Medium High -5.28 85.84 1.00
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level, after adjustment for multiple comparisons 
(Bonferroni).
Table 3.8: Comparison between estimated marginal means of response latencies bv
AO group within Trial Type (Experiment 4a).
Table 3.8 provides differences between mean response latencies between 
AQ groups within each level of the within-group factor, trial type. No two groups 
differed in latency scores in relation to the Unambiguous and Visual trial types. 
Ambiguous trials produced significant between-group results; both the Low and 
Medium groups had significantly lower latencies than the High scoring (BAP)
group. This finding reiterates that the High scoring group took longer to respond to 
Ambiguous trials in the absence of cues than did the other groups. A significant 
difference (p <.05) was also found for the High-Low group comparison in relation 
to Audio-Visual trials; the High group response times were lower than those derived 
from the Low group.
Experiment 4b: Intuitive Physics task: Gender and Group comparisons.
Gender N Mean Score (/24) Std. Deviation Range
Male 48 12.48 3.02 6 - 1 8
Female 57 11.26 2.46 4 -  18
Total 105 11.82 2.79
00l
Table 3.9: Mean scores for Intuitive Physics by Gender (Experiment 4b)
As can be seen in Table 3.9, performance of the intuitive physics was better 
in males than in females. An independent samples r-test obtained a significant 
difference in total scores by gender group (/(103) = 2.27, p  <.05). The Cohen’s d 
(.49) for the effect of gender indicates that it is medium-sized (Cohen, 1988). Using 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) method, it was found that total AQ 
scores did not correlate with intuitive physics scores (Appendix G), irrespective of 
whether the entire sample was considered, or whether male and female participants 
were assessed separately. A significant positive correlation was obtained between 
the Imagination subscale of the AQ and Intuitive Physics scores, meaning that as 
self-reported imaginative ability decreased, physics ability increased. This 
correlation was not found when gender subgroups were analysed separately.
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AQ Group n Mean Intuitive Physics score Std. Deviation Range
Low 12 11.50 1.78 8 -  14
Medium 80 11.80 2.93 4 -  18
High 13 12.23 2.77 8 -  17
Total 105 11.82 2.79 4 - 1 8
Table 3.10: Mean scores for Intuitive Phvsics bv AO Group (Experiment 4b)
Table 3.10 indicates that there is little variation in means when the sample is 
categorised according to total AQ score, although the pattern of results follows the 
prediction that the low group would produce the lowest mean, and the high AQ 
group the highest mean. A one-way ANOVA with AQ Group as the between-group 
factor was not significant (F<1). Testing the influence of gender for each AQ group 
with respect to intuitive physics scores revealed that no differences were found 
within the Low and High AQ groups; the effect sizes related to these independent 
sample /-test are small, which suggests that low power is not the reason for the null 
findings (/(10) = - 0.33, p  >.05, Cohen’s d=  .22, and /(l 1) = 0.17,p >.05, Cohen’s d 
= .10, respectively). Men scored significantly higher than women in the Medium 
AQ group; this result has a medium-effect size (//(male) = 12.6; //(female) = 11.1; 
/(78) = 2.38, p  <.05; Cohen’s d  = .54).
Examining correlations between Intuitive Physics scores and AQ subscales, 
independent analysis of each AQ group produced two significant results (Appendix 
H); the Imagination subscale within the Medium AQ scoring group correlates with 
intuitive physics scores (r =.23), whereas the High AQ group produced a significant 
inverse correlation between the attention-to-detail subscale and intuitive physics 
scores (r = -.63). Within this group, the greater attention-to-detail reported by an 
individual, the lower their score on the physics test.
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Experiment 4c: Relationships between Intuitive Physics scores and CoMG 
responses by Gender and AO Group.
Subgroup Crash Miss Ambiguous Audio-
Visual
Visual
Male -.17 .16 -.12 .05 -.21
Female .13 .07 .05 .17 .17
Low AQ -.06 -.24 .06 .15 .06
Medium AQ -.06 .14 -.01 .11 -.07
High AQ .17 -.05 -.26 -.09 -.16
Total
si* .08 -.03 .07 -.08
Table 3.11: PPMC correlations between Intuitive Physics scores and CoMG crash 
report proportions, bv Gender and bv AO group (Experiment 4c).
Table 3.11 presents correlation values between intuitive physics scores and 
the crash reports from each of the trial types in the Crash or Miss Game. For the 
total data sample, no evidence that these two variables are related was obtained (no 
r value was found to be significant). The same was found when each gender was 
analysed independently on this basis. Consideration of relationships for each AQ 
group also resulted in non-significant findings.
Subgroup Crash Miss Ambiguous Audio-
Visual
Visual
Male .10 .16 .10 .22 .10
Female -.10 .01 -.01 -.05 -.07
Low AQ -.14 -.39 -.61* -.49 -.55
Medium AQ -.03 .21 .09 .14 .07
High AQ .04 -.66* -.30 -.20 -.29
Total .09 .02 .08 .02 .01
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.12: PPMC correlations between Intuitive Physics scores and CoMG 
condition response latencies (ms), bv Gender and bv AQ group (Experiment 4c).
Table 3.16 presents correlations between CoMG response latencies and 
Intuitive Physics scores. Response latencies were found not to correlate with
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intuitive physics scores for the data set as a whole, or when separate analyses were 
performed for gender subgroups. Significant negative correlations were obtained 
between latencies in response to ambiguous trials and Intuitive Physics scores in the 
Low AQ group, and between these scores and latencies relating to unambiguous 
miss trials in the High AQ group. These inverse relationships indicate that superior 
intuitive physics ability is related to faster responding in both cases.
3.3.4 Results Summary and Discussion
Experiment 4a
This experiment successfully replicates studies reported by Sekuler, Sekuler 
and Lau (1997) and Scholl and Nakayama (2002). These researchers demonstrated 
that causality can be evoked as an automatic, perceptually-driven subjective 
experience through presentation of disambiguating auditory or visual cues in 
conjunction with an ambiguous dynamic visual event. As Ambiguous trials elicited 
significantly fewer crash percepts than were generated by either of the cue-based 
(Audio-Visual or Visual) trials, this version of the Crash or Miss Game successfully 
measures the disambiguating impact of both auditory and visual capture signals 
within one task. That neither cue evoked significantly more crashes than the other in 
general suggests that their power to generate causal percepts is broadly equivalent.
Categorisation on the basis of total AQ score created three groups; High, 
Medium and Low. The group of greatest interest is the High scoring group, as this is 
taken here to represent a Broader Autism Phenotype sample (i.e., a group of
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participants with atypically high numbers of autistic traits but below diagnostic 
thresholds for ASD).
The main hypothesis in this experiment is that the BAP group would provide 
evidence of compromised cross-modal integration, as inferred from reduced crash 
reports. The number of crashes reported in the key cross-modal condition (Audio- 
Visual trials) for the BAP group was not significantly different to that found for the 
Medium AQ group. Further, within-group comparisons did not show a significant 
difference in crashes reported for the Audio-Visual condition in comparison to the 
Visual condition. The interaction effect found was driven by an elevation in crash 
responses in association with the High AQ group, above the levels reported by both 
the Medium (control) and Low (comparison) AQ groups, when observing 
ambiguous trials in which no cues were presented. Support for the hypothesis is 
therefore not apparent from this study when the crash report proportions alone are 
considered.
Better evidence of compromised cross-modal processing in the BAP arises 
from the analysis of response time means. For the Medium AQ group, responses are 
comparatively fast when trials are either unambiguous or ambiguous, suggesting 
that subjective experience of causality or non-causality is clear for this group, 
making crash or miss judgements easy. In the presence of a disambiguating cue, 
though, responses take substantially longer, irrespective of cue type, possibly 
because integrating cue and ambiguous event information is generally a slower 
process than processing simple dynamic events alone. Unlike the Medium group, 
however, an exaggerated cue-cost was found in response to the Audio-Visual trials
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alone in the BAP group. Latencies for Visual trials, where an unambiguous crash 
was presented underneath the ambiguous event, did not significantly differ from 
those from the Unambiguous condition.
Furthermore, High AQ participants only responded rapidly when trials were 
unambiguous; ambiguity in itself generated significantly longer latencies. The mean 
duration for Ambiguous trials was also significantly longer than that produced by 
the Medium AQ group. Ambiguous responses were more closely comparable to 
Audio-Visual responses than Visual responses for the BAP group, with the Visual 
and Unambiguous condition generating similar response latencies.
The BAP group responded in much the same way as the Medium AQ group 
in terms of speed of response and accuracy when trials where unambiguous. BAP 
and control participants also responded similarly to the visual capture perceptual 
causality stimuli, in terms of latencies and subjective experience of crashes. 
However, the BAP participants experienced difficulty with processing ambiguous 
perceptual causality stimuli both when the auditory cue was present, and when it 
was not. As the visual capture cue is in fact an unambiguous launch event, it can be 
concluded that ambiguity per se resulted in judgement difficulties, and that cross- 
modal information that usually serves to disambiguate ambiguous causal events did 
not effectively do so in individuals who exhibit the Broader Autism Phenotype.
This conclusion is corroborated when comparisons with the Low AQ group 
are considered. According to Extreme Male Brain theory this group can be taken to 
represent the ‘extreme female brain’ type, just as the High AQ sample is taken here
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to represent the broader autism phenotype, which in turn has been related to the 
‘extreme male brain’(Baron-Cohen et al., 2006). A trend was found towards 
significance when crashes in response to the cross-modal condition were compared 
between the BAP and Low AQ group in isolation. The effect size found for the 
trend, in which the BAP group reported fewer crashes than the ‘extreme female 
brain’ group, was moderate-to-large (Cohen, 1988) which implies that larger group 
sizes may have generated a significant result, as the power within this analysis is 
low. This trend was not replicated when comparing responses to the within-mode 
visual capture cues, suggesting that any potential difference between these two 
groups may be specifically related to cross-modal processing.
The Low AQ group showed no difficulty responding to ambiguous 
perceptual causality stimuli; the means across trial conditions vary very little. This 
group produced the lowest mean in response to every trial type, and although a cue- 
cost pattern similar to the one found for the Medium group was seen, neither cue- 
based condition was associated with latencies significantly longer than associated 
with the Unambiguous condition. The processes underpinning the experience of 
perceptual causality for this ‘extreme female brain’ type therefore appear to be fast, 
whether the information provided is ambiguous or not, and categorical in nature 
(with definite misses or crashes perceived). In direct comparison, the BAP group 
took significantly longer to process information with ambiguous components, 
especially when that information was cross-modal (response latencies between High 
and Low groups being significantly different for Ambiguous and Audio-Visual 
trials), suggesting that the percepts generated for these individuals are ‘fuzzy’ rather 
than categorical in the presence of ambiguity, and that the disambiguating power of 
the auditory cue is weaker than it is for the Low AQ group.
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Taken together these conclusions support the idea that perceptual causality is 
experienced differently by individuals representing the broader autism phenotype, in 
comparison with people who manifest a few or an average number of autistic 
behavioural traits. Specifically, their responses to perceptual ambiguity lead to an 
exaggerated tendency to see crashes where others see misses, and they are not as 
readily influenced by auditory signals that generally generate percepts of causality 
as others are. Interestingly, their experience of causality in response to visual 
capture information (in which the causal information provided an unambiguous 
crash event generalises to influence perception of an ambiguous event) is similar in 
all respects to the control group, indicating that they are not generally impervious to 
disambiguating information.
However, people with few autistic traits appear to be perceptually efficient 
and consequently experience perceptual causality frequently and less equivocally 
than those with the Broader Autism Phenotype, suggesting a dissociation between 
these two groups which is particularly apparent when the stimuli presented are 
cross-modal in nature. This dissociation provides support for the Extreme Male 
Brain theory of autism. Whether this reflects differences at perceptual or cognitive 
level will be discussed in section 3.5.
The female preponderance within the Low AQ group and the dominance of 
males in the High AQ group generated male: female ratios equivalent to those found 
for equivalent groups in the original AQ distribution study (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001a). These gender imbalances could raise concerns about potential confounds in 
AQ group analyses if any gender effect was discernible from the data analysed in
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Experiment 4a. However, no evidence was obtained that gender significantly 
influences the number of crashes reported, or the response latencies recorded, for 
any Trial type. It can be concluded from these observations that the gender 
imbalances within both the Low and High AQ groups are unlikely to have had an 
effect on group results.
Experiment 4b
In Experiment 4b it was hypothesised that individuals with the Broader 
Autism Phenotype (as defined by high total AQ scores) should be superior to 
individuals without BAP on a task of Intuitive Physics. The pattern of results for 
groups categorised according to AQ scores followed the expected pattern, with the 
Low AQ individuals scoring on average less than the Medium AQ group who were 
marginally worse at the task than the High AQ group. Scores across groups did not, 
however, differ significantly (F<1), and so there is no statistical evidence to support 
the hypothesis.
There is evidence of a gender effect on the Intuitive Physics Task, as the 
mean scores between women and men are significantly different, with women 
performing worse than men overall. This male superiority adds weight to existing 
research findings in which men make fewer errors on tasks testing physics 
reasoning or knowledge about physical systems (as discussed in Chapter 2). The 
inclusion of women in the BAP group did not, however, influence the AQ group 
analysis, as their removal from this group reduces, not raises, its average score 
(from 12.23 to 12.13).
153
In terms of supporting or contradicting the extreme male brain theory of 
autism, the finding that women are generally worse at this physics task is equivocal. 
While the male/female score comparison supports the studies of gender effects that 
in part led to EMB theory, the same data fail to produce significant results when the 
female and High AQ group scores are compared. In this respect, the experiment 
here undermines a similar study undertaken by Lawson, Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright (2004) in which typical female adults were found to perform the 
Physical Prediction Questionnaire (PPQ) significantly worse than adult males with 
and without AS. Interestingly, there was no discernible difference between male 
groups in this PPQ study, either. As scores on both the PPQ and the Intuitive 
Physics Task (which are similar in design and content) between typical males and 
males classified as having autistic behaviours did not differ, it would appear that 
‘natural* physics ability previously associated with ASD does not produce greatly 
superior physics reasoning in BAP adults in comparison to well-educated non-BAP 
male adults.
The alternative interpretation of gender differences on intuitive physics tasks 
therefore is that ‘female type’ brains are not innately attuned to processing 
information about physical systems. This conclusion is supported by the finding that 
gender differences are only apparent within the Medium AQ group. The average 
numbers of autistic traits reported by the male and female subgroups within this 
category are similar, but their Intuitive Physics scores still differ significantly. No 
gender differences were found within either the BAP or Low AQ groups; means did 
not differ but effect sizes were small, suggesting that these findings were unlikely to 
be non-significant due to small cell sizes. Men and women within each of these
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experimental categories therefore appear similar to each other; men with few 
autistic traits perform the physics task like women with similar behavioural styles, 
as is also the case for women with a relatively high number of such traits and their 
male equivalents. This inference partially supports the idea that ‘extreme male’ and 
‘extreme female’ cognitive styles exist that are independent of gender, and that 
these phenotypes are associated with the number of autistic traits displayed at 
individual level.
Furthermore, it is interesting to find that imagination and intuitive physics 
ability are inversely related; scores on this physics task increase in line with 
increasing scores on the imagination subscale of the AQ (high scores on this 
subscale indicating difficulties with imaginative activities, such as visualising the 
physical appearance of characters in a book). The separate correlation values 
between genders and AQ groups indicate that this relationship holds true for men, 
but not women, within the Medium AQ scoring group only12. It would appear from 
this result that the inverted connection between science ability and imagination is a 
male characteristic. As one of the diagnostic characteristics of ASD is limited 
imagination (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994) and enhanced science 
ability has been associated with the broader autism phenotype and ASD (DeLong, 
2004; Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2001), this finding provides additional support 
for Extreme Male Brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002).
12 Imagination subscale scores amongst the 13 high AQ scorers were clustered around the mean of 
3.69, which was significantly higher than that found for the Medium AQ group (1.98; f(91) = -3.5, p  
=.001). This may account for the lack of correlation between Imagination and Intuitive Physics 
scores for the High AQ group.
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The final finding from Experiment 4b is that high AQ scorers (i.e., those 
expressing the BAP) exhibit an unusual inverse relationship between attention-to- 
detail and physics ability. Closer examination of the raw data suggests that the data 
points generating this relationship are almost exclusively male. In the BAP males, 
then, it would appear that local, detail-orientated processing of information is 
detrimental to understanding physics.
This inverse local processing/physics result conflicts directly with extant 
literature which supports the view that ASD is characterised at the cognitive level 
by detail-orientation, and that this processing style is related to natural, domain - 
specific science aptitude. There remains considerable debate regarding whether 
local detail processing is inflexible in ASD or whether it represents a ‘default’ 
cognitive style, as the contemporary account of weak central coherence theory 
describes it (Happe, 2006). Given the group size (n = 13) here, the negative 
correlation finding must be treated cautiously, but this study suggests that a local 
over global processing bias impedes physical cognition in relation to the BAP, 
which warrants further investigation. Certainly, a cognitive ability to integrate 
information at ‘systems-level’ is a pre-requisite for many of the scientific vocations 
attractive to individuals with BAP and AS, such as programming or engineering. 
With respect to Extreme Male Brain theory, Baron-Cohen, Knickermeyer and 
Belmonte (2005) state that ‘Systemising is the drive to analyse a system in terms of 
the rules that govern the system, in order to predict the behaviour of the system’. It 
is this cognitive facility, they aver, that characterises the ASD-science association. 
Too much constraint to operate at the local detail level would jeopardise such a 
facility, with consequences for domains such as physical cognition.
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Experiment 4c
For Experiment 4c, it was thought that gender differences would be apparent 
in terms of relationships between perceptual causality response and physics task 
performance. Findings from Experiment 3 led to the hypothesis that a significant 
positive correlation would be found for the general male group between Intuitive 
Physics scores and perceptual causality responses. By extension, this relationship 
was also predicted for the BAP group, corresponding to the idea that autism is 
produced by extreme male brain functioning. Scores from the Intuitive Physics task 
did not correlate significantly with the crash report proportions obtained from the 
experimental conditions of the Crash or Miss Game for the entire sample. This 
observation was repeated when gender subgroup correlations were assessed, and 
again when relationships between CoMG measures and their physics scores were 
examined separately for each AQ group.
The only indications that perceptual causality and physical cognition are 
inter-related in this experiment come from a dissociation in response times apparent 
between Low and High AQ groups. Faster response times were found to be 
associated with physics scores for the unambiguous miss trials in the High AQ 
group. In the Low AQ group, the same relationship was obtained for ambiguous 
trials. Had response latencies shown a uniform pattern of correlation with physics 
scores across trial types within these groups, the interpretation would have been that 
the relationship merely reflects processing efficiency, suggesting that the 
participants within these groups generally have higher IQs than the medium-scoring 
controls (Neubauer, Grabner, Fink & Neuper, 2005). That this is not the case
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suggests that specialised neural systems may exist that inter-relate specific 
perceptual and cognitive processes, and these might differ between extreme female 
and extreme male brains.
Generally, though, this latency/trial type relationship difference between 
High and Low AQ groups is only partial support for the hypothesis here that men 
differ from women in terms of relationships between perceptual causality and 
physics aptitude. Bertamini, Spooner and Hecht (2004) states that, despite 
considerable perceptual and interactive experience of the behaviour of objects, our 
default use of cognitive representations to guide our predictions about cause and 
effect in mechanical systems frequently fails us. They draw the broad conclusion 
that physical causal cognition is largely dissociated from perceptual processing; 
percepts generated from environmental interaction between/with objects are 
therefore not implicitly captured in terms of cognitive representations about those 
objects. These statements and the results of both Experiment 3 and Experiment 4c 
therefore conflict.
The main finding from Experiment 3 was that susceptibility to experiencing 
perceptual causality in response to audio-visual perceptual causality was related to 
intuitive physics in boys. This finding was not replicated with adult males in 
Experiment 4c. There are two plausible accounts as to why this might be so. The 
first is that the perception/cognition relationship found for science-orientated boys 
was driven by the inclusion of a subgroup of unusual individuals, in which case it 
would not prove replicable in a wide-ranging population of typical boys (or typical 
men). It can be supposed that a sample of Cardiff University students recruited from
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several Schools will not be representative of the general population, in that IQ 
distribution is likely to be skewed towards the higher end of a normal distribution. 
Therefore, ‘natural’ physics ability might be indistinguishable from learnt physics 
knowledge, and logical reasoning ability (related to overall IQ). Relationships in 
which thinking about cause and effect in physical systems may be related to 
perceiving cause and effect in objects, as found in boys in Experiment 3, would 
therefore be masked by compensating factors. The second account is that this 
relationship is only identifiable during childhood; neurobiological rearrangement 
during adolescence might create a dissociation between the perceptual and cognitive 
processes involved (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).
3.4 Experiment 5: Weak central coherence, the BAP and cross-modal 
integration
3.4.1 Introduction
In Experiment 4a, the BAP group was found to respond atypically to 
perceptual causality stimuli, in that crash reports were elevated when the stimuli 
were visually ambiguous, but slightly reduced in number (with significantly longer 
response times) when the stimuli were presented with an auditory signal that 
coincided with the point of visual occlusion. It was concluded that the BAP is 
associated with poor resolution of visual ambiguity, and also that the 
disambiguating strength of the auditory signal was weakened in this group, possibly 
suggesting that cross-modal processing is compromised in some respect.
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The main objective of this next study was to consider the temporal pattern of 
response to the auditory signal to generate causal percepts when its timing is varied. 
The study uses the perceptual causality task described for Experiment 3, in which 
the auditory signal is presented 250 milliseconds before and after the point at which 
the visual becomes ambiguous, (i.e., when the dynamic disk occludes the stationary 
disk). This experiment was therefore designed to investigate the underlying 
temporal parameters that produce causal percepts in response to cross-modal 
stimuli.
Spatio-temporal thresholds determine whether or not cross-modal perceptual 
causality phenomena are experienced (Guski & Troje, 2003; Lewald & Guski, 
2003). Processing audio-visual perceptual stimuli was shown to be slow relative to 
visual capture stimuli in the BAP group in Experiment 4, and crash report responses 
slightly suppressed relative to other groups (particularly the Low AQ group). Hence, 
if multisensory processing is affected within the high AQ-scoring BAP group, 
results may show both a reduced crash report response in comparison to other 
groups, coupled with exaggerated response times and an atypically ‘flat’ response 
pattern when timing of the auditory component is varied in relation to visual 
occlusion; the other groups should generate heightened numbers of crash responses 
when the auditory signal is presented simultaneously with occlusion (and fewer 
crashes when this signal is presented asynchronously).
In section 3.2.3, evidence that BAP superiority over non-BAP individuals in 
terms of Embedded Figure Task performance (Happd, Briskman & Frith, 2001) was 
described along with research implying that performance of the EFT was
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determined by perceptual processing biases (Jarrold, Gilchrist & Bender, 2005). 
Experiment 5 was therefore designed to assess whether EFT superiority could be 
evidenced from a BAP sample drawn from a student population, rather than from 
proband families. Given that gender differences are well-established for the EFT 
(e.g, Witkin, 1950) it was anticipated that non-BAP gender groups would show task 
performance differences. However, the fMRI BAP study of EFT performance 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2006) suggests that no gender influence will be found with 
respect to BAP performance.
The original EFT task was modified for this study so that data collection 
could be computerised. This version of the EFT also removed the visuo-spatial 
memory component of the original task by presenting each simple target shape 
alongside its complex figure, hence making the task reliant more on perceptual 
processes (akin to single feature search) than on working memory function.
Evidence of faster response times and better accuracy scores on this 
modified embedded figures task would lend itself to a perceptual interpretation of 
BAP performance, in that it would suggest enhanced single feature processing. The 
findings and data from Experiment 5b then allow a hypothetical relationship 
between perceptual integration and EFT performance to be considered in the next 
analysis (Experiment 5c). Together these experiments were designed so that the 
perceptual basis of the weak central coherence theory of ASD could be explored 
using the broader phenotype as an analogue model. Weaker perceptual integration is 
therefore hypothesised to be associated with enhanced EFT performance within the 
Broader Autism Phenotype.
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3.4.2 Method
Participants
Participant recruitment and data collection in this study was supported in 
part by undergraduate psychology students under the supervision of L. Grayson and 
Prof. S. Killcross. A total of 182 Cardiff University undergraduate participants were 
recruited by email, electronic participant panel and via social networking from 
social science, humanities, medical, engineering and science departments, ensuring 
that a range of disciplines were represented within each broad area of the AQ score 
distribution. The final sample comprised 6 6  males and 115 females aged between 
18 and 46 years (see Table 3.13). The exclusion criteria used in Experiment 4 were 
also applied in this study.
Group N Average Std Deviation Range
(Years:Months) (Years:Months) (Years:Months)
Female 116 21:0 3:2 18:5-38:11
Male 66 22:9 4:3 18:6-46:6
Total 182 22:0 4:0 18:5 - 46:6
Table 3.13: Descriptive Statistics of Participant Sample Age bv Gender Subgroup 
(Experiment 5).
Stimuli
Stimuli for the Crash or Miss Game were exactly as described in Experiment
3. The AQ questionnaire in this study was provided online as a web survey, because 
computer use in self-report behavioural questionnaires has been shown to reduce 
impression management bias (Booth-Hewley, Larson & Myoshi, 2007). A selection 
from Form A of the adult version of the EFT task (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 
1971) was used for the computerised adaptation, compromising ten complex figures
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and eight simple target shapes (three of which were duplicated across trials)13. The 
adapted task was programmed using E-Prime software.
Apparatus
The majority of the participants in this study were tested using the same 
apparatus and under the same conditions as described for Experiment 4. A further 
46 participants were recruited subsequent to the main testing sessions to expand the 
BAP group size, and these individuals were tested in a small, well-lit laboratory 
using the apparatus described in Experiment 3.
Procedure
Participants completed the AQ online as the first task, followed by the
CoMG and finally the EFT (the additional participants completed the online AQ
prior to attending CoMG/EFT test session). The data were collected by computer
under anonymous participant codes that allowed the three data sets involved to be
collated. Researchers remained blind to AQ scores throughout all test sessions. The
instructions and procedures for AQ and CoMG completion were as described in
Experiment 4. In the EFT task, participants were instructed to view the simple shape
outline presented on the right-hand side of the screen and search for its location
embedded within the coloured complex figure presented simultaneously on the left
side of the screen (as shown in Figure 1.2 ). A practice trial was provided so that
participants could demonstrate that they understood the instructions before starting.
The trial set began when the participant pressed the spacebar in response to an
onscreen prompt after the practice trial. As soon as the simple target was located
13 In the EFT version used for the additional participants, two extra trials were added at the end of 
trial set; these items’ data has been removed from analysis (it was originally intended to replicate the 
entire study, but as this was made impossible due to illness, the two data sets have been merged).
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within the figure, the participant pressed a highlighted button on the PC keyboard to 
record the response time. After each timed response, a screen appeared with a text 
prompt for the participant to trace the target location in the figure, after which the 
researcher recorded the accuracy response ( 0  for inaccurate; 1 for accurate), causing 
the next trial’s start screen to appear. After completion, the experiment ended with a 
’thank you’ screen.
Data from the EFT was treated in the following way to ensure that fast but 
inaccurate responses did not bias results. Any response time that exceeded the 
average duration found across the group for inaccurate responses (30 seconds) was 
coded as inaccurate, whether the participant located the target correctly or not. 
Delays in tracing the outline beyond ten seconds generated a time-out of the 
accuracy response screen; these time-out trials were recoded as inaccurate 
responses, and response times recorded as 30 seconds. These data treatments were 
designed so that the both accuracy and reaction time measures more closely reflect 
perceptual processing. Long response durations suggest that cognitive strategies, 
such as checking/rechecking, are being employed, or that a participant is sensing 
rather than knowing the answer and is using the verification stage to work out the 
location consciously.
3.4.3 Results
Outlier analysis and Group Categorisation
Outliers were identified from the Crash or Miss Game prior to AQ group 
allocation. Identification was made on the basis of pooled accuracy scores across the
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three auditory timing levels for each of the Unambiguous conditions (Miss and 
Crash) derived from the entire data set. Two standard deviations above the accuracy 
mean was the criterion for exclusion on the miss variable, and two standard 
deviations below the accuracy mean was the exclusion criterion for the crash data. 
The seventeen participants whose data were omitted included five males and twelve 
females, or 1 0  % of the total number of participants ( 1 2 % of the females and 8 % of 
the males). Four excluded participants (two male and two female) scored above 21 
on the AQ.
Group N Mean AQ score Std. Deviation Range
Male 61 18.9 6 .1 1 0 -4 0
Female 104 16.7 5.1 7 -3 1
Total 165 17.5 5.6 7 - 4 0
Table 3.14: AQ descriptive statistics for sample with CoMG outliers excluded 
(Experiment 5).
Table 3.14 provides descriptive statistics for the final 165 participants. These 
indicate that the AQ range here was restricted in comparison with that obtained in 
Experiment 4; there was little or no left tail, and so it included few low AQ scoring 
individuals. Both standardised kurtosis and skewness scores exceeded 3.29 ( 1J2 = 
4.55, 771 = 5.63, respectively; p  <.001). The AQ score distribution for the total 
sample was therefore abnormally skewed, with higher frequencies for total scores at 
the lower end of the range. Significant positive (leftward) skewness was found for 
both gender subgroups (Tj\ (male) = 4.08, p  < .001; rj\ (female) = 2.86, p  < .01) and 
the male subgroup had a significant kurtosis value (Tfc. = 3.34, p  <.001). For each 
sex, the AQ scores clustered towards the lower end of the scale, with long tails at 
the high-scoring end, and truncated tails at the lower end of the range. The male
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distribution, in addition, was abnormally peaked. Overall, the total data AQ 
distribution was not Gaussian. The significant positive kurtosis represents a small 
standard deviation overall, and therefore any categories produced on this cut-off 
basis would be unlikely to be representative of a wider population. Subscale 
distributions for this sample are supplied in Appendix I..
Given these distribution characteristics, it was decided not to include a Low 
AQ comparison group in the analyses. Instead, Medium AQ male, Medium AQ 
female and High AQ categories were created. This grouping allows for gender 
differences on all measures to be considered without similarities between high- 
scoring men and women masking the effects. Also it facilitates comparison between 
the High AQ BAP group with each gender control group (Medium AQ males and 
Medium AQ females), in line with the prediction from EMB theory that systemising 
biases can be found in both individuals of either sex in association with autistic trait 
expression. The High Group cut-off level found in Experiment 4 (total AQ score = 
21+) was used to define the BAP group, in order to allow for comparison between 
experiments.
Group n Mean AQ score Std. Deviation Range
Medium Male 40 15.4 2.7 1 0 - 2 0
Medium Female 85 14.9 3.3 7 - 2 0
HighAQ  40 25.3 4.3 2 1 -4 0
Total 165 17.5 5.6 7 -4 0
Table 3.15: AO distribution statistics bv AO Grouo (Experiment 5).
Table 3.15 provides the descriptive statistics for the AQ groups 
produced using total AQ values of 7 and 21 as the Low AQ and High AQ group cut-
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offs. Total AQ scores differed significantly across AQ Groups (F(2,162) = 133.57, p  
< .001). Adjusted post-hoc comparisons between each mean pair showed that AQ 
scores for Medium Male and Medium Female groups did not differ from each other, 
but that they both differed significantly from the High AQ Group (by 9.9 and 10.4 
points respectively, both p  <.001). A one-way ANOVA of the pooled accuracy 
scores with AQ group as the independent variable revealed no main effect of Group 
(F < 1); control trial accuracy was therefore comparable across groups. Independent 
samples f-tests were also carried out to ensure that there were no differences 
between accuracy scores on either of the unambiguous control trial conditions 
between the sexes; this test revealed that gender groups were comparable in this 
respect (t^ss (163) = 0.16, fCrash(163) =1.19, both p  >.05).
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Experiment 5a: Cross-modal differences in crash reports and latencies bv Gender 
and AO group
Analysis 1: Crash Reports by Gender
Group n Trial Type Mean Crash 
Reports
Std.
Deviations
Range
Male 61 - 250 ms .31 .29 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
0 ms (Simultaneous) .36 .29 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
+250 ms .23 .27 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
Female 104 - 250 ms .35 .32 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
0 ms (Simultaneous) .46 .32 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
+250 ms .26 .29 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
Total 165 - 250 ms .34 .31 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
0 ms (Simultaneous) .42 .31 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
+250 ms .25 .28 .0 0 -  1 . 0 0
Table 3.16: CoMG crash report proportions bv Trial Tvoe and Gender (Experiment
5al
The means for each of the three experimental trial types (-250ms, 0ms and 
+250ms, relative to occlusion) for each gender subgroup are provided in Table 3.16. 
The associated standard deviations indicate that there is considerable variation 
within both gender groups. There is some suggestion of an interaction between trial 
type and gender, as indicated by the difference in female and male mean for the 0  
ms (simultaneous) condition. A mixed 2 x 3  ANOVA was therefore conducted to 
test for gender differences on this task, with Gender as the between factor and the 
auditory timing conditions providing three levels of the within factor, Trial. A main 
effect of Trial was obtained (F(2, 326) = 48.83, p  c.OOl). No main effect of gender 
was found (F(l, 163) = 1.82, p  >.05). A trend towards significance was seen for the 
interaction between gender and auditory timing (F(2, 326) = 2.64, p  = .07).
Given the apparent different in means for the simultaneous condition 
between sexes (Table 3.20 above), an independent samples t-test was conducted to
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consider whether the trend towards a significant interaction was in part due to a 
gender difference for this trial type. The analysis confirmed that, when the auditory 
signal was timed to correspond with the point of occlusion, women reported more 
crashes than men (//(male) = .36, //(female) = .46; r(163) = -2.09, p  <.05).
Trial Type 1 Trial Type 2 Mean Difference Std. E rror
-250ms 0  ms -.08* . 0 2
+250 ms .09* . 0 2
0ms +250 ms .16* . 0 2
* The mean difference is significant at the .001 level.
Table 3.17: Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni-adiusted) of mean differences in Crash 
Report Proportions bv Trial Type (Experiment 5a).
For the main effect of Trial (the within-group factor), post-hoc test of 
differences between marginal means verified that crash report proportion scores 
differed significantly between each pair of trial types (Table 3.17), with the 
simultaneous and -250ms trial types eliciting significantly more crash reports than 
the -250ms condition.
Analysis 2: Response Latencies by Gender
Gender analyses were performed for the response time measure. Collapsed 
response times representing the two unambiguous control conditions (crash and 
miss) were highly correlated (r = .82), and so a general Unambiguous response time 
condition was generated, increasing the levels of the within-group variable (Trial) to 
four. Standardised values of the Unambiguous control variable identified six 
individuals for whom average response times across all unambiguous trials were
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two standard deviations above the mean obtained from the entire data set. These 
outliers (four male and two female; three high AQ scorers and three medium AQ 
scorers) were removed to avoid their inclusion masking any between-group effects, 
reducing the sample size to 159 participants.
Group n Trial Type Mean Response 
Times (ms)
Std.
Deviations
Range
Male 57 - 250 ms 579.8 450.5 13.10-2198.9
0 ms (Simultaneous) 515.6 348.5 47.10- 1566.3
+250 ms 482.6 384.3 35.80 - 2015.8
Unambiguous 360.2 205.1 9.84-910.9
Female 102 - 250 ms 577.9 408.8 27.80-2107.4
0 ms (Simultaneous) 591.9 519.1 15.00-3586.1
+250 ms 570.7 373.3 6.10 - 1804.7
Unambiguous 395.2 213.1 60.74 - 906.9
Total 159 - 250 ms 578.6 422.8 13.10-2198.9
0 ms (Simultaneous) 564.6 465.5 15.00 -3586.1
+250 ms 539.1 378.4 6.10-2015.8
Unambiguous 382.7 2 1 0 . 2 9.84 - 910.9
Table 3.18: Descriptive Statistics of CoMG response latencies (ms) bv Trial Type 
and Gender (Experiment 5a)
The descriptive statistics obtained from the final data set (without response 
time outliers) are given in Table 3.18. It can be seen that response to the collapsed 
Unambiguous condition was generally faster than was found for the experimental 
ambiguous conditions. Outside of this observation, latency means across the 
auditory timing conditions do not appear to vary greatly.
A 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA was undertaken to determine the effect of Gender 
(the between-group factor) on latencies for each trial type (the within-group factor). 
The analysis confirmed that there is a main effect of Trial (F(3,471) = 23.41, p < 
.001). No main effect of Gender (F < 1), or significant interaction between Gender
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and Trial (F (3,471) = 1.21, p  > .05) were identified, agreeing with the observation 
that latencies are generally equivalent across gender subgroups.
Trial Type 1 Trial Type 2 Mean Difference Std. Error
-250ms 0  ms 25.1 27.8
+250 ms 52.2 24.4
Unambiguous 2 0 1 .1 * 25.8
Oms +250 ms 27.1 27.0
Unambiguous 176.1* 30.4
+250ms Unambiguous 148.9* 2 2 . 0
* The mean difference is significant at the .001 level.
Table 3.19: Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni-adiusted) of mean differences in Response 
Times bv Trial Type (Experiment 5a).
Significant mean differences were found between latencies obtained for the 
pooled Unambiguous condition and for each of the experimental trial types, but 
these were not found to differ from each other (Table 3.19), indicating that 
introduction of the auditory signal generally lengthens response times.
Analysis 3: Crash Reports by AQ Group
Prior to consideration of the experimental data, accuracy data were analysed 
to ensure that all AQ groups performed the task according to the instructions. A 
mixed 3 x 2  ANOVA, with the AQ group as the between factor was performed. The 
collapsed unambiguous control trial conditions (Unambiguous crashes and 
Unambiguous misses) were used to provide the within factor, Trial. No main effect 
of AQ Group or trial (both F<1) was obtained, nor a significant interaction found
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between Group and Trial (F (2, 162) = 1.39). Thus no AQ group was less accurate
with respect to either control variable more than the others.
O Medium Male
■ Medium Female
■ High AQ
-250ms 0ms +250ms
Figure 3.4: Crash Reports bv Auditory Signal Timing and AQ Group (Experiment 
5a)^
Figure 3.4 presents the means and standard errors for each level of auditory 
timing condition by AQ group. All groups show the same pattern across timing 
conditions, with auditory signal presentation prior to occlusion generating fewer 
crash reports than induced by simultaneous presentation, and presentation after 
occlusion producing the lowest crash reports. However, in the Medium Male and 
High AQ groups, the facilitatory ‘peak’ produced in the 0 ms condition is not as 
pronounced as it appears to be in the Medium Female group, for which an elevation 
in number of crashes reported is generally apparent. Medium Male and High AQ 
groups’ responses appear equivalent across all conditions.
To analyse the affect of varying auditory timing on the number of crashes 
reported, a mixed 3 x 3  ANOVA was performed with AQ group (Group) as the 
between-groups factor, and the three auditory timing trial types as the within-group 
factor (Trial). No main effect of Group (F(2,162) = 2.29, p  = . 10) nor interaction
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between Group and Trial (F(4,324) = 1.32, p  >.05) were obtained. A main effect of 
auditory timing condition (the within-group factor) was apparent (F(2,324) = 45.06,
p < .0 0 1 ).
Trial Type 1 Trial Type 2 Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.
-250 ms 0 ms (Simultaneous) -.072* .018 .000
+250 ms .087* .017 .000
0 ms +250 ms .159* .016 .000
* The mean difference is significant at the .001 level.
Table 3.20: Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni-adiusted) of mean differences on Crash
Report Proportions between Auditory Timing Trial Types (Experiment 5a).
As presented in Table 3.20, adjusted post-hoc comparisons confirmed that 
each timing condition differed significantly from all other timing conditions in 
terms of crash report scores, confirming the observation that the highest crash report 
scores are associated with the simultaneous condition, and the lowest scores are 
produced in response to the +250ms condition.
From Figure 3.4, it appears that the Medium Female group may differ from 
the other two groups in terms of crashes reported for the simultaneous auditory 
timing trials. For this condition, the AQ groups were therefore compared using a 
one-way ANOVA in which AQ group was the between-group factor (Group), and a 
significant main effect of Group was found; F(2, 164) = 3.74, p  <.05.
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AQ Group 1 AQ Group 2 Mean Difference Std. E rror Sig.
Medium Male Medium Female -.13 . 1 0 . 1 0
HighAQ  .01 . 1 0 1 . 0 0
Medium Female HighAQ  .13 . 1 0 .08
Table 3.21: Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni-adiusted) of mean differences on Crash
Report Proportions for the Simultaneous Trial Type between AQ Groups 
(Experiment 5a).
Using Scheffe pair-wise comparisons (Table 3.21), post-hoc analysis found 
that no group significantly differed from any other with respect to the number of 
crashes experienced in the simultaneous auditory timing condition, although trends 
were seen for a difference between the Medium Female group with both the High 
AQ (p = .08), and Medium Male (p = .10) groups.
The trend between the typical female and High AQ group warranted further 
analysis, as inclusion of High AQ females may have distorted the result. Testing 
gender subgroups within the High AQ group by independent samples r-test 
demonstrated, however, that the number of crashes reported in the simultaneous 
auditory timing condition did not differ between men and women in this category (ji 
male = .35, JU female =-35; f(38) = 0.05, p  >.05).
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Analysis 4: Response Latencies by AQ group
700 r-
□ Medium Male (n = 38)
■ Medium Female (n = 84)
■ High AQ (n = 37)
-250 ms 0 ms +250 ms Unambiguous
Figure 3.5: Response Times (ms) bv Auditory Signal Timing and AQ Group.
As for the gender analysis, the collapsed data for both unambiguous control 
trial types was included in analysis of the response latencies associated with each 
auditory timing condition14. The six outliers identified from the control data were 
removed prior to analysis. Figure 3.5 shows that the Medium Female and High AQ 
groups vary very little in response times across experimental trial types. The 
Medium Male group produced the fastest times for each condition, and this group 
does appear to vary in terms of response speeds across auditory signal timings. The 
shortest response times are seen for the Unambiguous control condition, irrespective 
of group.
A 3 x 4 mixed ANOVA, with the three AQ groups as the between factor, and 
Trial (three levels of auditory timing conditions plus the collapsed control trial
14 Average response times for all unambiguous control trials (crashes and misses) were found to 
correlate highly and significantly with each other, justifying use o f a single collapsed variable for 
control trial response times.
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condition) as the within-group factor, was performed. This analysis provided no 
evidence of differences in response times across AQ groups, contrary to the 
observations drawn from Figure 3.5. There was no significant main effect of AQ 
group (F (2, 156) = 1.62, p  >.05), and no interaction between AQ group and 
auditory timing trial type (F <1) was identified. A main effect of Trial Type, the 
within-group factor, was obtained (F(3,468) = 20.90, p  < .001). Pairwise 
comparisons between estimated marginal means for this within-subjects factor 
confirmed that the response times in the Unambiguous condition were significantly 
shorter than the response times found for the three auditory timing conditions, and 
latencies between experimental trial types did not differ (corresponding to the same 
analysis in relation to gender, above).
Experiment 5b: EFT task performance bv Gender and AO Group
Performance on the EFT was measured by accuracy and response times. The 
data sample used was the same as that used for Experiment 5a, with the outliers on 
CoMG control trial accuracy and response times excluded prior to this analysis (in 
preparation for Experiment 5c, where CoMG variables are correlated with EFT 
measures). Outliers on the EFT accuracy scores (i.e., those with scores two standard 
deviations below the mean for the entire sample) were identified. Identification led 
to the further removal of three men and three women, all from the Medium AQ 
groups, except for one high AQ scoring male. Outlier exclusion therefore reduced 
the sample size from Experiment 5a by c.4% to 153 participants.
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Analysis 1: EFT Accuracy and Response Times by Gender
EFT
Measure
Group n Mean Std.
Deviation
Range
Accuracy Male 54 8.69 1 .2 1 5- 10
(/10) Female 99 8.15 1.33 4 -1 0
Total 153 834 131 4 - 1 0
Response Male 55 1 0 . 8 8 4.66 3.35-23.51
Time Female 99 12.46 4.38 2.50-22.74
(Sec.s) Total 153 11,90 4.53 2.50-22.74
Table 3.22: Descriptive Statistics of EFT Accuracy and Response Times (seconds) 
bv Gender (Experiment 5b)
Table 3.22 provides the means and standard deviations for both EFT 
measures (accuracy and response times) by gender. It can be seen that men are both 
generally more accurate and take less time to respond than women, although the 
ranges and standard deviations are similar. These observations were confirmed by 
performing independent samples /-tests adjusted for unequal cell sizes (/acc.(151) = 
2.51, p  <.05; /Time (151) = -2.04,/? < .05), with men showing significantly higher 
accuracy scores and lower response times.
Analysis 2: EFT Accuracy and Response Times by AQ Group
Measure AQ Group n Mean Std.
Deviation
Range
Accuracy Medium Male 36 8.58 1.36 5 -1 0
(/1 0 ) Medium Female 81 8 .1 2 1.34 4 -1 0
High 36 8.58 1.13 6 - 1 0
Total 153 8.34 1.31 4 -  10
Response Time Medium Male 36 11.32 4.67 4.32-19.62
(Sec.s) Medium Female 81 12.58 4.15 5.21-22.74
High 36 10.97 5.06 2.50-22.51
Total 153 11.90 4.53 2.50-22.74
Table 3.23: Mean EFT Accuracv Scores and Response Times (seconds) bv AO
Group (Experiment 5b).
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Considering AQ groups, the means (Table 3.23) for both measures generally 
followed the patterns predicted; women were slower and less accurate than men, 
who in turn were slower than the high AQ participants (although equally accurate). 
Taking each measure independently, one-way ANOVA analyses were run using AQ 
group as the independent variable (between-group factor). Scores obtained were 
found not to differ by AQ group in either analysis, although a trend was found for 
EFT accuracy scores to differ by AQ group (F(2,150) = 2.40, p  = .09). With respect 
to response times, no effect of AQ Group was observed; F(2, 150) = 2.00, p >.05.
To investigate the trend in accuracy score differences, independent samples 
r-tests were conducted between both Medium Male and High AQ group scores with 
Medium Female group scores, but again only trends were obtained after correcting 
for unequal cell sizes ( fo e d . Male (115) = -1.71,/? = .09, and /High a q (  115) = -1.80, p  = 
.08, and so the observation that women performed the task less accurately than 
typical men and High AQ scorers was only partially supported.
Measure Gender n Mean Std.
Deviation
Range
Accuracy (/10) Male 18 8.89 .83 7 - 1 0
Female 18 8.28 1.32 6 - 1 0
Total 36 8.58 1.13 6 - 1 0
Response Time (Sec.s) Male 18 1 0 . 0 2 4.68 4.91-22.51
Female 18 11.92 5.38 2.50-21.03
Total 36 10.97 5.06 2.50-22.51
Table 3.24: Mean EFT Accuracy Scores and Response Times (seconds) bv High
AO Gender Subgroup (Experiment 5b).
Table 3.24 shows that EFT mean scores and response times appear similar 
between male and females with high AQ scores. A gender comparison was
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undertaken to ensure that conflation of high AQ scoring males and females had not 
distorted the AQ group analyses. Scores on both measures between high AQ 
subgroups were not significantly different (Jacc.(34) = 1.6 6 , p = .11, and fnme(34) = 
-1.13, p  >.05). Female High AQ individuals were also less accurate and slower than 
Medium group male participants, but not significantly so 0acc.(54) = 0.79, p  >.05, 
and tTime(54) = -0.43, p  >.05). The high AQ group responses were therefore not 
affected by combining data from males and females with high total scores, although
high AQ men are significantly faster and more accurate regarding EFT performance 
than medium-scoring females (*acc.(97) = 3.1 l ,p  < .05, and f r im e (9 7 )  = -2.3l ,p  
<.05) when these data are compared independently.
Experiment 5c: Relationships between perceptual integration and EFT performance
Measure 1 Measure 2 r P
EFT Accuracy EFT Response -.78* 
(/10) Times (Sec.s)
. 0 0
Crash reports -.13 . 1 0
EFT Response Crash reports .14 
Times (Sec.s)
.08
* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.25: PPMC Correlations between EFT measures and Crash Report 
Proportions from the Simultaneous (0 ms) CoMG condition (Experiment 5c).
The simultaneous (0ms) condition was selected to determine whether 
perceptual integration was related to performance on the Embedded Figures Task; 
this timing condition produced the maximum number of crash reports for each AQ 
group. Correlations between this variable and the EFT variables were computed for 
the complete data set (153 participants). These results are presented in Table 3.25. 
Accuracy and response time data from the EFT were found to be inversely related (r
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= -.78, p  <.001); as accuracy scores increased, average response times decreased. 
The crash report measure was found not to correlate significantly with either EFT 
measure, although trends were found for accuracy to decrease and response times to 
increase as more crashes were reported (aacc. = 13, p  = . 10; rTime = . 14, p  = .08). 
The magnitudes of these correlation values represent small effect sizes.
Measure 1 Measure 2 Gender r
EFT Accuracy EFT Response Times Male -.78*
Female -.78*
Crash report Male .07
Female -.19
EFT Response Crash reports Male .09
Times Female .14
* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.26: PPMC Correlations between EFT measures and Crash Report 
Proportions from the Simultaneous (0 ms) CoMG condition bv Gender (Experiment
5cL
As shown in Table 3.26, female (n = 99) and male (n = 54) data produced 
significant correlations between the two EFT measures of equal magnitude (r = -.78 
and r = -.78, respectively; p < .001). The relationship between EFT accuracy and 
crashes reported bordered on significance for women (r = -.19, p  = .06), but not for 
men; the relative values of r do not significantly differ (Fisher’s r-to-z = -1.51, p > 
.05).
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AQ Group N Crashes vs. EFT 
accuracy
Crashes vs. EFT 
response time
EFT accuracy 
vs. response 
time
Medium Male 36 .03 .2 1 . 7 5 **
Medium Female 81 -.25* .25* -.75**
High AQ 36 .13 - . 2 1 -.90**
Total 153 .14 13 -.78**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.27: PPMC Correlations between Crash Proportions from the Simultaneous
(0 ms) CoMG condition and EFT measures, bv AO Group (Experiment 5c).
Correlation results for the same relationships investigated for each of the AQ 
groups are summarised in Table 3.27. A significant inverse relationship was 
produced between EFT accuracy and response times for all groups. Two further 
relationships were also derived for the Medium Female group. The number of 
crashes reported increased as EFT accuracy decreased, and as EFT average response 
times lengthened. These relationships were of identical magnitude (both r = .25, p 
<.05), representing small-to-medium effect sizes.
Fisher’s r-to-z transformations between the Medium Female group and each 
of the Medium Male and High AQ groups were performed. For the Medium Male 
comparison, the value of r obtained for the Medium Female group was not found to 
be significantly different for EFT accuracy ( za c c .  = -1.37 p  >.05, two-tailed) or EFT 
response times (ziime = -2, p  >.05). In comparison with the High AQ group, 
however, the z value obtained for accuracy correlations is close to significance (zAcc. 
= - 1 .8 6 , p  = .06, two-tailed), and is significant for response times (zTime = 2.26, p
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<.05); these results indicate that the typical female and High AQ groups are 
dissociated in terms of EFT performance.
A separate analysis of the High AQ group was undertaken for the female 
participants only (n = 18). The correlations between EFT measures and crashes 
reported in the simultaneous condition of the CoMG were rAcc. = 08, and rtime = - 
.25; neither of these values is significant, and they are both of opposite valence to 
those obtained for the Medium Female group. A Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
comparing the respective correlation values for the relationship between EFT time 
and crash reports for High AQ and Medium AQ females revealed a trend towards 
significance ( z = -1.81, p  = .07).
3.4.4 Results summary and Discussion 
Experiment 5a
Generally, results from this experiment indicate that no evidence was found 
to support the idea that the broader autism phenotype is substantially different from 
the typical phenotype with respect to cross-modal integration. However, there was 
evidence that typical men and women differ in terms of sensitivity to simultaneous 
cross-modal stimuli, although men and women expressing the broader phenotypes 
are equivalent in this respect.
The main hypothesis for Experiment 5a was that integration across the 
senses would be compromised in high AQ scoring individuals; hence fewer crash 
reports were predicted for this group in response to audio-visual perceptual causality
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stimuli. There was no support for this prediction from Experiment 5a; no evidence 
of a main effect of group was discernible when crash report proportions were 
compared between AQ groups across all auditory timing conditions. Furthermore, 
lack of a significant interaction suggests that none of the groups responded 
differently from the others under the varying auditory timing conditions. All groups 
perceived more crashes when the auditory signal was presented as the moving disk 
occluded the stationary disk, but fewer crashes were seen when the signal occurred 
250 milliseconds before or after this point. Given that the pattern of response across 
conditions ran in parallel across Medium Male and High AQ groups, the hypothesis 
that temporal encoding of audio-visual integration is atypical in relation to the BAP 
received no support, as a ‘flat’ response level was no more apparent for the High 
AQ group than for the Medium Male group.
Only the Medium Female group showed any tendency towards a true 
‘peaked’ response. The absence of a significant interaction between group and 
auditory timing condition is difficult to interpret, in that none of the patterns in the 
data are as exaggerated as was expected, given the high crash report proportion 
(0.70) obtained across groups in Experiment 4 (see Figure 3.2), which followed the 
data originally reported by Sekuler et al., 1997 (simultaneity generating a mean 
percentage of bounces exceeding 60% from ten naive participants).
The disparity between studies in relation to power of the simultaneity effect 
may reflect sampling biases, as the overall AQ score mean for the first study was 
almost four points lower than found for the sample here (13.7 vs. 17.5); people with 
fewer autistic traits are predicted to be better perceptual integrators than people with
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relatively more traits (the logical extrapolation from the hypothesis that high AQ 
scores are associated with poorer integration). However, this cannot be the sole 
explanation, as the High AQ group in Experiment 4 experienced more crashes than 
the typical female group in Experiment 5, despite having a considerably higher 
mean AQ score at group level.
It would appear then that methodological differences between studies are 
also involved in producing these conflicting results. The most obvious difference 
between studies is that the control trials in Experiment 5 were all presented with 
auditory signals at timings equivalent to those for the experimental trials. This 
aspect of the design was purposeful. The relative salience of experimental trials was 
reduced so that no rule-based response strategies could be adopted by participants 
(such that hearing a click generated an automatic crash response). The introduction 
of audio-visual control trials may have caused the categorisation boundaries 
defining the crash percept to be less distinct in Experiment 5 relative to Experiment
4. The finding that no significant differences exist in terms of differences in 
latencies at group level across trial types may also be explained on this basis (no 
interaction was obtained between Group and Trial in the latency analysis in 
Experiment 5a).
When genders were compared, women were seen to experience more 
crashes in the simultaneous condition of the CoMG (although this difference only 
produced a trend towards an interaction when all three timing conditions were 
included in the analysis). Enhanced female susceptibility to this specific audio­
visual phenomenon is unexpected for two reasons: The stimuli are object-based, not
184
social in nature, and no such disparity in crash report proportions was found 
between sexes in the equivalent simultaneous audio-visual condition in Experiment 
4a. As men tend to show enhanced processing of objects and reduced social stimuli 
processing, and women show the reverse pattern (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997) 
this result initially appears anomalous.
However, it could be argued that object-based processing in men (and social 
stimuli preference in women) is due to attentional (and hence cognitive) biases; 
when attention is directed solely towards basic perceptual stimuli, sex differences in 
perception may reflect different patterns. For instance, perceptual speed indexes 
have shown female advantages (Hedges & Nowell, 1995; Kimura, 1999). Although 
these tasks (such as object-based pair matching) are generally uni-modal, the 
enhanced ability to process sensory information efficiently and quickly may 
generalise to include more effective cross-modal processing in women.
When both Experiments 4 and 5 are considered together, there exists a 
conflict in terms of heightened typical female crash responses over typical male 
crash reports in the simultaneous condition of Experiment 5a (which was not found 
for the identical condition in Experiment 4a). The inconsistency may relate to the 
fact that the mean for the Medium AQ group in Experiment 4 was relatively low. 
The normative mean for typical (i.e., non-BAP) student males originally provided 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was 18.6, whereas the male student AQ mean for the 
sample in Experiment 4 was 13.5 (versus 15.4 in Experiment 5). This five point 
discrepancy suggests that the conflict in results is caused by sampling differences, 
with the typical male sample in Experiment 4 showing far fewer autistic traits than
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would generally be expected. In EMB terms, it would be expected that fewer traits 
in the typical males would be related to more ‘female-type’ processing for the 
Medium AQ group overall, which in turn would account for the lack of male/female 
differences found in Experiment 4a for the perceptual causality task. The 
conclusion, therefore, is that the sex difference in Experiment 5a is a valid result.
Experiments 5b
The adapted version of the adult Embedded Figures Task was specifically 
designed to assess the perceptual processing component of participant performance. 
Participants did not to have to hold the simple target shape in mind whilst 
examining the complex figure in which it is embedded, and hence the visuo-spatial 
working memory aspect of the task was removed. Enhanced perceptual processing 
of single features has been argued to be the root of autistic superiority on this task 
(Jarrold et al., 2005; Pellicano et al., 2005), and so it was anticipated that this 
amended embedded figures task would provide evidence of an ability advantage in 
association with the broader autism phenotype. If the BAP is an extreme 
manifestation of the male brain, then typical men should show also show superiority 
over typical women. Additionally, women with the broader phenotype were 
predicted to show the same advantages as men with BAP on this task.
This altered EFT methodology produced gender differences in which men 
were found to be generally more accurate and took less time on average to respond 
than women. The significantly faster response latencies corroborate a wealth of 
evidence of male advantage on this task (e.g., Miller, 2001; Voyer, Voyer, & 
Bryden, 1995). In a review of visuo-spatial versus verbal sex differences, Halpem
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(2004) concluded that memory tasks in which spatial transformations (such as 
mental rotations) are required favour men, suggesting that such information is better 
encoded by men than women. It was reasonable to predict therefore, taking response 
times for accurate trials as representative of processing efficiency, latency 
differences between the sexes to be maintained even though the visuo-spatial 
memory component was removed in the new EFT methodology. Results indicating 
male superiority supported this expectation, and are interpreted here to suggest that 
perceptual processing drives this advantage in men.
The results from the AQ group analysis are more complex. Neither accuracy 
nor speed of response advantages could be found for the High AQ scoring group 
over typical males and females using this EFT methodology. This study therefore 
does not support the findings from recent research that BAP is associated with 
superior ability on tests of weak central coherence. Happe, Briskman and Frith 
(2001) and Bolte and Poustka (2006) report enhanced speed for correct responses in 
parents with ASD children, but Baron-Cohen et al. (2006) and de Jonge, Kemner 
and van Engeland (2006) found no such difference between BAP parents and 
comparison parents.
Given the fact that EFT accuracy is also inconsistent in autism research 
(even within ASD studies; Brian & Bryson, 1996, Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 
1991), the results reported here are not unusual. It is likely that the altered 
methodology and changes in data adjustment have contributed to the results 
observed for Experiment 5b. The amendments made to standard EFT procedure for 
Experiment 5 were specifically designed to aid understanding whether perceptual
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processes between groups defined by AQ scores differed. In most other studies, as 
de Jonge et al. (2006) state, response times for inaccurate responses are adjusted to 
180 seconds, which means that slight differences between participants in accuracy 
lead to disproportionately inflated differences in their mean response times. This 
flawed method may have generated false latency results in prior studies, but this is 
not the case here as the mean time for inaccurate scores across all participants was 
substituted for every inaccurate response and every response that exceeded 30 
seconds15. Also, side-by-side target shape/complex figure presentation removed the 
cognitive element involved in other studies, which was important because this 
prevented confounds based on individual variation in visuo-spatial working 
memory.
On this basis, from this study it appears that there is little difference between 
BAP individuals and non-BAP individuals on EFT performance when perceptual 
processing alone is considered. It may be then, that the BAP and ASD studies in 
which superiorities are found when testing participants with embedded figures 
represent a cognitive (i.e., memory) difference, in which (visual) detail encoding 
and retention is enhanced in working memory.
It may also be that the range of EFT accuracy and latency scores across the 
entire sample is constrained due to the distorted AQ score distribution in 
Experiment 5. In particular, there was only one participant who scored under ten in 
the female sub-sample. Furthermore, the female group mean in Experiment 5 (//. =
15 The alternative approach was to analyse data relating to correct responses only. This option would 
have led to people who only responded accurately to the easiest trials appearing to have very fast 
average latencies.
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16.7) is comparatively high, relative to that found for females from Experiment 4 (// 
=11.3); the AQ scores for the female participants in Experiments 4 and Experiment 
5 are significantly different (t(155) = -4.22, p < .001). In terms of the AQ group 
analyses, complete lack of ‘extreme female brain’ participants in the typical female 
group may have prevented a significant effect of group being found in Experiment 
5b.
The last points to note regarding Experiment 5b are that the women included 
in the broader phenotype group exhibited mean EFT scores on both measures that 
fell between those associated with typical men and women, and that the high AQ 
scoring men were seen to be significantly faster and more accurate than typical 
women once the BAP females were removed. In this respect, the results presented 
here parallel those found by Happe, Briskman & Frith (2001), who reported that 
fathers, but not mothers, of children with ASD were faster and more accurate than 
controls on the Embedded Figures Task.
Experiment 5c
When the relationship between EFT performance and cross-modal 
integration is considered, more information regarding the role of gender in EFT 
performance is discovered. The expected result for Experiment 5c was that poor 
perceptual integration would be related to enhanced EFT performance in men and 
BAP individuals. No such relationships were found, and instead inverse correlations 
were obtained between heightened perceptual integration and poorer EFT 
performance for both measures in typical women only. There are two interesting 
conclusions to draw from this male/female difference. The first is that, in line with
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the finding that women appear better perceptual integrators than men generally 
(Experiment 5a), female and male perceptual phenotypes show distinctions in terms 
of how the same visual stimuli are processed. The second is that atypical women 
(those with a relatively high number of autism traits) are comparable to men 
(irrespective of BAP presence or absence) in that they do not display this negative 
perceptual integration/visual disembedding relationship.
To understand the neural processes responsible for this dissociation between 
typical females and typical males/BAP individuals, one candidate brain region 
warranting discussion is the extrastriate visual cortex. Activity within this site may 
be the common factor that accounts for enhanced cross-modal integration (as 
inferred from elevated number of crashes seen in the simultaneous condition of the 
CoMG in Experiment 5a), and its correlation with visual disembedding performance 
in Experiment 5c, in typical women. The extrastriate visual cortices function to 
integrate visual information and resolve competition between types of visual 
information (Beck & Kastner, 2005; Kastner, De Weerd, Pinsk, Elizondo, Desimone 
& Ungerleider, 2001; Miller, Gochin & Gross, 1993; Pack, Gartland & Bom, 2004). 
This cortical region also includes area MT/V5, the neural base for motion 
information processing (Braddick, Atkinson & Wattam-Bell, 2003). Enhanced 
responsivity to complex dynamic audio-visual stimuli may be related to increased 
feature integration, as both processes involve activation of areas within the 
extrastriate visual region. Therefore, at neural level, results from Experiment 5 
taken together suggest women and men may differ in terms of the neural areas that 
respond to the cross-modal perceptual causality and EFT stimuli.
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Evidence from a recent brain imaging study does support the suggestion of 
differential neural recruitment between genders in response to complex stimuli. 
Although deemed a pilot study due to low group numbers, Baron-Cohen et al.
(2006) has reported fMRI research study in which activation of neural regions in 
response to EFT stimuli varied by gender. Their results indicated significantly 
heightened levels in extrastriate activity in typical females as compared to typical 
males and BAP adults (parents of ASD probands). In this study, mothers of children 
with ASD generally responded at the neural level in the same way as did fathers and 
male controls. In the left-hemisphere primary visual cortices, mothers also showed 
less activity than typical males, suggesting that they have an extreme male pattern 
of neural response (as well as the fathers). The argument of equivalence between the 
BAP in men and women in terms of a particularly male perception/cognition 
relationship is therefore empirically supported by response to stimuli testing weak 
central coherence, as reported both in Experiment 5c and in the fMRI study by 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2006).
It would therefore appear that differential encoding of embedded figures is 
gender-based, with women expressing the broader phenotype possibly showing a 
‘male brain’ pattern of response. In typical women, the extrastriate visual cortex 
may play a role in EFT resolution that is specific to their sex. Elevated levels of 
extrastriate activity may also account for the heightened sensitivity shown by typical 
women in this study to cross-modal perceptual causality, as the stimuli used are 
dynamic in nature. This explanation extends to the inverse relationship found 
between elevated levels of crash reports and EFT performance between individuals 
within the typical female group. No such relationships were found for women
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expressing a high number of autistic traits, who, like typical men and BAP men, 
exhibit correlations between perceptual integration and EFT measures that verge on 
being significantly different from those of typical women.
It is therefore concluded that Experiment 5c provides partial support for the 
Extreme Male Brain theory of autism, in that the BAP appears to represent male 
brain functioning, whether such individuals are male or female, with respect to 
relationships between perceptual integration and EFT performance.
3.5 General Discussion and Conclusions
The general aims of this chapter were to investigate whether there was any 
initial experimental evidence for compromised cross-modal integration in ASD, 
using the Broader Autism Phenotype as an analogue model. Secondarily, the studies 
were designed to consider whether the BAP in the general population showed the 
same cognitive superiorities as have been found in relations of ASD probands. As 
Extreme Male Brain theory equates the BAP to an exaggeratedly male brain type, 
gender differences within BAP and non-BAP groups were also analysed.
Results from these investigations are summarised below. However, there are 
many factors that could have influenced results generated by using Autism- 
Spectrum Quotient questionnaire scores as the basis for categorising groups. The 
AQ is a self-report instrument and behavioural questionnaires are known to be 
methodologically flawed in this respect. Participants may distort data by resorting to 
socially desirable responding. In other words, they may “stretch the truth in an effort
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to make a good impression” (Martin & Nagao, 1989, p. 72). Distortion of self- 
report behavioural data on this basis has been acknowledged as challenge to 
psychological research for over five decades (e.g. Edwards, 1953); questionnaire- 
based study results must therefore be treated cautiously. The argument here, though, 
is that a few BAP individuals may have been included in the Medium AQ group in 
both studies. Given that this group contains many more individuals than the 
experimental BAP groups, their data is unlikely be disproportionately influential, 
although in the experiments 4b and 4c the marginal superiority of Medium AQ 
group males over BAP males on average Intuitive Physics scores (means 12.64 vs. 
12.13) may reflect an impression management effect.
Notwithstanding potential confounds generated by using the AQ, the studies 
did produce some interesting findings. In terms of cross-modal integration, 
compromise in association with BAP was only apparent when audio-visual stimuli 
were compared with visual stimuli (Experiment 4a) within this group. Extended 
response times in both the audio-visual and ambiguous conditions suggest that 
processing ambiguity is hard for BAP participants, and that the auditory signal is 
not as effective as the visual capture cue in terms of relative disambiguation 
strength. This finding was interpreted as meaning that the causal percept generated 
by cross-modal integration is less clear than the percept created by viewing the 
visual capture stimuli, given that these unimodal stimuli were processed as quickly 
as unambiguous control stimuli. Results from comparing categorical responses (i.e., 
crashes reported) between AQ groups showed that the BAP group is similar to other 
groups in terms of responding to disambiguating cues, irrespective of cue type 
(cross-modal or unimodal). However a trend was found in the hypothesised
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direction when crash reports in the key audio-visual CoMG condition were 
compared between High and Low AQ groups, with the BAP latencies being 
significantly longer.
The results relating to the low AQ group suggested that task performance by 
these participants in Experiment 4a differed distinctly from that of the BAP group. 
The uniformly rapid responses across trial types suggested that percepts generated 
by all stimuli facilitated easy judgements, and the response to disambiguating cues 
indicated a greater sensitivity to these signals than the other groups (although not 
significantly so). Hence this group potentially represents the opposite end of the 
autistic dimensional continuum (Wakabyashi et al., 2006). If this is the case, it is 
interesting to note that the continuum may have a perceptual aspect, and that 
absence of autistic traits may be related to heightened perceptual integration (both 
within and across modes). The low AQ group was predominantly female, hence the 
low AQ/high AQ distinctions found in Experiment 4a provide support for EMB 
theory, rather than for the main hypothesis of compromised perceptual integration.
The results of Experiment 5a cannot add to this conclusion, as no participant 
could be categorised as exhibiting this ‘anti-BAP’ profile (none reported fewer than 
7 autistic traits). Lack of low AQ scorers may therefore have influenced results; in 
this study, High AQ responses showed no differences in either latencies or crash 
reports with respect to the auditory signal irrespective of its presentation timing. 
However, in this version of the main task, typical women and men differed again in 
that women integrated the auditory signal more effectively in the critical 
(simultaneous) auditory timing condition and consequently perceived significantly
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more crashes, whereas within the BAP group no such gender distinction was found, 
and responses produced a pattern equivalent to that of typical men. The broader 
phenotype therefore does not appear to be associated with compromised cross- 
modal integration, but the fact that BAP women are similar to BAP men although 
typical women are dissimilar to typical men does partially support EMB theory 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002), and suggests the inclusion of perceptual integration 
behaviour as a marker for the BAP/anti-BAP continuum.
Broader autism phenotype was not found to be linked to autistic superiority 
in either physics or visual disembedding ability. Where difference was found to 
exist, it occurred between typical men and high AQ scorers with typical women. 
Typical females were found to be weaker at physics, to integrate audio-visual 
stimuli more effectively than men, and to be comparable to men with respect to the 
EFT, yet process stimuli differently from men (in that variation in EFT performance 
is correlated at the individual level with cross-modal integration sensitivity for 
women with normal range autistic trait expression). Unlike typical women, female 
participants deemed to represent the BAP are similar to men, especially with respect 
to the lack of perception/cognition relationship inferred from the crash report/EFT 
accuracy data (although they were not found to be superior to typical women on 
EFT measures, unlike High AQ men). Again, this dissociation in male/female 
performance differences between BAP and typical groups is predicted by EMB 
theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002).
On most cognitive functions, gender distributions are broadly similar and 
only produce small mean disparities (Hedges & Nowell, 1995). It has been
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concluded that gender ratio biases at the extreme tails of these distributions are the 
source of such small effect sizes (Halpem et al., 2007). There is support from the 
studies here that some individuals represent exaggeratedly female and male brain 
types, which are associated with low or high presence of autistic traits. Has the BAP 
and its hypothetical antithesis contributed to sex differences findings in the 
cognitive literature?
Broader phenotype investigation presents research method issues that may 
not be easy to resolve. This point notwithstanding, the main finding from this 
chapter regarding the perceptual broader autism phenotype is that it appears similar 
to the typical male perceptual phenotype, which shows differences from the typical 
female phenotype in some respects. Hence the BAP shows signs of ‘extremity’ only 
when its counterfoil (the exaggerated female brain type) is present. This conclusion 
generates a problem for further research into perceptual integration in ASD, in that 
subtle perceptual differences based on male vs. female brain differences may not be 
found (as target and control groups are gender matched).
Generally, no inferences regarding autism as the manifestation of extreme 
male brain function can be made from these studies. It could be argued, though, that 
to produce the severity of atypical behaviour sufficient to warrant diagnosis of an 
autism spectrum disorder, the brain function of an affected individual is likely to be 
very different from that of a typical peer. If perceptual integration is causal to the 
autistic condition, then exaggerated differences in response to cross-modal stimuli 
should be detectable. The following chapter therefore investigates cross-modal 
integration with respect to a group of children and adolescents with ASD.
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Chapter 4: Cross-modal integration in ASD
4.1 Overview
The previous chapter provided some indication that cross-modal integration 
is compromised in the Broader Autism Phenotype. The general conclusions drawn 
were that individuals expressing the BAP, irrespective of their gender, are largely 
comparable to non-BAP males, and that they differ from typical females and 
individuals with few autistic traits in some respects. For instance, individuals with 
the BAP of both genders and typical men tended to report fewer crashes than typical 
females when the auditory signal coincided with occlusion of the disks in 
Experiment 5a. Also, EFT performance in typical women is inversely related to the 
number of causal events experienced, suggesting that perceptual integration within 
the visual extrastriate region competes with single feature processing; this 
relationship is not apparent in men or, more interestingly, in association with 
expression of the BAP in individuals of either sex (Experiment 5c).
These findings, although consistent with Extreme Male Brain theory, do not 
constitute evidence that difficulties in multisensory processing at the perceptual 
level exist in ASD, as responses to the cross-modal perceptual causality stimuli 
associated with the broader autism phenotype are broadly comparable to levels of 
response for typical men expressing an average number of traits (as measured by the 
AQ). However, the BAP groups in Experiments 4 and 5 display AQ means that 
equate to ‘intermediate level’ scores (as defined by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001), therefore the slight (non-significant) reductions
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in causal percepts generated in association to the BAP relative to typical male 
results may be more pronounced when testing individuals with diagnoses of ASD.
In this chapter Experiment 6 considers cross-modal integration in ASD by 
comparing boys with and without diagnoses matched for age and non-verbal IQ or 
verbal IQ in terms of CoMG performance. This study also includes data from the 
children’s intuitive physics test (the What Happens Next? Task, as described in 
Chapter 2). Comparative analyses using these data explore whether any 
relationships exist between perception and cognition within ASD. Given recent 
evidence of perceptual differences between autism and Asperger Syndrome 
(Mazefsky & Oswald, 2006; Tsermentseli, O’Brien & Spencer, 2007), a final 
analysis is presented in Experiment 6 in which cross-modal integration and 
intuitive physics scores are contrasted between age and non-verbal IQ-matched 
ASD diagnosis subgroups.
4.2 Introduction
4.2.1 Multisensory processing in ASD
Myriad reports of abnormal visual perception in relation to ASD, and 
growing evidence of auditory differences in autism, led Iarocci and Macdonald
(2006) to call for a specific and systematic investigation of multisensory processing 
from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. They point out that no single historical 
psychological or neuroscientific account of ASD has comprehensively explained 
both the cognitive phenotype and characteristic behaviours of autism. The co­
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existence of abnormal sensory patterns with cognitive differences in ASD has been 
portrayed as coincidental rather than potentially causal. The fundamental cause for 
all autistic behaviours has therefore been suggested to be the atypical 
neurodevelopment of multisensory integration systems, and its subsequent impact 
on establishing the neural architecture required to support socio-cognitive functions 
dependent on multimodal signals (Iarocci & McDonald, 2006).
Within the visual mode, Bertone has in part justified the validity of viewing 
perceptual integration issues in autism as a problem arising at primarily the 
perceptual rather than the cognitive level. His ‘complexity-specific’ hypothesis 
(Bertone & Faubert, 2006) predicts that perception in autism reflects ‘diffuse or 
non-specific neural dysfunction of neuro-integrative mechanisms affecting complex 
perceptual processing in autism in general’. The resulting Signal Integration Theory 
(Bertone & Faubert, 2006) is supported by evidence that response to first and 
second order sinusoidal gratings, in which the visual ‘noise’ variable between 
stimuli recruit either visual area V 1 alone or multiple visual areas, is specifically 
associated with autism (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2 for a more comprehensive 
description of this theory).
Signal Integration Theory has not as yet been extended to abnormal 
multisensory processing of poorly integrated unimodal information. Little has been 
established to date with regard to multisensory processing differences in autism. 
Seemingly similar studies have produced conflicting results. For instance, de Gelder 
and Vroomen (1991) found that children with autism experience a diminished 
facilitatory effect of simultaneous visual speech to aid decoding of unclear auditory
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speech in comparison to controls, and concluded that cross-modal integration is 
deficient in autism.
However, Williams, Massaro, Peel, Bosseler and Suddendorf (2004) more 
recently reported that it is not cross-modal integration per se that is affected in 
autism. Although Williams et al. (2004) found evidence of a reduced McGurk effect 
in a group of children with ASD, they also demonstrated that differences in visual 
speech-reading ability (unimodal) were largely responsible for this difference. With 
the McGurk effect, mouthed presentation of a syllable such as /ga/ distorts the 
auditory perception of /ba/ so that /da/ is heard; such perceptual blending 
dramatically reduces the overall accuracy of auditory syllable detection, whereas 
congruent presentation of the syllable in both auditory and visual modes greatly 
facilitates accuracy. In this study, once speech-reading ability was accounted for, no 
bi-modal facilitation of accuracy was discernible in the target group in the 
congruent condition, suggesting that the lack of perceptual blending in the McGurk 
condition was being driven by weaknesses in visual processing alone.
In the emotional domain, Hall, Szechtman and Nahmias (2003) found that 
adults with HFA/AS did not experience a facilitatory effect of auditory emotional 
congruence when viewing emotional face stimuli, unlike their peers. Irrespective of 
congruence or otherwise of the emotional content of the face/voice pairings, 
simultaneous presentation produced abnormal cerebral blood flow patterns in the 
target participants that were suggestive of attentional conflict (i.e., over-activation 
of ‘gating’ regions such as the thalamus). It could be argued that stable integration 
of multisensory signals would lead to prioritised processing over unimodal signals
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so that this conflict in recruiting attentional resources would not occur; attentional 
conflict therefore points to a pre-attentional perceptual integration failure in the 
target group.
However, examining cross-modal effects on high-order processes such as 
speech or emotional recognition in autism cause interpretative difficulties, in that 
this approach necessitates the involvement of both perceptual and cognitive 
systems, and so performance might not directly reflect perceptual activity (because 
top-down influences cannot be discounted). For instance, Williams et al. (2004) 
found that auditory speech accuracy of a small sample of target participants 
improved after computer-mediated speech-reading training in which directed 
attention to lip movements was promoted. This amelioration of an apparent 
perceptual integration deficit associated with ASD through increasing attendance to 
the visual component of speech argues against any perceptual integration basis for 
multisensory deficits.
Conversely, Smith and Bennetto (2007) considered this evidence against a 
perception system involvement for the multisensory incoherence reported by 
individuals with ASD to be insufficient. Their careful investigation of the degree to 
which visual information aids comprehension when listening to speech embedded in 
noise showed that autistic participants did not benefit from intersensory redundancy 
in the stimuli to the same extent as typical controls. Furthermore, when group 
differences were re-analysed at the individual level by hierarchical regression, a 
unique factor distinct from lip-reading ability was found to be significant within the 
model produced from the ASD data. The researchers concluded that this separate
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factor may represent a pre-attentive audio-visual integration abnormality associated 
with autism diagnosis that contributes to early and ongoing speech development.
The search for a pre-attentive perceptual integration deficit has also been 
attempted using purely audio-visual non-speech stimuli. For example, the Shams (or 
fission) illusion refers to the influence of a series of beeps on the perception of a 
series of flashes presented in the visual periphery (Shams, Kamitani, Thompson & 
Shimojo, 2002). In typical subjects, when more beeps than flashes are presented 
they evoke additional illusory flickers. In a recent autism study based on this 
illusion (Van der Smagt, van Engeland & Kemner, 2007) fifteen adult participants 
meeting DSM-IV criteria for autism, and fifteen controls matched for age and IQ 
produced patterns of reported numbers of flashes in relation to the number of beeps 
presented that did not differ significantly between groups. Van der Smagt et al.
(2007) concluded that any multisensory integration difficulties discovered in 
association with Autism Spectrum Disorder must therefore originate in processing 
stages beyond low-level perception in high-functioning adults with autism.
The authors are careful not to over-generalise the conclusion drawn to apply 
to autistic individuals with below-normal IQ, but the difficulty is that this study’s 
target group is actually superior to the average normal population in terms of 
general intelligence. In fact the IQ profile obtained, in which standardised verbal 
scores exceeded performance scores by 7 points (with comparative standard 
deviations between IQ tasks), suggests that the target group included more 
individuals with a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome than with high-functioning
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autism, as Asperger Syndrome has been found to relate to high verbal functioning 
(Ehlers et al., 1997).
The distinction between diagnoses of autism and AS is relevant as it has 
been suggested that the two diagnoses are differentiable in terms of response to 
auditory cue intensity. In one recent study (Mazefsky & Oswald, 2006) comparison 
showed that an HFA group performed significantly worse than an AS group in 
terms of accuracy of emotional comprehension conveyed by tone of voice, but only 
when the stimuli’s signal intensity was low, suggesting that signal processing 
efficiency is compromised in autism more so than in Asperger Syndrome. With 
respect to the Shams ASD study (Van der Smagt et al., 2007), the intensity of the 
auditory signal (75dB) may have been super-threshold for the sample group; 
without threshold testing the modulating effect of auditory cue intensity on 
sensitivity to the Shams phenomenon, any fine-grained differences between target 
and control groups may have been lost, and any overall differences at this high 
intensity clouded through conflation of AS and HFA diagnoses within the target 
sample.
Another consideration of the wider applicability of the study by Van der 
Smagt et al. (2007) to ASD as a whole is the particular pattern of neural activity 
evoked by the Shams illusion stimuli, which may actually play on a relative 
perceptual ‘strength’ associated with ASD. It is thought that the combination of the 
auditory and visual stimuli in the Shams task functions to increase activity early on 
in visual processing, within the primary cortex, V 1 (Arden, Wolf & Messiter, 2003) 
The subjective perception of the illusion has also been shown to be associated with
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enhanced VI activity (Watkins, Shams, Tanaka, Haynes & Rees, 2006). The 
autism-specific visual signature proposed by Bertone and Faubert (2006) includes 
an amplification of signalling efficiency of this area in comparison to other visual 
regions.
The disparity across the existing cross-modal literature may reflect testing 
audio-visual integration at different processing levels; the Shams illusion is low- 
level and perceptual in nature, but the speech stimuli used in the lip-reading and 
McGurk tasks evoke several cognitive, as well as perceptual, processes although 
Smith and Bennetto (2007) concluded that ‘pre-attentive’ perceptual integration is 
deficient in ASD using speech-in-noise stimuli. It is therefore essential to 
investigate multimodal processing at an early level in ASD using paradigms other 
than the Shams task.
4.2.2 Cross-modal integration mechanisms in perceptual causality
Selection of the cross-modal perceptual causality phenomenon (Sekuler et 
al., 1997) as the basis for the studies in this thesis was designed to facilitate 
assessment of audio-visual integration at the perceptual level in ASD. In the cross- 
modal experience of perceptual causality, the auditory information provided distorts 
perception of the ambiguous dynamic visual event in order to generate a percept 
that has inherent higher-order meaning (i.e., causality). The neural mechanics of 
this phenomenon have been investigated by Bushara, Hanakawa, Immisch, Toma, 
Kansaku and Hallet (2003) using similar stimuli to those used by Sekuler et al. 
(1997) and presented within the Crash or Miss Game.
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Bushara et al. (2003) were specifically interested in the neural processes 
within the perceptual system that support cross-modal binding in order to afford a 
high level of meaning, rather than those recruited simply when congruent auditory 
and visual information is provided. In their fMRI task, the ambiguous stimuli used 
comprised two bars converging with a collision sound presented at the point of 
occlusion. The differences between the activation patterns associated with reports 
of causal and non-causal percepts generated in response to these stimuli were 
contrasted. Activation only associated with the experience of causality was taken to 
represent neural areas involved in cross-modal binding, rather than simple 
processing of the separate auditory and visual stimuli components (a result verified 
by repeating the process using identical stimuli with the sound removed, to ensure 
that these regions were not simply related to causal perception per se).
The results reported by Bushara et al. (2003) concurred with prior cross- 
modal studies using audio-visual stimuli that were congruent in space and time, in 
that the multimodal network found in association with ‘causal’ responses was 
widely distributed across cortical and sub-cortical regions. However, the important 
result from this study was that the experience of causality is related to exaggerated 
activity within multimodal areas such as the superior colliculus, coupled with 
decreased activity in both visual and auditory modality-specific areas. The authors 
interpreted the finding of decreased activation in both visual and auditory cortex as 
evidence against top-down attentional modulation, arguing that an attentional shift 
or bias to either the auditory or visual signals generated would create heightened 
activation in one cortex relative to the other. As both unimodal cortices’ activity 
was suppressed whenever a causal percept was experienced, Bushara et al. (2003)
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concluded that this activation pattern evidences a ‘reciprocal and competitive 
interaction between multimodal and predominantly unimodal processing networks’. 
They further propose that the operation of multimodal networks occurs in parallel 
with modality-specific areas, i.e., as equivalent sites for early sensory processing 
and cross-modal interaction, rather than serving at a later stage within a hierarchical, 
unimodal-to-multimodal sensory processing model.
The conclusion from the study by Bushara et al. (2003) is of considerable 
interest as it accommodates the proposal that enhanced perceptual functioning 
within one modality (as suggested by Mottron et al., 2006) may exist alongside 
cross-modal integration deficits at the individual level. Evidence of neural path 
dissociation between unimodal and cross-modal processing in relation to audio­
visual perceptual causality stimuli therefore aids interpretation of results on 
Experiment 6.
4,2.3 Intuitive Physics in ASD
This final study (Experiment 6) includes the WHN?T in order to determine 
whether prior evidence of an ‘innate’ physics superiority can be replicated using IQ- 
and gender-matched children. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, Lawson and 
Spong (2001) reported the finding that children with AS achieved higher scores on 
an Intuitive Physics task than their overall mental age (MA) scores predicted 
(although their scores on a test of non-verbal IQ were in line with mental ages), and 
significantly better than a large group of age-matched control males of normal
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intelligence. However, it should be noted that the control children were not matched 
on IQ measures in this study.
Binnie and Williams (2002) have also demonstrated that children with 
autism show preserved abilities in the domain of physical causal cognition, in 
conjunction with impaired intuitive psychology and intuitive biology. In a later 
related study (Binnie & Williams, 2003) comparing intuitive physics and intuitive 
psychology, the target group (mean age 6 years, 3 months) showed a superior ability 
to reason about physical phenomena. Despite the autistic children having the lowest 
mean standardised PIQ score, the physics scores for this group were significantly 
higher than those of chronologically matched TD controls, and of three other 
comparison groups of TD children (preschoolers, 7-year olds and 10-year olds), 
suggesting that the children in this sample were displaying an ‘islet of ability’ as 
their physics scores exceeded predictions from their general intellectual functioning.
The finding that superior physics ability applies to autism as well as to AS is 
important, as autism is more frequently associated with below normal IQ, and so 
this result strengthens the argument of preserved/superior innate physics aptitude 
outside of general intellectual abilities; according to the Binnie and Williams study 
(Binnie & Wiliams, 2003) this domain-specific specialism appears to generalise 
across autism spectrum subgroups. The final analyses in Experiment 6 therefore 
include comparison of intuitive physics measures between matched autism and AS 
groups.
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4,2.4 Summary of hypotheses
The current conflict in findings between studies investigating the hypothesis 
that perceptual incoherence and multisensory processing difficulties in ASD are 
related to disrupted early integrative processing is re-examined in Experiment 6, in 
which cross-modal perceptual causality data obtained from children with and 
without ASD are contrasted. As the causal phenomenon generated by the CoMG 
reflects early integrative processing, it is predicted that children with ASD will 
report fewer crashes than their control peers across all timing conditions of the task, 
in line with Signal Integration Theory (Bertone & Faubert, 2006). The second part 
of this study considers whether ASD is related to superior intuitive physics in 
comparison to matched controls, as has been previously reported, and whether there 
is any evidence of an intact correlation between cross-modal processing and 
intuitive physics skill in these boys, as was found in the non-diagnosed (and 
therefore deemed ‘typically developing’) sample of science-orientated boys 
(Experiment 3).
To date no distinguishing markers have been identified that reliably 
differentiate between Aspergers Syndrome and Autism (Ritvo, Ritvo, Guthrie & 
Ritvo, 2008), although multiple studies have provided evidence of AS-specific 
cognitive, attentional, behavioural, genetic and sensory atypicalities (Baron-Cohen 
& Klin, 2006). Specific stimulus-intensity differences in interpretation of emotion 
information suggests that there may exist perceptual differences between autism and 
Asperger Syndrome (Mazefsky & Oswald, 2006). Also, Tsermentseli, O’Brien and 
Spencer (2007) have recently reported that autism differs from AS in terms of 
compromised coherent visual form detection. Therefore the final analyses in this
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chapter presents comparisons using a subset of the data from Experiment 6 in order 
to evaluate whether these two diagnoses might be separable in terms of cross-modal 
integration, and intuitive physics.
4.3: Experiment 6: Cross-modal integration in children with ASD
4.3.1 Introduction
The aim of this study was to investigate whether or not children and 
adolescents with ASD differed from matched controls in terms of their response to 
cross-modal perceptual causality, their relative intuitive physics abilities and the 
relationships between them.
Using audio-visual perceptual causality stimuli, cross-modal integration may 
be shown to be compromised in three respects: The consequence of integration (i.e. 
the perception of causality) may be less frequently experienced in ASD; the 
processing speed may be slower (as indicated by longer response times), and the 
temporal window across which the auditory information can influence visual 
processing may be extended (generating a flat response pattern when auditory 
presentation timings are varied). If any or all of these factors are found to differ 
significantly between target groups and controls, the hypothesis that cross-modal 
perceptual integration is atypical in ASD would be supported.
In Experiment 3, a significant developmental effect was found in that the 
number of causal percepts (crashes) reported by participants systematically 
increased as their ages increased, and therefore participants in this study were
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matched closely for chronological age between ASD and control groups. As gender 
effects were found in adults (Experiment 5) with typical women experiencing 
crashes more often than men or participants with the BAP, this study examines 
cross-modal integration in ASD boys only. The reasoning behind this decision is 
that if atypical perceptual integration is related to behavioural aspects of ASD 
(Mottron et al., 2006) then it should be demonstrably different between boys with 
and without diagnoses; inclusion of ASD girls, who are conjectured to have 
integration processing more akin to that of boys than to that of their own gender 
(after Experiments 4 and 5), may produce a false result as female controls may have 
higher crash reports than males.
It is not known how dimensions of intelligence affect perceptual causality 
processing, but it is feasible that functions of ‘general intelligence’ may interact 
with perceptual development to influence results. To avoid potential confounds of 
this nature, matching was extended beyond chronological age to produce two 
control groups on the basis of either verbal or non-verbal intelligence, using the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and the Naglieri Nonverbal Assessment 
Task (NNAT) respectively. Age effects were again controlled across target and 
control groups through close chronological matching, and so raw rather than 
standardised task scores were used to ensure that vocabulary and non-verbal 
reasoning abilities were evenly matched between groups. Any differences found 
could then be ascribed to ASD, rather than to any differences in intelligence 
between groups.
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4.3.2 Method
Participants
Twenty- three boys and male adolescents with diagnoses of either autism 
(ten), Asperger Syndrome (eleven) or Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; two) were recruited via mainstream schools with 
special needs units and special needs schools across South Wales and Somerset. 
Parents contacted by letters distributed by the participating schools provided full 
informed consent. Potential control participants were recruited as in the same way 
from mainstream schools across South Wales. Parents were asked not to respond if 
their children had been diagnosed with dyslexia, ADHD, colour-blindness, visual or 
hearing difficulties in order to avoid confounds introduced by these conditions. 
Ninety-one boys recruited were assessed for verbal and non-verbal IQ abilities using 
the BPVS and NNAT were tested on IQ measures. Of these, 85 also completed the 
experimental tasks.
Families of the target children provided details of diagnosis and the 
clinicians or educational psychologists who had diagnosed their children, in order to 
confirm that each participant met with current DSM-IV criteria for an ASD 
condition. Parents of twenty out of these twenty-three participants also completed 
the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ16; Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 2003). 
From these parental report data, suitability for inclusion in the study was verified for 
twenty participants (Appendix G). Testing with the two standardised intelligence 
scales showed that four target participants fell below the lower normal/near-normal
16 The SCQ was previously called the Autism Screening Questionnaire (Berument, Rutter, Lord, 
Pickles & Bailey, 1999). It provides a categorical cut-off for diagnosis of ASD of 12 points from a 
possible 40, and uses an algorithm designed for diagnosis according to DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria.
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IQ range (i.e., below 80 points) on the BBPVS, and a further three scored below 80 
standardised points on the NNAT. One additional participant scored below this cut­
off level on both IQ tasks.
Apparatus/Task Stimuli
The apparatus and task stimuli used were identical to those used in 
Experiment 3, for the experimental tasks. Participants’ verbal and non-verbal 
intelligence quota scores were obtained using the British Picture Vocabulary Scales 
(BPVS) and Naglieri Non-Verbal Assessment Task (NNAT) respectively, according 
to published procedures (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997; Naglieri, 1997).
Procedure
Participants were tested in quiet, isolated rooms under normal lighting 
conditions during their normal daytime school routine. As far as possible, similar 
environments were created across all participating schools. The BPVS and NNAT 
(in that order) were administered on the first testing day, and the experimental test 
day was conducted within two weeks for all bar three cases17. The experimental 
tasks were presented in the same order, with the CoMG preceding the WHN7T in all 
cases.
17 BPVS and NNAT testing is advised to be repeated only after 6 months, and so the data from few 
individuals with extended periods between test days is unlikely to have influenced results.
212
4.3.3 Results
Outlier and exclusion analysis
Three potential participants from the control reserve were excluded on the 
basis that their control trial accuracy measures exceeded 2 standard deviations of the 
mean for the entire group data on either or both of the control trial accuracy 
measures. In addition, three potential participants’ data were excluded because their 
responses to the feedback sheet (Appendix C) indicated that they had generated 
response rules, producing a total control group of 79 participants. Three participants 
with ASD were excluded as their control data exceeded two standard deviations of 
the control means for the entire data set, and one data set was removed as the 
participant refused to complete the CoMG task. The final group size for target 
participants was therefore nineteen; seventeen of whom had SCQ scores provided 
by parents that reaffirmed their diagnosis of ASD (Appendix M).
Group allocation according to age and 10 matching
Allocation of typically-developing boys to control groups was made on the 
basis of their raw scores and chronological age after completion of all study tasks18; 
matching was completed ‘blind’ to experimental data to avoid selection bias.
18 As recruitment of ASD participants extended across a long period of time, potential control 
participants completed the experimental tasks to generate a reserve of potential matches.
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Group N Mean age 
(years;months)
Age range BPVS (mean raw 
scores; range in 
brackets)
NNAT (mean raw 
scores; range in 
brackets)
ASD 19 12;5 9;11 -  15; 1 103.5 (6 0 - 147) 36.4(12-56)
VIQ-match 
(control 1 )
19 11 ;9 5;2 -  17; 1 104.5 (79 -  148) -
N V IQ - 
match 
(control 2 )
19 1 2 ; 1 6;9 -  17;6 36(17-61)
Total 57 12; 1 5;2 -1 7 ;6 - -
Table 4.1: Group means and ranges for age and 10 scores (Experiment 6 )
Descriptive statistics of the age and IQ match dimensions for each group are 
provided in Table 4.1. For non-verbal IQ matching, raw scores generally matched 
within 3 points, but inclusion of ASD participants with below normal and high IQ 
caused three match pairs to be highly discrepant in age (>30 months); for two of 
these match pairs, the control children were younger than targets, but the reverse 
was true for the final pair. An independent t-test revealed the age difference 
between groups to be non-significant (t(36) = 0.47, p  = .64).
Matching on verbal IQ was comparatively more difficult; poor performance 
of target participants with autism led to problems identifying same-age individuals 
with the same difficulties; six of the pairs matched on this dimension have widely 
discrepant chronological ages between participants. However, at the group level, 
these age differences did not produce a significant difference between control and 
ASD chronological age means (t(36) = 0.91, p  = .37). Two one way ANOVAs with 
group as the between-factor and accuracy as the dependent variable were performed 
to determine whether the ASD target group performed the CoMG task comparably 
to both the control groups on control trials. Both analyses indicated that there were
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no significant differences between average accuracy scores for either the 
unambiguous miss or crash conditions (F<1, p  >.05 for all analyses).
Experiment 6 a: Comparison of cross-modal integration across groups (the Crash or 
Miss Game)
Analysis 1: Crash reports
Group N -250ms 0ms
(Simultaneous)
+250ms
ASD 19 .34 (.29) .40 (.31) .22 (.24)
VIQ-match (control 1) 19 .38 (.24) .48 (.28) .25 (.24)
NVIQ-match (control 2) 19 .45 (.27) .56 (.27) .36 (.27)
Total 57 .39 (.26) .47 (.29) .28 (.25)
Table 4.2: Crash report proportion means (with standard deviations in parentheses) 
by auditory stimulus timing condition across groups (Experiment 6 a).
As can be seen from Table 4.2, there was a tendency for mean crash reports 
for the target group to be consistently low across all auditory stimulus timing 
conditions relative to the control groups (especially in contrast with the non-verbal 
control group means). However, the pattern obtained across conditions was found to 
be similar (with highest crashes reported for the simultaneous condition in all 
groups).
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Figure 4.1: Crash Reports by Auditory Signal Timing and Group (Verbal 10 
matching; Experiment 6a).
For the verbally-matched comparison, a mixed 2 x 3  ANOVA analysis, with 
Group as the between-factor and auditory signal timing as the within-factor (Trial 
Type) revealed no main effect of Group or significant interaction between Group 
and Trial Type was obtained (F<1 in both cases), and so the number of crashes 
reported by the ASD group did not significantly differ from the control group.
There was, as usual, a main effect of Trial Type; F(2,72) = 17.23, p <.005. The 
post-hoc analyses are presented in Table 4.3, below.
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Figure 4.2: Crash Reports by Auditory Signal Timing and Group (Nonverbal IQ 
matching; Experiment 6a).
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Figure 4.2 presents results for the second comparison with controls matched 
for age, gender and non-verbal IQ ability. Here it can be seen that the ASD group 
data, although producing the usual ‘peaked’ pattern across the three auditory signal 
conditions, show a general reduction in crash reports in comparison to the control 
group responses.
The mixed 2 x 3  ANOVA undertaken for this comparison revealed, however, 
no significant main effect of the between factor, Group; F(l,36) = 2.96, p  = .09, 
although the trend seen is in the hypothesised direction. The interaction between 
Group and Trial Type was also not found to be significant (F < 1). Again, the main 
effect of Trial Type was significant; F(2,72) = 18.54, p  <.005. The post-hoc 
analyses are presented below in Table 4.3.
Analysis Trial type 1 Trial type 2 Mean
Difference
Std.
Error
Vs. -250ms 0 ms .07 .04
Verbal IQ (Simultaneous)
Controls +250ms -.2 0 * .03
0 ms +250ms -.13* .04
Vs. -250ms 0 ms -.089* .03Nonverbal (Simultaneous)
IQ +250ms .103* .03
Controls 0 ms +250ms .192* .04
•  The mean difference is significant at the .01 level after Bonferroni adjustment for multiple
comparisons.
Table 4.3: Pairwise comparisons between mean crash report proportions bv Trial 
Type and by Analysis (Experiment 6 a).
Table 4.3 provides the mean differences between Trial Type conditions for 
each comparison. Post-hoc analysis of the significant main effect of Trial Type for 
the verbal IQ comparison revealed that the -250 ms and simultaneous auditory 
signal timings did not produce crash report proportions that differed significantly
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from each other, but crash report scores for both conditions were significantly
different from those of the +250 ms timing condition. For the nonverbal IQ
comparison, means obtained from all three timing conditions differed significantly
from each other.
Analysis 2: Response Latencies
Testing the latencies for both unambiguous crash and miss control trials
indicated that they were not significantly different but were highly correlated within
each group. Therefore the data from these two control conditions were pooled to
produce a single latency variable (Unambiguous), against which the three
experimental conditions could be compared.
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Figure 4.3: Response Latencies (milliseconds) by Auditory Signal Timing 
Condition and Group (Verbal IQ matching; Experiment 6a).
Figure 4.3 presents the pattern of response latencies across ASD and verbal
IQ matched groups. The Unambiguous pooled condition produced lower latencies in
the verbally matched group, but in general responses look comparable across the
□  ASD
■  Verbal IQ Controls
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three experimental trial conditions. Using a 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA analysis with 
Group as the between-group factor and auditory signal timing as the within factor, 
Trial Type, it was found that a main effect of Trial Type was produced (F(3,108) = 
5.00, p <.001 after Huynh-Feldt adjustment). No main effect of Group, or 
significant interaction between Group and Trial Type (F < 1 in both cases) were 
obtained, supporting the observation that the two groups look comparable across 
auditory signal timing conditions.
Adjusting for multiple comparisons, post-hoc analysis indicated that the 
main effect for the within factor (Trial Type) was the result of a significant 
difference between the pooled Unambiguous condition latencies and the response 
times for the Simultaneous (0 ms) experimental condition.
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Figure 4.4: Response Latencies (ms) by Auditory Signal Timing Condition and 
Group (Nonverbal IQ matching. Experiment 6a).
In Figure 4.4 the latencies for each auditory signal timing condition are 
presented by group for the ASD comparison with non-verbal IQ matched controls.
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The latencies for ASD group responses appear large in comparison to the nonverbal 
group response times in the simultaneous condition. An analysis of response 
latencies, using a 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA with Group as the between factor and Trial 
Type as the within factor, was therefore performed. Results indicated that there was 
a main effect of Trial Type (F(3, 108) = 3.84, p  <.05), but no main effect of Group 
(F < 1). The interaction term between Group and Trial Type was also not found to 
be significant (F(3, 108) = 1.92, p >.05).
Although the ASD target group responded to the Simultaneous condition 
more than 250ms, on average, slower than the nonverbal IQ matched controls, this 
difference was not found to be significant when tested independently (f(36) = 1.36, 
p  >.05). Effect size analysis of this mean difference produced a Cohen’s d value of 
0.45, which represents a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1988), however, suggesting 
that the power of the analysis is poor.
Post-hoc tests between marginal means (with Bonferroni adjustment) 
indicated that the main effect for the within factor (Trial Type) represents a general 
lengthening of reaction time across all ambiguous experimental conditions, 
irrespective of auditory signal timing; the mean for the pooled Unambiguous control 
condition was significantly reduced in comparison to each experimental condition 
mean.
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Experiment 6 b: Comparisons of intuitive physics scores across groups (the What 
Happens Next? Task)
Group n WHN?T score
i/24)
Standard
Deviation
Range
ASD 18 14.4 7.2 4 -2 3
VIQ-match 
(control 1 )
18 14.6 6 . 8 1 - 2 2
NVIQ -  
match 
(control 2 )
18 14.9 6 . 2 1 - 2 2
Total 54 14.6 6.6 1 -2 3
Table 4.4: Means and standard deviations for WHN?T scores bv Group (Experiment
6 b).
One participant with ASD refused to complete the What Happens Next? 
Task; removal of his data and that of his matched controls reduced the cell size for 
analysis of WHN?T scores to eighteen. As can be seen from Table 4.4 mean values 
for WHN?T scores were found to be very similar across all groups. A one-way 
ANOVA with Group as the between factor verified that there is no significant 
difference between the scores obtained across all groups (F(2, 55) = .03, p >.05).
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Experiment 6 c: Relationships between cross-modal integration and intuitive physics
Group n Comparison PPMC (r) p
ASD 18 Age vs. CoMG .14 .58
Age vs. WHN7T .58* .0 1
CoMG vs. WHN7T .24 .34
VIQ-match 18 Age vs. CoMG .15 .55
(control 1 ) Age vs. WHN7T .58* .0 1
CoMG vs. WHN7T .25 .31
NVIQ-match 18 Age vs. CoMG -.32 . 2 0
(control 2 ) Age vs. WHN7T .81* . 0 0
CoMG vs. WHN7T .03 .91
Total 54 Age vs. CoMG -.04 .78
Age vs. WHN7T .62* . 0 0
CoMG vs. WHN7T .19 .18
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.5: PPMC values for correlations between age. CoMG crash report 
proportions and WHN?T scores by Group (Experiment 6 c).
Table 4.5 presents correlational analyses undertaken between age, cross- 
modal integration (using the CoMG simultaneous condition responses) and intuitive 
physics (WHN?T) variables. Only one significant relationship was observed; age 
was found to be positively correlated to WHN?T scores across the total 5 to 17 year 
old sample (r = .63, p  < .001). Repeat analyses undertaken separately for each group 
generated the same pattern of results. Analysing relationships between raw scores 
for vIQ and nvIQ with intuitive physics scores for each group produced high and 
similar r values across and within groups (ranging from .70 to .85).
i
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Experiment 6 d: Comparison of cross-modal integration between autism and Asperger 
Syndrome
Group Age (months)
Mean (SD) Range
Verbal IQ 
Mean(S.D.) Range
Nonverbal IQ 
Mean (S.D.) Range
AS (8) 153 (19.7) 123-181 117(26.4) 61 -  147 38.4(13.8) 12-56
Autism (8) 151 (10.2) 138 - 169 98.6(18.9) 60-121 37.4 (8.0) 29-49
Total (16) 152.1 (15.4) 123 -181 107.8 (25.1) 60-147 37.9 (11.5) 12 -56
Table 4.6: Mean Age and IQ raw scores for Diagnostic Subgroups (Experiment 6 d).
Table 4.6 provides descriptive statistics for two diagnostic subgroups to 
facilitate comparison between autism and Asperger Syndrome/PDD-NOS19. The AS 
participants have superior verbal scores to the Autism participants, although these 
groups are comparable in terms of both non-verbal IQ ability and age. The 
standardised scores on each measure indicate that the AS group shows equivalence 
in terms of non-verbal and verbal abilities (102.0 vs. 107.5, respectively), whereas 
the Autism subgroup exhibits a 15-point differences between the two (with non­
verbal ability superior to verbal ability; 102.8 vs. 87.4, respectively). These two 
subgroups therefore appear to differ only in terms of verbal ability; an independent 
f-test of standardised verbal scores confirms this observation (r(14) = 2.36, p <.05).
Independent t-tests on accuracy scores for both unambiguous crash and miss 
trials between autism and AS subgroups were found not to be significant t e a s h ( 1 4 )  
= 1.08, tMiss(14) = -0.92, p > .05 in both cases), and so these groups did not differ in 
terms of following the task rules.
19 Only one participant with PDD-NOS is included in this group.
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Figure 4.5: Crash Reports by Auditory Signal Timing and Diagnostic Group 
(Experiment 6d).
Figure 4.5 provides the crash report proportions by diagnostic subgroup. In 
general, the pattern across auditory timing conditions looks similar between groups 
in that a peak in responses is associated with the 0 ms timing condition. From this 
figure, however, the AS group appear to produce a ‘flatter’ response across time, as 
the facilitation effect of simultaneous auditory signal presentation is seen to be 
minimal, in contrast to the Autism group, for which an uplift in crash responses 
between the 0 ms and -250 ms conditions can be seen.
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA analysis was performed to test these observations, 
with diagnostic subgroup as the between-factor, Group, and the auditory timing 
levels as the within-factor, Trial. This analysis produced a significant main effect of 
Trial (F (2, 28) = 6.45, p < .05), but no main effect of Group or significant 
interaction between Group and Trial (both F < 1). Adjusted post-hoc tests of the 
main effect of Trial resulted in findings of significant differences in marginal means 
between both the -250ms and 0ms auditory timing conditions in comparison with
224
the +250 ms condition. There was therefore no evidence of difference between these 
diagnostic groups in terms of either their overall sensitivity to cross-modal 
perceptual causality stimuli, or the temporal parameters constraining these 
susceptibilities.
Diagnostic Group Participant -250 ms 0  ms + 250 ms
Asperger Syndrome/ 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
PDD-NOS 2 0.60 0.50 0.60
3 0.40 0.55 0 . 0 0
4 0.70 1 . 0 0 0 . 2 0
5 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
6 0.60 0.45 0.50
7 0.40 0.25 0 . 2 0
8 0.40 0.80 0 . 1 0
Means 0.39 0.44 0 .2 1
Autism 1 0.60 0.70 0.50
2 0 . 1 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 0 0
3 0 . 0 0 0.50 0 . 1 0
4 0.60 0.65 0.70
5 0 . 1 0 0.15 0 . 0 0
6 0 . 2 0 0.35 0.40
7 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 0
8 0.60 0.55 0 . 2 0
Means 0.29 0.40 0.24
Total 16 .34 .42 .22
Table 4.7: Individual Participants’ Crash Reports by Auditory Signal Timing and 
Diagnostic Subgroup (Experiment 6 d).
Table 4.7 provides subgroup crash report data at the individual level, from 
which it can be seen that the AS and Autism groups have comparable numbers of 
participants with relatively high and low crash reports.
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Figure 4.6: Response Latencies by Auditory Signal Timing and Diagnostic Group 
(Experiment 6d).
As can be seen from Figure 4.6, response latencies for the pooled 
Unambiguous control variable and across the three levels of the auditory timing 
factor are broadly comparable between diagnostic subgroups. Both groups generate 
the same pattern of responses, with lengthened response times seen in association 
with the experimental trial types relative to those found for the Unambiguous 
condition, with the longest times reported for the simultaneous (0 ms) auditory 
timing condition.
Performance of 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA analysis, with diagnostic subgroup as 
the between-factor, Group, and the auditory timing levels as the within-factor, Trial 
was conducted. This analysis confirmed the observations derived from Figure 4.6; 
no main effect of Group or significant interaction between Group and Trial (both F 
< 1). A main effect of Trial was obtained (F(3, 42) = 2.80, p = .05). Adjusted post- 
hoc tests of the main effect of Trial produced no significant differences in marginal 
means between any pair of auditory signal timing or control conditions. From these
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analyses, it can be concluded that the two diagnostic subgroups do not differ in 
terms of response latencies either across all trial types (including the pooled control 
trials), or in terms of their pattern of response across trial types.
Intuitive Physics
The two diagnostic subgroups were also compared in terms of their intuitive 
(WHN?T) scores. Means for both groups were similar ( / / a s  ( 8 )  = 14.85, //A u tism  (8 ) = 
14.00), and an independent samples t-test verified that the two groups did not differ 
in terms of their intuitive physics abilities (/(l 6 ) = 0.21, p  >.05).
4.3.4 Results Summary and Discussion
In recent research into autism, focus has been on integration of perceptual 
information across disparate brain regions (Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic & Faubert, 
2003). In this study, a hypothesised deficit in cross-modal integration associated 
with ASD was investigated utilising an audio-visual perceptual causality 
phenomenon, similar to that reported by Sekuler et al. (1997). In this phenomenon, 
presentation of an auditory cue induces the perception of causality in an otherwise 
ambiguous dynamic visual event. By matching children with and without diagnoses 
of ASD according to gender, age and measures of general intelligence, cross-modal 
perceptual integration was assessed in terms of both sensitivity to the phenomenon 
(number of causal events perceived) and its temporal constraints, using a 
computerised test called the Crash or Miss Game (CoMG).
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Contrary to the hypothesis, both target and control participants were found 
to experience cross-modal perceptual causality to the same extent. Furthermore, no 
difference in overall sensitivity to the phenomenon between groups was discernible 
whether the children with ASD were matched to peers on the basis of verbal IQ or 
non-verbal IQ functioning, although a trend towards significance was identified 
when total crash reports were compared in the non-verbal IQ analysis. In terms of 
spatio-temporal constraints, the pattern of responses shown by children with ASD as 
the timing of the auditory cue was varied relative to the point of occlusion was also 
comparable to both control groups, with peak levels of response associated with the 
simultaneous condition of the task. In this last respect, the perception of causality 
generated in participants by the launch/pass stimuli in the CoMG task were 
comparable to those originally reported using similar bouncing/streaming stimuli in 
typical adults (Sekuler et al., 1997).
The interpretation of these results is that, with respect to this sample of 
individuals with ASD, cross-modal integration is not compromised to any 
significant extent, and the impression of causality derived from audio-visual events 
is governed by the same temporal parameters in ASD that constrain causal 
perception in typically developing children. The second conclusion to be drawn is 
that cross-modal integration at the perceptual level is intact, given the findings of 
the fMRI study by Bushara et al. (2003) that cross-modal perceptual causality is, in 
part, generated by pre-attentive activity in multimodal regions such as the superior 
colliculus.
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The distinction between multisensory processing at the cognitive and 
perceptual levels is important, as it is the level of processing that differentiates 
between studies investigating the role multisensory processing plays in ASD. The 
stimuli used in the CoMG task here and in the study published by Van der Smagt et 
al. (2007) are said to be primarily perceptual in nature. The speech-based stimuli in 
other ASD studies (e.g. Smith & Bennetto, 2007) recruit both perceptual and 
cognitive subsystems, and are therefore more complex; difficulties dissociating the 
relative contributions of cross-modal perception and cognitive processes to speech- 
processing ability make any deficits found hard to locate the locus of any deficit 
identified.
Assessment of audiovisual integration of speech stimuli at early pre- 
phonological and late phonological stages using an ERP method has recently 
allowed identification of the locality of integrative difficulties within the autistic 
brain (Magnee, de Gelder, van Engeland & Kemner, 2008). The results of this 
recent study support the crux of the main finding from Experiment 6 . Pre- 
phonological audiovisual interactions were found to be intact in terms of the timing 
and pattern of the electroencephalographic responses (EEG) obtained from a target 
group of adult males diagnosed with PDD. The audiovisual interactions 
corresponding to later phonologically driven integration, however, indicated 
impairments relative to matched controls.
The conclusion to draw from both the perceptual causality results and this 
ERP study is therefore that relative sparing of early audio-visual processing may be 
dissociated from complex audio-visual integration at a higher processing level. This
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argument also corresponds with the interpretation provided by Van der Smagt et al. 
(2007) that early perceptual integration is intact in high-functioning individuals with 
autism, as their null findings of resistance to Shams illusion stimuli indicated.
Given that a trend in the hypothesised direction was found between target 
and nvIQ control groups’ relative sensitivities to cross-modal perceptual causality 
stimuli, the converse interpretation of these results could be made; proponents of 
perceptual integration as a primary deficit in ASD might argue this case. However, I 
would suggest that, if cross-modal integration is of wide-ranging developmental 
significance, better evidence of a deficit should be obtainable especially as age, 
gender and absolute non-verbal ability (raw scores) were matched on a one-to-one 
basis for the majority of participants in the nvIQ comparison.
Additionally, I would look to within-mode explanations for the marginal 
difference found, through consideration of the neural regions involved in the 
experience of perceptual causality. The findings from the fMRI study reported by 
Bushara et al. (2003) that audio-visual causality is a perceptually-driven 
phenomenon (rather than the consequence of an explicit inference) have recently 
been supported by Dufour, Touzaline, Moessinger, Brochard, and Despres (2007), 
who found that subliminal presentation of the auditory signal suffices to induce the 
effect. Dufour et al. (2007) concluded from the breadth of the temporal window 
across which sound could be made to induce perceptual causality in their subliminal 
study that the superior colliculus was the neural site involved, because the optimal 
functioning of multisensory neurons in this subcortical structure is associated with 
an interactive temporal window of several hundreds of milliseconds (Meredith,
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Nemitz, & Stein, 1987). No abnormality was found in relation to the ASD group in 
Experiment 6 a in terms of the temporal constraints determining response levels 
across the three auditory timing conditions; no significant interaction between Trial 
and Group was obtained in either comparative analysis. It would therefore appear 
that the integrative function of the superior colliculus is generally intact for these 
participants.
In addition to superior colliculus (SC) operation, however, perceptual 
causality phenomena also recruit considerable visual extrastriate region resources. 
Using fMRI, Blakemore et al. (2001) have demonstrated that the dynamic visual 
component of unambiguous visual causal events generates heightened levels of 
activity bilaterally in V5/MT/MST, the motion processing system within extrastriate 
cortex, concomitant with elevated SC operation. It is proposed that visually- 
generated perceptual causality signalling may have augmented superior colliculus 
activity in the typical children in the nvIQ analysis but not in the target participants, 
as several studies exist in which motion processing has been found to be deficient in 
ASD (see Milne, Swettenham & Campbell (2005) for a review).
Milne et al. (2005) concluded that motion processing deficits are not present 
in all children with ASD. For the first analysis, children with diagnoses of AS, 
autism and PDD-NOS were included within one group to ensure statistical power, 
but to ensure that this conflation across the range of autism spectrum diagnoses had 
not masked a bivariate distribution within the first analysis (Experiment 6 a), a 
comparison of crash report scores between groups categorised as AS/PDD-NOS 
versus autism was undertaken. Although cell size was low (n = 8  per subgroup), the
231
analysis reported in Experiment 6 d provides no evidence from crash reports or 
response latencies of a diagnostic dissociation in terms of cross-modal perceptual 
integration.
At the individual level (Table 4.7) the numbers of individuals per subgroup 
showing little or no sensitivity to cross-modal perceptual causality appear 
comparable; in total, five out of 16 individuals with ASD can be categorised as 
‘poor integrators’ for whom neither superior colliculus or visual extrastriate 
signalling suffices to induce the percept of causality. It would be interesting to 
analyse the relative proportions of such individuals within clinical and control 
groups. A significant difference in frequencies of unsusceptible individuals between 
groups would be informative for future research, particularly because superior 
colliculus malfunction has been associated with poor connectivity with the 
dorsalateral prefrontal cortex and frontal eye fields in HFA, which together may 
account for eye gaze problems found in many individuals with ASD (e.g., Goldberg, 
Lasker, Zee, Garth, Tien & Landa, 2002).
At the cognitive level, the ASD group showed intact, but not superior, 
intuitive physics abilities; scores on the WHN7T were similar across all groups 
(Experiment 6 b ) , and between diagnostic subgroups matched for nvIQ (Experiment 
6 d). These results could be interpreted to mean that individual performance of the 
WHN7T may reflect general intelligence, rather than, domain-specific function 
(especially as results from the vIQ match group were equivalent to those of the 
nvIQ group). In Experiment 6 c, the only significant correlations found in relation to 
WHN7T scores were with age, and with vIQ or nvIQ raw scores (which in
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themselves are highly correlated with age), across all groups. No evidence of a 
privileged relationship between the experience of causality and physical causal 
reasoning was therefore obtained, suggesting that even for the ASD group, general 
maturation and education are likely to account for intuitive physics ability in this 
study. Does this finding suggest that the ‘innate’ superiority of individuals with 
ASD in terms of intuitive physics previously suggested does not exist? Binnie and 
Williams (2003) have reported precocious physics superiority in children with ASD 
over control groups of both older and more able TD children, but here the target 
group children were substantially younger than the participants in Experiment 6 , 
and so it may be that any innate advantage, or islet of ability, in children with 
autism is expressed in terms of precocity, rather than absolute superiority across 
development into adulthood (by which stage general intellectual functioning may 
compensate for mediocre domain-specific operation in typical individuals). Indeed, 
in many studies investigating intuitive physics, intra-individual dissociations 
between intuitive physics and intuitive psychology have been reported (e.g., Baron- 
Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, Lawson & Spong, 2001), whereas some studies have 
failed to find differences in physics skill between adult males with and without AS 
(e.g., Lawson et al., 2004). These points will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
In summary, the results of the study presented in this chapter are that, 
generally, individuals with any of a range of autism spectrum conditions show no 
signs of atypical cross-modal integration at the perceptual level in response to 
audio-visual stimuli established to induce causal percepts. In addition to intact 
sensitivity to such stimuli, the participants in this study showed a pattern of 
response to varying timing of the auditory component of these stimuli that is
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broadly similar to that found for closely-matched peers. Together these results have 
been interpreted to mean that multisensory processing at the perceptual level in 
relation to superior colliculus activity is generally intact in ASD, although some 
individuals within the cohort do appear to show broad insensitivity to these stimuli. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that this particular aspect of perceptual integration is of 
causal relevance to ASD as a developmental condition, at least in individuals with 
near- to above-normal IQ with ASD, a conclusion supported by similar results from 
other studies using perceptual cross-modal phenomena.
4.4 General Discussion and Conclusions
In Chapter 3, evidence of male/female differences in cross-modal perceptual 
integration were interpreted as partial support from Extreme Male Brain theory, 
particularly in the light of apparent dissociations between women with high autistic 
trait expression and individuals with low or medium levels of trait expression. 
However, it was stated at the start of this chapter that, for cross-modal perceptual 
integration to be of fundamental importance to development in ASD, clear evidence 
was required of a deficit in this respect between boys with and without diagnoses. 
Using cross-modal perceptual causality to stimulate cross-modal integration failed 
to provide unequivocal evidence, although some individuals in the target group 
were uniformly resistant to this phenomenon, irrespective of the timing of the 
auditory signal. It is therefore suggested that some individuals with ASD may 
exhibit signs of multisensory processing failure within superior colliculus, but that 
this neural challenge is not ubiquitous. Signal integration theory (Bertone &
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Faubert, 2006) was therefore not found to extend to cross-modal perceptual 
integration.
It was also conjectured that extrastriate visual functioning may contribute 
over and above cross-modal integration in the superior colliculus to the experience 
of causality, as motion processing is predominantly a function of the V5/MT visual 
area which has been shown to be highly activated by causal visual events. This 
extrapolation reflects, in part, findings from Chapter 3 (Experiment 5c) that women 
with poor EFT performance (presumably as a result of strong feature integration in 
the visual extrastriate) also show heightened sensitivity to cross-modal perceptual 
causality stimuli. Again, women expressing the BAP showed a non-significant 
relationship in this respect, with a correlation value significantly different from that 
of typical women.
Given that the ASD participants here also showed no distinct advantage in 
either a child’s intuitive physics task or a perception-based variant of the EFT, the 
results presented in Chapter 4 are taken to mean that ASD represents normal male 
brain function in terms of perceptual integration.
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Chapter 5: Cross-modal Integration as a Complexity/Simplicity 
Gender Difference
5.1 Introduction
The integration of sound and vision is important for humans to interact 
efficiently with their environment. Co-occurrence of sensory inputs in space and 
time orients our attention (Spence & McDonald, 2004), helps us to understand 
causal relationships between events (Blakemore et al., 2001), and putatively 
enhances our formation of specific forms of representations, such as emotion or 
quantity, from early infancy (Jordan et al., 2006). Dysfunction within the neural 
mechanisms supporting multisensory processing would therefore have widespread 
consequences, particularly with respect to social interaction as emotion, speech and 
non-verbal communication are heavily reliant on processing stimuli that are feature- 
rich and multimodal by nature.
People with autism spectrum disorders are diagnosed mainly by the presence 
of atypical behaviours relating to social interaction. Language development and 
social communication, along with restricted imagination and interests and/or 
repetitive stereotypies, form the ‘autistic triad’. The sensory threshold hypo- and 
hyper-sensitivities also frequently associated with this behavioural triad have long 
been catalogued (Kern et al., 2006), but their relevance to the development 
differences seen in ASD has yet to be understood. Iarocci and McDonald (2006) 
consider that the many autobiographical accounts of subjective perceptual 
incoherence provided by individuals with HFA and AS should be empirically 
investigated, in order to evaluate the potential contribution disjointed multisensory 
processing may make to the development of autistic cognition and behaviour.
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Considerable evidence of superior within-mode perceptual processing in 
ASD has been reported in the last decade, leading to theories that enhanced 
perceptual functioning (EPF) is an important part of the autism phenotype (Mottron 
et al., 2006). Bertone and Faubert (2006) propose that, in addition to elevated 
functioning in relation to single features of sensory stimuli, perceptual integration 
within a single modality may be compromised (and in fact, that simple stimulus 
feature processing may be a compensatory result). Their Signal Integration Theory 
(SIT) therefore represents a perceptual interpretation of the Complexity Hypothesis 
(Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 1997), in which underconnectivity between distal 
brain regions is thought to account for ‘negative’ aspects of autism in terms of 
complex representational failure; Signal Integration Theory is attractive, in that it 
also accommodates findings of superiorities (‘positive’ signs) linked to ASD 
cognition. For instance, enhanced primary cortex activity could explain faster and 
more accurate visual disembedding performance, which until recently was 
considered to reflect failure to generate integrated representations at the cognitive 
level in ASD (Weak Central Coherence theory; Happe & Frith, 2006).
Attempts at extrapolating the ideas within EPF and SIT to the multisensory 
framework proposed by Iarocci and McDonald (2006) have produced conflicting 
results to date. At the perceptual level, cross-modal (taken here to mean audio­
visual) processing has been found to be intact by Van der Smagt et al. (2006). In 
terms of speech processing, Magn£e et al. (2008), using ERP methodology, have 
found early intact cross-modal potentials coupled with atypical late signalling, and 
hence conclude also that perceptual integration is not abnormal in ASD. Bennetto
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and Smith (2006), conversely, suggest that a pre-attentive cross-modal component 
of speech processing is compromised in children with autism.
To be relevant to the debate regarding ASD as a perceptual development 
disorder, a cross-modal phenomenon was selected as the basis of examination of 
multisensory processing in typical children, adults with autistic traits and children 
with ASD diagnoses. Cross-modal perceptual stimuli (Sekuler et al., 1997) are of 
value to research in this area because they have been shown to be the consequence 
of perceptual system functioning (Bushara et al., 2003), generate large effect sizes 
in adults (Zhou et al., 2007), and are theoretically related to the development of 
intuitive physics (Michotte, 1963). Intuitive physics is a specific aspect of cognition 
that is thought to be spared/superior in ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, 
Lawson & Spong, 2001).
Visual disembedding and intuitive physics are tasks that show gender 
differences; males are known to exhibit advantage over females in these respects 
(Halpem et al., 2007). Such differentiation in cognitive abilities between the sexes 
has led Baron-Cohen (2002) to propose the Extreme Male Brain (EMB) theory of 
Autism, in which the ‘hypersystemising’ of individuals with ASD (i.e., their 
tendency to process all environmental stimuli in terms of systems and rules) occurs 
at the expense of ‘empathising’ (i.e., failure to process social information, resulting 
in mindblindness; Baron-Cohen, 1995). As men’s cognitive phenotype can be 
broadly described as a systemising bias, and women’s cognitive style as an 
emphasis on socio-cognition, ASD is said to be the product of an extremely male- 
type brain.
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Baron-Cohen (2008) has also suggested that autistic ‘traits’ (personality 
characteristics producing behaviours similar to those associated with autism) are 
expressed in everyone to a greater or lesser extent, such that ASD is not a category 
of difference but one end of a continuum (with individuals representing extreme 
female-type brains at the other end).
Hence, through research using adapted cross-modal perceptual stimuli, the 
studies in this thesis were designed to evaluate whether perceptual integration of 
sound and vision is compromised both in individuals with a high number of autistic 
traits, and in children with ASD. The theoretical idea informing these studies is that 
development in ASD is biased towards a male perceptual phenotype in which 
simple stimuli are processed over complex stimuli. This concept conjoins the 
principles within Extreme Male Brain, Signal Integration and Complexity theories 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002; Bertone & Faubert, 2006; Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel,
1997). In addition, a developmental study was included to determine whether 
perceptual developmental differences exist between typical boys and girls in terms 
of inter-relationships with a cognitive ability known to be superior in ASD (intuitive 
physics), in order to consider whether ASD might, in future, be remodelled in terms 
of extreme male perceptual development.
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5.2 Summary of findings
5.2,1 Task development (Experiments 1 and 2)
In order to address the questions raised regarding the role of multisensory 
processing at the perceptual level may play in the development of the autistic mind, 
two tasks were designed and piloted: The first of these, the Crash or Miss Game, is 
based on the phenomenon of cross-modal perceptual causality induction, originally 
reported by Sekuler et al. (1997); the second is a novel task that facilitates 
assessment of the development of intuitive physics across a wide range of ages and 
abilities (called the What Happens Next? Task, or WHN?T).
Experiment 1 was a pilot of the CoMG, in which adult participants’ 
responses to varying the timing of auditory signal presentation relative to the point 
at which a dynamic disk occludes a stationary disk onscreen were assessed. In the 
original task (Sekuler et al., 1997) the two disks moved towards each other, 
occluded, and passed on; presentation of an auditory signal at the point of occlusion 
was found to influence the impression made by this ambiguous event such that the 
two disks were seen to collide and reverse direction on occlusion. Simultaneous 
presentation of the auditory signal with occlusion in the CoMG (Experiment 1) was 
also shown to generate percepts of causality in adult observers although trials 
comprised one static and one dynamic visual element. Presentation of the auditory 
signal 250 ms prior to and after occlusion also generated causal ‘crash’ reports, but 
to a lesser extent than seen for the simultaneous ( 0  ms) condition.
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The results from Experiment 1 are equivalent to the findings reported by 
Sekuler et al. (1997) that the spatio-temporal parameters constraining the induction 
of cross-modal perceptual causality generate a peak in response associated with 
simultaneous audio-visual presentation. However, rather than generating the 
impression of two disks bouncing, the auditory stimulus in my task serves to create 
the causal impression of one disk launching the other. It can therefore be concluded 
that the CoMG stimuli elicit the cross-modal perceptual causality in a way that is 
similar to the original paradigm investigating this phenomenon, making the task 
suitable for testing perceptual processing aspects of this phenomenon in various 
populations.
Intuitive physics tasks assess the cognitive ability to reason about the action 
of forces on objects, or the operation of physical systems. Many tests exist that 
assess aspects of intuitive physics (e.g, the Intuitive Physics test designed by Baron- 
Cohen et al., 2001), but these were deemed unsuitable for use in developmental 
research in that they were either too complex (in terms of verbal ability demanded 
of participants) or insufficient in trial number and scope of difficulty to look for 
cross-sequential developmental effects. The What Happens Next? Task was 
therefore specifically designed to be biased towards non-verbal processing (through 
use of simple instructions and graphics), and to cover a range of levels of difficulty 
in which trial content drew on several different physical concepts. In Experiment 2, 
it was shown that the WHN?T effectively assesses the development of conceptual 
physical reasoning in children from 5 to 11 years old, producing correlations of 
moderate-to-high effect size (r = .62) between intuitive physics scores and child 
age in both genders.
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5.2.2 Perceptual causality and intuitive physics during development
(Experiment 3)
In Experiment 3, the inter-relationships between the perception of causality 
and intuitive physics ability during development were investigated. There were 
three objectives for the study: The first was to assess sensitivity of the CoMG task 
to development of cross-modal perceptual causality experience in typical children; 
the second was to investigate the neuroconstructivist idea that cognitive ability is 
predicated by perceptual development on a domain-specific basis (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1991; 2007), and the last aim was to consider whether gender differences are 
discernible during typical development. This third objective was related to the 
hypothesis that the development at the neurobiological system level of processing 
biases might differentiate between male and female cognitive phenotypes, which in 
turn might contribute to the association between male cognition and science aptitude 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002; Halpem et al., 2007).
The key result from Experiment 3 is that sensitivity to cross-modal 
perceptual causality stimuli was found to develop in typically developing children 
aged from 5 to 13 years old; crash (launch) percepts in the simultaneous condition 
of the CoMG increase as age increases (r = .33). The pattern of results across 
auditory timing conditions produced the same ‘peaked’ pattern as found in the adult 
pilot (Experiment 1), but also indicated that the temporal window for experiencing 
causality was wider for children than adults (as pre-occlusion auditory signal 
presentation generated causality to a greater extent in this sample). Hence it was 
concluded that the CoMG is an effective method of assessing differences in cross- 
modal perceptual causality across ages, and also that varying auditory presentation
242
timing may allow for temporal contingencies important to the phenomenon to be 
investigated.
The finding that the What Happens Next? Task is sensitive to age effects 
was replicated in Experiment 3, demonstrating that the age range that can be tested 
by this task extends to older children (to age 13 years; r -  .64). No gender 
differences in this age/cognition relationship was discernible, as a Fisher’s r-to-z 
comparison failed to reach significance, and the slight superiority of girls over boys 
in terms of WHN?T scores was also not found to be significant.
Given that both tasks effectively measure developmental effects, the 
relationship between the perception of causality and intuitive physics ability could 
be investigated. For the TD group as a whole, a small-to-moderate correlation was 
found between these two measures (r = .38). The interpretation of this result is 
ambiguous. Although the perceptual and cognitive tasks are theoretically related 
(Michotte, 1963), evidence that both sensitivity to perceptual causality and physical 
causal cognition increase with age could simply represent general brain maturation, 
a reasonable conclusion that does not address the idea of privileged 
perception/cognition relationships that facilitate domain-specific neural maturation 
(as proposed by Karmiloff-Smith, 1991). For such an idea to be supported, evidence 
of differences in developmental perception/cognition relationships between groups 
known to function differentially at the cognitive level is required.
Experiment 3 provides partial support for the concept that privileged 
perception/cognition relationships drive domain differentiation. When the TD
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sample was sub-divided on the basis of gender, a dichotomy was apparent between 
groups in terms of the inter-relationships between age, perceptual causality and 
intuitive physics. For the girls, partialing out the variance in both perception and 
cognition measures reduces their correlation to one that is not significant, yet for the 
boys’ data, this relationship remains significant. In terms of multiple regression 
analysis, age was found to be the only significant factor predicting intuitive physics 
ability in girls, whereas in boys the only significant predictor entered for the 
stepwise regression model was CoMG crash scores. It can be argued from these 
results that intuitive physics develops differently in the sexes; for the girls, general 
development (and education) are probably the most likely contributors to physics 
understanding, but the individual difference effect found for the boys indicates that 
the more perceptual causality is perceived during development, the better the child’s 
physical causal cognition.
A true dissociation between genders is not claimed from the findings from 
Experiment 3c, as comparison of the relative r values for partial correlations 
between perception and correlation measures between the sexes is not significant. 
However, the difference in regression models produced from these data when sub­
divided by gender is taken here to be partial support for neuroconstructivist theory 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1991). However, Experiment 3 reiterates that both the CoMG and 
WHN?T are sufficiently sensitive to be useful in the investigation of both individual 
differences and development effects.
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5.2.3 The Broader Autism Phenotype and gender differences in cross-modal
integration, and perception/cognition relationships (Experiments 4 and 5)
Having verified that the CoMG task is sensitive to age differences, the next 
two experiments investigated individual difference effects in cross-modal perceptual 
causality, in relation to Autism Spectrum Disorder. Expression of personality traits 
relating to characteristics of ASD has been shown to normally distributed across 
non-clinical populations as measured by the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron- 
Cohen, 2008). Wakabayashi et al. (2006) have also shown that total AQ scores load 
onto a single personality dimension that is independent of the ‘Big Five’, which 
suggests that ‘autistic-ness’ exists in all individuals to varying extent. In 
Experiments 4 and 5, the responses of individuals with a relatively high number of 
autistic traits (as measured by the AQ) were contrasted with low- and medium AQ 
scoring groups on two versions of the CoMG task. The first of these was a variant of 
the original in which the relative strength of the auditory cue to generate causal 
percepts was measured against that of a visual ‘causal capture’ cue (Scholl & 
Nakayama, 2002). The second study utilised the original CoMG task in which the 
timing of auditory cue presentation varied between trial conditions. As it has been 
proposed that multisensory processing is both atypical in, and of causal importance 
to, ASD (Iarocci & McDonald, 2006), it was hypothesised that cross-modal 
perceptual causality effects would be reduced in association with a sample of 
participants displaying autistic traits, and may also show temporal contingency 
differences in this group.
In both these studies, secondary tasks for which people expressing the 
Broader Autism Phenotype (Bailey et al., 1998) have been shown to be superior
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were included, namely the Intuitive Physics Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the 
Embedded Figures Task (Shah & Frith, 1983). Their inclusion was designed to 
examine a) whether individuals with high AQ scores drawn from a general, non- 
clinical population exhibit similar advantages, and b) the relationships between 
gender and these task advantages. Testing physics and visual disembedding abilities 
therefore allowed the population-level interpretation of the BAP, and its relationship 
to Extreme Male Brain Theory of Autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002), to be examined.
The final aim of the studies presented in Chapter 3 was to investigate, in each 
of Experiments 4 and 5, whether gender differences exist in terms 
perception/cognition relationships. The rationale behind this aim was that perceptual 
theories of autism as a developmental disorder (e.g., Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning; Mottron et al., 2006) propose that atypicalities in processing 
environmental stimuli are causal to both the aetiology of ASD and the outcome at 
the individual level of children with this diagnosis. If perceptual differences reflect 
exaggeration of the male phenotype (cf. EMB theory), and if intuitive physics/EFT 
task performance is associated with superiorities in the BAP (Happe et al., 2001), 
then individuals with high numbers of autistic traits should show ‘exaggeratedly 
male’ response patterns on both the CoMG and the cognitive tasks. Furthermore, 
perceptual and cognitive measures should be inter-related.
Findings from Experiment 4: The BAP, Cross-modal Perceptual Causality and 
Relationships with Intuitive Physics
Experiment 4 showed that the high AQ group perceived crashes when 
viewing ambiguous stimuli more often than low- and medium-scoring groups in the 
absence of perceptual causality cues. However, this group also reported fewer
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crashes when the auditory cue was present in relation to the low AQ group (trend 
only; t(23) = 1.87, p  =.07). Gender was not found to produce significantly different 
general levels of response, or differing patterns of response across trial types, and 
therefore the interaction found between AQ group and trial condition is not the 
consequence of gender biases within the high and low AQ groups.
The low AQ group generally responded faster and the high AQ group slower 
than the medium (control) group. The medium group was found to display a ‘cue- 
cost’, in that response times lengthened in response to trials in which either of the 
perceptual causality cues (auditory or visual capture) were present. This cue-cost 
was also found for the high AQ group, but significantly more so in relation to the 
audio-visual condition than the visual capture condition. Furthermore, latencies 
recorded in response to ambiguous (no cue) trials were significantly longer in this 
group than found for the unambiguous control trials and visual capture trials. 
Between groups, response times for ambiguous trials differed between the high AQ 
group and both other groups, and between high and low AQ groups for the audio­
visual condition. Again, no differences between genders were found in terms of 
general response times or patterns of latencies across experimental conditions.
A male advantage was found in the Intuitive Physics Task data in 
Experiment 4b, but no evidence of superiority associated with high AQ scores was 
found. Contrasting scores by gender within each AQ category, it was found that a 
gender difference was only apparent within the medium range control group.
Correlations between intuitive physics scores and the number of causal 
percepts experienced in the audio-visual CoMG condition were found not be
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significant when the data were analysed at either the AQ group level or between 
genders. This result was also found when crash reports and physics scores were 
correlated in relation to the visual capture and ambiguous conditions of this CoMG 
adaptation. When latencies were analysed, significant negative correlations were 
found between response speed for ambiguous trials and physics scores in the low 
AQ group (i.e. faster responses were associated with higher scores), and, in the high 
AQ group, between response speed on the unambiguous miss control trials and 
physics scores.
Results from Experiment 5: The BAP, Cross-modal Perceptual Causality and the 
Embedded Figures Task
In Experiment 5, no low scoring individuals were identified within the 
sample, and targeted recruitment of participants produced a significantly higher 
group mean for AQ scores than was found for the sample in Experiment 4. The 
categorisation criteria for AQ groups was therefore amended to produced three 
groups: A medium AQ scoring female group; medium AQ scoring male group, and 
high scoring (BAP) group, comprising male and female participants with total AQ 
scores exceeding 20 points. The CoMG in this study was the original version, in 
which audio-visual trials were categorised according to stimulus onset asynchronies 
between auditory timing and the point of occlusion (-250 ms, 0 ms and +250 ms), 
which allowed the effect of varying auditory presentation timing on the numbers of 
crashes reported to be assessed.
Prior to AQ group analysis, gender sub-groups were found not to 
differ in terms of the total crashes seen when the number of causal percepts were
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analysed, but a trend towards significance was seen for the interaction between 
gender and auditory timing (F(2, 326) = 2.64, p  = .07). When the simultaneous 
condition was analysed independently, a significant difference was obtained 
between genders; women were shown to be more sensitive to the cross-modal 
perceptual phenomenon than men. No differences in latencies were found.
When the AQ group analyses on crash scores were undertaken, the influence 
of gender was also apparent, although only a borderline trend (p = . 1 0 ) for a main 
effect of AQ group was found, and no interaction across the three timing conditions 
(- 250 ms, 0 ms and +250 ms) between AQ group and trial type was obtained.
When, however, the simultaneous (0 ms) condition was analysed in isolation, a 
main effect was found; at post-hoc stage, the Medium Female group showed a trend 
towards experiencing a greater numbers of crashes than either the Medium Male or 
the High AQ groups. Moreover, within-group analysis of the high AQ group 
showed that women and men with a high number of autistic traits did not differ in 
this respect, with mean crash scores being identical. Again, no significant 
differences in latencies were obtained from any AQ group analysis.
Gender was also implicated when EFT accuracy and response time measures 
between gender groups were assessed, replicating many findings of male 
superiorities on this task (originating with its development by Witkin, 1950). Only 
one trend was obtained when the AQ group analysis was undertaken, with the 
Medium Female group accuracy scores tending to be lower than both those from the 
Medium Male and high AQ groups (trends only). The high AQ female participants
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were shown to be slightly less accurate in terms of EFT performance than medium- 
scoring men; comparison between accuracy scores of high AQ males and medium- 
scoring females produced a significant result, however.
The EFT was amended in this study so that rapid, accurate responses 
determined scores and latencies; any inaccurate responses were given a fixed 
latency value, and any overlong accurate responses (or time-outs during the 
response verification) were recoded as inaccurate trials. Also, targets and complex 
figures were provided together. On this basis, results can be interpreted as 
representing perceptual, rather than cognitive, processing. This scoring system 
means that, at the individual level, reaction times and accuracy scores are highly 
correlated. However, trends were also seen in the correlations between sensitivity to 
cross-modal perceptual causality (simultaneous condition crash reports) and EFT 
measures, with accuracy decreasing and latencies increasing as more crashes are 
perceived.
Further investigation of these relationships showed that these relationships 
were significant within the Medium Female group alone. Comparisons of the 
relative r  values using the Fisher’s r-to-z method indicated a near-significant 
difference in the variance in EFT accuracy related to the variance in crashes 
reported between the Medium Female and the High AQ groups. The difference in 
relative correlational values found for this relationship between medium-scoring and 
high-scoring women was also found to approach significance (z = -1.81, p  = .07).
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Results Interpretation
From these results, the conclusion regarding whether the Broader Autism 
Phenotype is associated with compromised cross-modal perception, cognitive 
superiorities or relationships between perception and cognition is equivocal; 
differences, where apparent, are mainly marginal and exist only in the context of 
gender or low level of expression of autistic traits.
If ASD represents an ‘extreme male brain’ then the BAP should exhibit 
exaggeratedly male response patterns across all the tasks involved in Experiments 4 
and 5. However, high AQ scorers performed each task at levels that were broadly 
equivalent to male participants with medium-range trait expression. A notable 
exception to this statement relates to processing perceptual causality stimuli. In 
Experiment 5a, for high AQ scorers, relatively high crash report scores with 
elongated response times were found to significantly differ from those of the 
medium- and low-scoring groups when no cues were present, but a trend towards a 
reduction in crashes perceived was obtained when the auditory cue was present 
(relative to low AQ scorers). These differences suggest that cross-modal processing 
is atypical in association with the BAP, but only in comparison with individuals 
with low autistic trait expression. Therefore only partial evidence for the hypothesis 
that multisensory processing is challenged at the perceptual level in relation to 
autism can be claimed from these studies.
Men and individuals expressing the broader phenotype are similar, yet from 
these two experiments it was demonstrated that women are different; significantly 
worse than men on intuitive physics and EFT tasks (Experiments 4b and 5b), more
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sensitive to cross-modal stimulation (Experiment 5a) and, at the individual level, 
showing a trend towards an inverse relationship between propensity to perceive 
cross-modal causality and EFT accuracy (p =.06). Women with high autistic trait 
expression, however, show none of these differences when scores are compared 
with either those of typical men or those of men with high AQ scores, indicating 
that the female broader autism phenotype most closely resembles ‘male brain’ 
functioning in terms of both perceptual and cognitive processing. The significant 
dissociation between women with high and average autistic trait expression in terms 
of the relationship between EFT accuracy and cross-modal perceptual causality is 
therefore relevant to Extreme Male Brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002), in that 
women with autistic characteristics appear to perceive (and think) like men in this 
respect.
5.2.4 Cross-modal integration in ASD (Experiment 6)
The evidence from Experiments 4 and 5 mainly indicated that the female 
perceptual phenotype differs from the male, and provided partial evidence of 
compromised audio-visual processing in relation to the BAP. Experiment 6  was 
designed to examine cross-modal integration specifically in relation to ASD by 
using the original CoMG task to test boys and adolescents with diagnoses for 
autism, PDD-NOS or Asperger Syndrome. The CoMG version used allowed 
auditory signal timing to be varied between trial types. Given that a developmental 
effect had been established in a comparable sample of boys (Experiment 3), and 
heightened cross-modal perceptual causality was found in typical women 
(Experiment 5), the control children in Experiment 6  were matched by gender and
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age, as well as on one of two standard measures of general intellectual function 
(verbal/non-verbal IQ). In this sample, children with ASD diagnoses ranged in IQ 
from near normal to above normal on both measures.
The number of causal percepts reported did not differ overall between 
groups in the vIQ comparison. In the nvIQ (in which age matching was less 
compromised) a trend was found in the hypothesised direction; across all three 
timing conditions, the ASD group crash scores were reduced, and a marginal main 
effect was seen. In terms of interactions, the pattern of response across auditory 
timings was invariant across all three groups, with the normal simultaneous ‘peak’ 
response apparent in ASD as well as vIQ and nvIQ control group data. Similarly all 
analyses of latencies showed no between-group differences, nor interactions 
between group and auditory timing factors.
Testing intuitive physics using the What Happens Next? Task revealed that 
no one group’s scores were superior (and means across target and control groups 
were very similar). Therefore performance by the ASD participants in this study did 
not display any natural domain-specific physics ability above and beyond the level 
seen for children with comparable general intellectual function, as measured by 
their verbal or non-verbal attainment. This conclusion was verified by the fact that 
the only significant correlations produced within each group between age, crash 
reports, physics scores and these IQ measures indicated developmental and general 
intelligence effects that were comparable in magnitude across participant groups.
253
As both Mazefzky and Oswald (2007) and Tsermentseli et al. (2007) have 
recently reported perceptual differences between HFA and AS, a comparison was 
undertaken between subgroups of participants with ASD categorised according to 
diagnosis. It was hypothesised that this comparison would indicate a general 
reduction in cross-modal perceptual causality sensitivity in between participants 
with autism and AS in Experiment 6 . Individuals with HFA have been shown to 
have lower emotional perception accuracy than those with AS (Mazefsky &
Oswald, 2007), and they also appear to exhibit both form and motion processing 
deficits (whereas comparison participants with AS were shown to have intact 
motion processing; Tsermentseli et al., 2007). However, the hypothesis here was not 
supported, as no such difference was discernible between groups at the perceptual 
level. Furthermore, there were no differences between groups apparent in relation to 
their physical causal reasoning, as WHN?T scores were of similar magnitude.
5.3 Overall interpretation of empirical results
5.3.1 Cross-modal and Visual Integration in ASD
Only marginal evidence of compromise was found when comparing children 
with and without diagnoses on their sensitivity to cross-modal perceptual causality, 
and therefore it has been concluded that, in terms of this phenomenon, cross-modal 
integration is intact. This conclusion concords with that made by Van der Smagt et 
al. (2007).
The phenomenon of cross-modal perceptual causality has been related to 
function of a specific sub-cortical region, the superior colliculus. It is inferred from
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the results of Experiment 6  that the operation of the SC is intact in the majority of 
participants with ASD in this study. The marginal finding of a slight reduction in 
susceptibility might relate to inclusion of a few resistant individuals in the ASD 
group, which in turn may be associated with either superior colliculus failure. 
Alternatively, these individuals’ performance may arise from poor SC function and 
reduced augmentation of cross-modal signalling by motion processing signals (as a 
consequence of poor visual processing within extrastriate areas V5/MT/MST; Milne 
et al., 2005), given that visual causality is a function of collaborative SC and 
extrastriate operation (Blakemore et al., 2001).
This interpretation appears to be reasonable given extant research on vision 
processing in ASD. Bushara et al. (2003) have proposed that multisensory 
processing of perceptual stimuli in the SC occurs in parallel with serial processing, 
with SC activation inhibiting the function of unitary sensory cortices through 
feedback inhibition. It would be predicted therefore that the enhanced simple feature 
processing in ASD stated to reflect V1 functioning with associated reduced visual 
feature integration across visual system regions outside of V 1 (Bertone & Faubert, 
2006) could co-exist with intact cross-modal integration in superior colliculus.
However, lack of augmentation of cross-modal signalling in SC as a 
consequence of dysfunctional signal integration would have developmental 
consequences for the developing brain in individuals with autism. The superior 
colliculus plays a role in emotion comprehension (de Gelder, Morris & Dolan,
2005); reduction in complex visual signal integration due to weak extrastriate visual 
cortex function would prejudice the development of neural architecture supporting
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emotion processing, whilst leaving simplistic cross-modal integration operation 
intact. The issue for neurodevelopment would then be one of underconnectivity 
from the SC onwards. This extrapolation is based by recent advances in brain 
imaging research in ASD that has led to the Underconnectivity Hypothesis (Just, 
Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 2004; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana & Minshew,
2006), in which distal neural region connectivity is posited to be the basis for 
negative symptomatology in ASD.
5.3.2 The Broader Autism Phenotype and Gender Differences in Perceptual
Integration
The general conclusion drawn from studies relating the broader phenotype is 
that high expression of traits associated with characteristic ASD behaviours shows a 
trend towards lower cross-modal perceptual integration. As women with average 
trait expression appear to experience cross-modal causality more than men, then it is 
surmised that SC supplementation of cross-modal integration by extrastriate 
function (specifically with regards to motion processing) may account for this 
gender effect. If this is the case, then the finding that women with high trait 
expression show a male-like tendency to be less susceptible to the cross-modal 
phenomenon might mean that their extrastriate function shows signs of compromise 
that their gender would not predict. The finding that ‘typical’ women experience 
cross-modal causality significantly more in the simultaneous condition of the 
CoMG only supports this interpretation, as the multisensory function of the SC 
extends across hundreds of milliseconds (Merideth, Nemitz & Stein, 1987).
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The interpretation of this conclusion is that the studies in this thesis provide 
partial support for Extreme Male Brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002) in terms of 
perceptual processing. It is not the case that Experiments 4 and 5 unequivocally 
demonstrate cross-modal disadvantage in relation to a broader perceptual phenotype 
in ASD, as comparison of high AQ scorers’ performance on the CoMG on both 
versions of the task were broadly comparable to medium-ranging AQ scorers and 
men. However, the proposed existence of differential gender-based perceptual 
causality processing styles is supported by evidence from CoMG scores correlated 
with EFT performance, in which women (not men or high AQ scorers) alone show a 
trend towards inverse relationship between cross-modal perceptual causality 
sensitivity and EFT performance (i.e. better perceptual integration response is 
coupled with poorer visual disembedding at the individual level).
In neuro-imaging studies Blakemore et al. (2001) showed visual causality is 
associated specifically with V5/MT/MST activation in extrastriate cortex that was 
not apparent when similar, non-causal dynamic events were presented, and Baron- 
Cohen et al. (2003) found that response to EFT stimuli involved exaggerated 
extrastriate activity in typical women, but not in men or in parents of either gender 
of ASD probands (although this paper reported pilot data only). In Experiment 5c, 
the correlations between cross-modal perceptual causality versus EFT performance 
relationship between women with and without high autistic trait expression were of 
opposite valences, and comparison of the effect sizes found for each of these groups 
by Fisher’s r  to z transformation suggested a trend towards dissociation (p = .07). 
Taken together, one interpretation of the findings from Experiment 5 is that 
perceptual processing in women is biased to ‘complex integration’ (cross-modal
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sensitivity boosted by complex visual integration signalling). Conversely, men (and 
individuals of both sexes with high numbers of autistic-like traits) could be regarded 
as favouring simplistic perceptual processing.
In broad terms, this conjectured general model of gender differences in 
perceptual processing biases inter-relates EMB theory with ‘weak perceptual 
coherence’, an alternative to Weak Central Coherence theory that accommodates 
findings of both superior visual disembedding performance in connection with ASD 
and the BAP (Shah & Frith, 1983; Happd, Briskman & Frith, 2001) and inferior 
performance by women (Witkin, 1950).
5.3.3 Perceptual Causality and Intuitive Physics
On the basis of the interpretation of results provided to this point, the results 
from Experiment 3, in which an individual differences effect between the 
experience of cross-modal perceptual causality was related to intuitive physics 
across a wide-age range of TD boys, could be also be reframed in terms of gender -  
based perceptual biases during development; ‘simplistic’ object-based causality, as 
a function of SC activity, may facilitate representational formation regarding causal 
physical relations.
It has been shown that infants’ representation of number is enhanced by 
multisensory redundancy (Jordan et al., 2008); the idea here is that SC activity 
facilitates the same amelioration of physical causal representations, but that this is 
more a feature of ‘male-type’ than ‘female-type’ brain development. Spelke (2005) 
avers that innate knowledge and privileged perception/cognition domain-specific
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relationships are equivalent in male and female infants. However, connectivity and 
neuronal maturation in infant visual systems is rapid, and differential processing 
biases encoded in male and female genotypes might produce dissociated 
neurodevelopmental trajectories in the first few years of life. Potentially, social 
stimulus versus non-social stimulus gender preferences (Connellan et al., 2000) in 
infancy might reflect such perceptual developmental tendencies.
It has been argued, on the basis that gender differences do not show large 
effects, that male and female brains function to a large extent on a similar basis 
(Hyde, 2005); therefore, any biases in perception/cognition during development 
may be masked by general intellectual development in the majority of children. At 
the extreme tails of gender distributions of psychological variables it may be 
possible to see such effects. The visitor population of the science museum may have 
included a high frequency of children with a ‘gift’ for science, hence results from 
Experiment 3 have not been replicated to date in general school populations, or in 
Experiment 6  participants. If science-giftedness is the consequence of an innate 
neurodevelopmental relationship between object-based causality perception and 
physical reasoning, then students with precocious talents in this direction should 
evidence the same relationship as obtained in Experiment 3.
5.4 The Complexity/Simplicity Model in Development
On the basis of the research I have undertaken I propose that the crucial 
phenotypic difference between the genders during development reflects separate 
perceptual processing biases towards complex feature-rich environmental stimuli in 
women, and simple object-based stimuli in men. If a female drive to complexity at
259
the perceptual level is a feature of early neurodevelopment, then the relative 
salience of social (complex) over object (simple) stimuli in the environment could 
conceivably train attention towards one stimulation source over another from 
infancy. This idea is an adaptation of the Intersensory Redundancy Hypothesis 
proposed by Bahrick and Lickliter (2000), who suggest that multisensory processing 
serves to direct attention and enhance perceptual discrimination during 
development, but here their idea is extrapolated to suggest a mechanism for the 
development of sex differences.
The complexity/simplicity developmental model, although conjecture, 
reconciles conflict between findings from Experiment 3 and Experiment 4a. 
Ultimately, extreme bias towards processing simple features within vision, 
combined with reduced augmentation of cross-modal causality processing through 
complex feature integration, would lead to intact/superior object-based cognition 
and reduced socio-cognitive functioning. Simplistic perceptual processing (whether 
cross-modal or unimodal) in the absence of complex perceptual processing would 
bias neurodevelopment in an extreme male brain direction.
5.5 Limitations of the thesis and future directions
The studies in this thesis, though novel, generate more questions than are 
answered by the findings. There are also some concerns regarding design and 
analysis that constrain their interpretation.
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With the BAP studies (Experiments 4 and 5), the high AQ scoring groups 
are treated as if they represent a homogeneous sample, yet there is considerable 
heterogeneity between individuals in terms of subscale scores. It may be that there 
are particular endophenotypic relationships (Losh & Piven, 2007) that cannot be 
detected within the studies which would be theoretically informative to analyse, but 
small sample sizes make such an approach difficult. Although Wakabayashi et al. 
(2006) consider that an ‘autistic’ personality dimension exists in which every 
individual displays traits relating to ASD to varying degrees, aggregations of such 
traits do not necessarily map onto subscales, or subscale combinations, within the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient.
The potential existence of a population-level autism continuum also 
highlights a difficulty when matching children with and without diagnoses, and it 
may be that the nvIQ control group in Experiment 6  includes some individuals 
(particularly those displaying precociously high nvIQ raw scores) may also express 
aspects of the BAP; this possibility could in future be controlled through using the 
adolescent version of the AQ to screen potential participants (Baron-Cohen, 
Hoeckstra, Knickermeyer &Wheelwright, 2006), although doing so might raise 
some interesting questions about co-relationships between extreme nvIQ and ASD 
in itself.
Experiment 6  is also limited in that it does not allow for inter-group contrast 
between visually-induced and cross-modal perceptual causality. The reason for this 
is that an initial attempt to do so failed because the children with ASD strove for 
‘truth’ and regularity in the CoMG (Baron-Cohen, 2008a); when trials with and 
without auditory cue trials were inter-mingled, most of the six pilot participants
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responded consistently to audio-visual trials by reporting crashes. Feedback 
suggested that they formed an explicit inference whenever they heard a noise to the 
effect that the objects must have collided.
As is the case with many studies in ASD and the broader phenotype, all the 
analyses here would have benefited from increased power through larger group 
sizes. Small cell numbers in particular constrained within-group gender 
comparisons that would have made inferential statistics obtained in the BAP studies 
easier to interpret.
In addition to redesigning tasks to address the issues described above, 
proposal of male/female perceptual developmental phenotype differences generates 
several novel avenues for further research. In adults, differences in extrastriate 
function (using global dot matrix stimuli contrasted with EFT presentation, for 
instance) would be particularly interesting in conjunction with neuro-imaging and 
AQ group categories; this study would extend the pilot study reported by Baron- 
Cohen et al. (2006) outside of proband families into the general population.
Similarly, on a larger scale, the relationships between the Broader Autism 
Phenotype and perceptual processing atypicalities such as motion processing need 
to be better understood, especially as recent research suggests the presence within 
the BAP of endophenotypes described as ‘aloof and ‘rigid’ (Losh & Piven, 2007).
One of the predictions made in this thesis is that superior colliculus 
functioning will be found to be intact with respect to multisensory processing in
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ASD. New static stimuli have already been programmed as a first step towards 
testing this hypothesis; the Which Ball is Beeping? Game is a psychophysical 
staircase in which the offset/onset duration between an audio-visually synchronous 
event and a vision-only event is incrementally decreased until the chance threshold 
is reached. It is expected that performance on this task will be improved in girls, but 
not boys, when the visual complexity of the cross-modal stimulus is increased, with 
the reverse pattern seen when the visual distractor’s complexity is increased.
If the superior colliculus has a role to play in the development of emotional 
processing, then the complexity/simplicity developmental hypothesis could be 
tested using the CoMG task again with typically developing children, but this time 
with the second cognitive measure being a social task, such as ‘Reading the Mind in 
Film’ (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008). A dissociation should be apparent 
between genders in this study, with girls’ crash report scores significantly predicting 
socio-emotional task scores.
Finally, the idea that extreme sensitivity to object-based causality generates 
superior physical causal reasoning that is most apparent at the extreme tails of IQ 
distribution can be tested out through recruitment of children of both genders with 
precocious intellectual abilities. Such a ‘gifted child’ study would incorporate a 
suitable measure of ASD trait expression (such as the AQ-Adolescent version; 
Baron-Cohen, Hoeckstra et al., 2006) so that relationships between IQ, gender and 
autistic superiorities could be explored.
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5.5 Concluding Comments
The seminal and influential cognitive theories of ASD, especially Weak 
Central Coherence (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe & Frith, 2006) and Mindblindness 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) have provided massive insights into autism and its related 
conditions. Though these theories are still highly relevant, the criticisms that no 
single cognitive account suffices to explain all behaviours characteristic of this 
mysterious way of being, or provides a truly developmental explanation for the 
processes described, have moved the debate on to focus on other issues. Of typical 
note are the advances being made in understanding the perceptual autism 
phenotype, inspiring new theories, such as Enhanced Perceptual Functioning 
(Mottron et al., 2006) and Signal Integration Theory (Bertone & Faubert, 2006), 
which have the potential to shed light on the developmental course of ASD.
The idea that perception may drive development through stimulating brain 
maturation has been proposed by researchers of great merit such as Karmiloff- 
Smith, who has posited that privileged perception/cognition relationships produce 
both domain-specific differentiation at the cognitive level and increasingly complex 
neural architectures (1992). More recently, Karmiloff-Smith (2007) has proposed 
that atypical epigenesis, such as that seen in the course of ASD development at the 
individual level, reflects small neural challenges and processing abnormalities 
present from birth that cascade over time to generate widespread effects. Innate 
perceptual atypicalities represent a possible candidate for such snowballing effects.
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Bertone and Faubert (2006) draw on the concept that complexity is the core 
issue in ASD (Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 1997) by considering its application to 
perceptual processing in autism. They propose that neurobiological interaction (i.e., 
co-operation and competition) between areas of the visual system is atypical in 
autism, in that feedback signalling from integrative areas fails to modulate 
inhibitory processes within primary cortex V1. The consequence of this failure is an 
‘autistic perceptual signature’ in which feature processing is enhanced and feature 
integration is compromised. A particularly attractive aspect of their Signal 
Integration Theory is that it can account for positive aspects of ASD such as 
attention-to-detail and enhanced visual disembedding, as well as implying that 
processes relying on complex perceptual integration may be challenged.
This thesis began by considering perceptual integration across modalities to 
be potentially a source of cascading neurodevelopmental differences that would 
push the autistic brain along a highly specific maturation path. However, in the light 
of evidence obtained through these studies that cross-modal integration at the 
perceptual level is possibly intact, it has been concluded that the combination of 
‘simple’ visual processing with low-level multisensory processing may promote the 
development of a brain that is geared to attend and respond to, and think about 
objects rather than people. Conversely, brains that process complex, highly- 
integrated information might orientate their owners towards social attention and 
cognition.
As a dichotomy is apparent in aspects of female versus male perception and 
cognition, I have proposed in the conclusion of this thesis that autism during
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development represents the operation of an extreme male perceptual brain, an idea 
based on Extreme Male Brain Theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Autism as an 
exaggeration of differing developmental trajectories based on gender differences at 
the perceptual level would predict the pattern of spared versus under-developed 
neural connectivity between distal brain regions that is now being uncovered 
through imaging techniques (e.g. Just et al., 2006). Multisensory perceptual 
processing may prove to be important in understanding the developmental course of 
ASD, but not in itself per se but in terms of developmental interactions with the 
single senses of sound and vision.
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Appendix A: Crash or Miss Game Instructions
Voice-over: Hello. We’re going to play the ‘crash or miss’ game. All you have to
do is watch two balls moving on the screen.
Image: Yellow smiley face
Voice-over: When you see the first ball crash into the second ball, press the red
key.
Image 2: Red key
Voice-over: When you see the first ball miss the second ball, press the yellow
key.
Image 3: Yellow key
Voice-over: Let’s have a look!
Image 4: Yellow smiley face
[Demonstration animation: Unambiguous Miss with Simultaneous Sound]
Voice-Over: Let’s look at another one.
Image 5: Yellow smiley face
[Demonstration animation: Ambiguous Event with Simultaneous Sound]
Voice-over: They’re going quite fast -  shall we practice?
Image 6 : Smiley face
(Practice session with each type of trial introduced)
Noise: Applause
Image 7: Big gold star
Voice-over: You’re really good!! Let’s play the Crash or Miss Game!
Image 11: Smiley face
[Pause screen with text: Press Space Bar To Begin The Game]
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Appendix B: What Happens Next? Task instructions
B
“This is called ‘What Happens Next? I’m going to show you a picture of 
something about to happen (point to ‘before’ picture). Now, either A (point to 
‘after’ picture A) or B (point to ‘after picture B) happens next. W hich one is it? 
Does A or B happen next?”
[Record Answer on Sheet; if two or more incorrect answers are given at any 
level of difficulty, stop at the END of that section].
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Appendix C: The Crash or Miss Game Feedback Sheet
Verification questions
Participant Number:
Gender:
Date:
1. When both balls were the same colour (either both white or both green), what did 
you think you saw?
Crashes Misses Both
2. Were you aware of the ‘clicks’?
Yes No
3. Did you notice that they didn’t always happen at the same time?
Yes No
[Comments]
4. Do you think that the clicks affected what you saw?
Yes No
If yes, how?
5. Did you make up any rules about how to respond as you went along?
Yes No
If yes, what?
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Appendix D: The Autism-Spectrum Quotient
The Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AO)
Ages 16+
SPECIMEN, FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY.
For full details, please see:
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, R. Skinner, J. Martin and E. Clubley, (2001). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AO): Evidence from Asperger Svndrome/High 
Functioning Autism. Males and Females. Scientists and Mathematicians. 
Journal o f Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 15 -  17.
Participant code: Gender:
Date of birth:.....................................  Today’s Date.
How to fill out the questionnaire
B elow  are a list o f  statem ents. P lease read each statem ent very carefu lly  a n d  rate how  
strongly you  agree o r  disagree w ith it by circling yo u r answer.
DO NOT MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT.
Examples
E l. I am willing to take risks. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
/slightly\
^disagree/
definitely
disagree
E2.1 like playing board games. definitely 
agree 1
/siighttyv 
agree )
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
E3.1 find learning to play musical instruments easy. definitely slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
/lefinitSty
[disagree)
E4.1 am fascinated by other cultures. / definitely 
agree J
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree disagree
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1 . 1 prefer to do things with others rather than on 
my own.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 . 1 prefer to do things the same way over and over 
again.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy 
to create a picture in my mind.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 .1 frequently get so strongly absorbed in one 
thing that I lose sight of other things.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
5 .1 often notice small sounds when others do not. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
6 . 1 usually notice car number plates or similar 
strings of information.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve 
said is impolite, even though I think it is polite.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
8 . When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 
what the characters might look like.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
9 .1 am fascinated by dates. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of 
several different people’s conversations.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
1 1 . 1 find social situations easy. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
1 2 . 1 tend to notice details that others do not. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
13.1 would rather go to a library than a party. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
14.1 find making up stories easy. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
15.1 find myself drawn more strongly to people than 
to things.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
16.1 tend to have very strong interests which I get 
upset about if I can’t pursue.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
17.1 enjoy social chit-chat. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get 
a word in edgeways.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
19.1 am fascinated by numbers. definitely slightly slightly definitely
290
agree agree disagree disagree
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 
work out the characters’ intentions.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
21.1 don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 2 . 1 find it hard to make new friends. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 3 . 1 notice patterns in things all the time. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 4 . 1 would rather go to the theatre than a museum. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is 
disturbed.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 6 . 1 frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a 
conversation going.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 7 . 1 find it easy to “read between the lines” when 
someone is talking to me.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 8 . 1 usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 
rather than the small details.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
2 9 . 1 am not very good at remembering phone 
numbers.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 0 .1 don’t usually notice small changes in a 
situation, or a person’s appearance.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
31.1 know how to tell if someone listening to me is 
getting bored.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 2 . 1 find it easy to do more than one thing at once. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s 
my turn to speak.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 4 .1 enjoy doing things spontaneously. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 5 .1 am often the last to understand the point of a 
joke.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 6 . 1 find it easy to work out what someone is 
thinking or feeling just by looking at their face.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 
what I was doing very quickly.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
3 8 . 1 am good at social chit-chat. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
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39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on 
about the same thing.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing 
games involving pretending with other children.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
41.1 like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g. types of car, types of bird, types of 
train, types of plant, etc.).
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 2 . 1 find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 
to be someone else.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 3 . 1 like to plan any activities I participate in 
carefully.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 4 . 1 enjoy social occasions. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 5 . 1 find it difficult to work out people’s intentions. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
46. New situations make me anxious. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 7 . 1 enjoy meeting new people. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 8 . 1 am a good diplomat. definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
4 9 . 1 am not very good at remembering people’s date 
of birth.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
5 0 . 1 find it very easy to play games with children 
that involve pretending.
definitely
agree
slightly
agree
slightly
disagree
definitely
disagree
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Appendix E: Intuitive Physics Test (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & Lawson, 2001).
[Downloaded from http://www.autismresearchcentre.com/tests/default.asp: October, 
2005. Sample page only provided]
H U  MrtM tAmm to fla i aai i M w  yon can eaaly andintsa rt fcwr 
thing* im fc and U m U n.
Ew* qnaikm bits a diagram by i t  wiaieh the answer a n  he wotted mi.
Alter enoh ijewtiuo lhae is b dwee nfewsem. Only «*c b cerect When 
yee flwk y«u heve fcmBd the eoriecl im.vwr, plewe hwioBle your ch^oe b> 
putties a t k h  m n—d h. An ntngle la shown bdow.
The sectioa should not lake any mure than 10 mhiar\ Plwae tty lo answer 
all liwqBWUDOS as quick 1>' and a s  w i t rJy  m  yna ran , and then en ier the  
total tim* hikm to euwyfc/i thu sreik/n in the box m the cad.
□ Whichmvm wUl balance die beuu? 
(a) A (e)C. (dj all equal
A D  C
NOTE TOT. TIME WTQUK YOU SIAKX!
gacahuif
11 die whed fuwdus as shown, P will 
(a) move to the right and stop 
I b) mu-v lha lait and stop 
(c> uwvc u > and no 
teiaoae of these
r
When t~.e two screw* are turned the sane 
amount as thowi, .lie had will move Towards 
(a)F (b)G <c}H lc)J <c)K
Which way done wbeot X nova? 
(a)chher (b )/^  (c)ry (dlrtavjrtul
A- pad) To move die bos: easily hi fee dinxaiun
ixni showuthe tope wouldbe be» attached to
- (•: M (b}N lOU (d)P («>0
APPENDIX F: AQ Subscale Statistics (Experiment 4)
Group n AQ subscale Mean (SD) Range
Female 57 Social Skills 1.21 (1.74) 0 -  10
Attention Switching 3.67 (1.84) 0 - 8
Attention to Detail 4.18 (2.32) 0 - 8
Communication 2.33 (1.74) 0 - 9
Imagination 1.74 (1.61) 0 - 7
Total 11.26(2.47) 2 - 2 7
Male 48 Social Skills 1.73 (1.66) 0 - 6
Attention Switching 4.10 (1.86) 0 - 9
Attention to Detail 3.79 (1.79) 0 - 8
Communication 2.17 (2.05) 0 - 9
Imagination 2.52 (1.73) 0 - 6
Total 14.31 (5.79) 3 - 2 7
Total 105 Social Skills 1.45 (1.72) 0 -  10
Attention Switching 3.87 (1.85) 0 - 9
Attention to Detail 4.00 (2.17) 0 - 8
Communication 2.26 (1.88) 0 - 9
Imagination 2.10 (1.70) 0 - 7
Total 13.67 (5.50) 2 - 2 7
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APPENDIX G: AQ Subscale Score/Intuitive Physics Correlations
by Gender (Experiment 4c)
Group n AQ subscale PPMC (r)
Female 57 Social Skills .03
Attention Switching .06
Attention to Detail .02
Communication .07
Imagination .05
Total .08
Male 48 Social Skills .05
Attention Switching -.07
Attention to Detail .01
Communication .01
Imagination .25
Total .07
Total 105 Social Skills .07
Attention Switching .02
Attention to Detail -.01
Communication .03
Imagination .20*
Total .10
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX H: AQ Subscale Score/Intuitive Physics Correlations
by AQ Group (Experiment 4c)
AQ Group n AQ subscale PPMC (r)
Low 12 Social Skills -.21
Attention Switching .22
Attention to Detail .00
Communication -.10
Imagination -.36
Total .10
Medium 80 Social Skills .08
Attention Switching -.08
Attention to Detail .06
Communication -.05
Imagination .23*
Total .11
High 13 Social Skills -.06
Attention Switching .19
Attention to Detail -.63*
Communication .31
Imagination .11
Total -.22
Total 105 Social Skills .07
Attention Switching .02
Attention to Detail -.01
Communication .03
Imagination .20*
Total .10
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX I: AQ Subscale Statistics (Experiment 5)
Group n AQ subscale Mean (SD) Range
Female 104 Social Skills 2.19 2 .0 0 ) 0 - 8
Attention Switching 4.60 2.09) 1 - 1 0
Attention to Detail 5.42 2.05) 1 - 1 0
Communication 2 . 0 0 1.53) 0 - 6
Imagination 2.50 1.54) 0 - 8
Total 16.71 5.07) 7 - 3 1
Male 61 Social Skills 2.31 2.09) 0 - 9
Attention Switching 4.87 1.78) 2 - 9
Attention to Detail 5.80 2.40) 1 - 1 0
Communication 2.98 1.84) 0 - 8
Imagination 2.95 2.06) 0 - 8
Total 18.92 6.15) 1 0 - 4 0
Total 165 Social Skills 2.24 2.03) 0 - 9
Attention Switching 4.70 1.98) 1 - 1 0
Attention to Detail 5.56 2.18) 2 - 1 0
Communication 2.36 1.71) 0 - 8
Imagination 2.67 1.76) 1 - 8
Total 17.53 5.58) 7 - 4 0
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APPENDIX J: SCQ SCORES FOR PARTICIPANTS WITH
ASD (EXPERIMENT 6)
Diagnostic Group Participant SCQ Scores
Asperger Syndrome/ 1 32
PDD-NOS 2 2 0
3 23
4 28
5 13
6 19
7 20
8 34
9 27
1 0 2 2
1 1 23
Mean 23.72
Autism 1 34
2 17
3 24
4 26
5 27
6 33
7 35
8 32
Means 28.5
Total 19 25.74
